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Chapter ONE: Introducing the study on the DBSA 
1 Introduction 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) have traditionally been understood as 
vehicles to achieving economic growth. The primary motive of DFIs is to fill gaps 
within the market economy. These gaps are understood as emerging from market 
failure, where neither government nor the private sector is able to finance 
development projects. It is such an intermediation gap, that DFIs are designed to fill.  
DFI‟s address imperfections in the market by delivering packaged support for 
development projects led by clients perceived by the private sector as having too 
much financial risk (Hoffman 1998; Scott 2008). DFIs such as the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa (DBSA) are intended to bridge obstacles such as this, providing 
development finance to borrowers who would otherwise not have qualified for 
development finance. In most instances, DFIs such as the DBSA finance projects of 
strategic importance for the state, such as infrastructure (Ligeti 1985:306).  
A prime example of a project ideally taken on by the DBSA would be a road 
infrastructure and storm water-management project in Intsika Yethu, a municipality in 
the Eastern Cape. This initiative was introduced by the community‟s mayoral 
committee. Typically, a project of such nature would struggle to obtain funding from 
the private sector. This is due to the community‟s lack of capacity to absorb the 
development finance and translate it into a viable development project able to 
service its debt (DBSA Annual Report 2007/08).  
The competitive market inherently excludes most municipal projects in poor areas. 
This, again, is due to such communities lacking sufficient income to be perceived as 
creditworthy. Therefore, a DFI would fill the gap by financing projects perceived as 
too risk by the private sector.  
Also, in such an instance, even the national government would likely be unable to 
take on the full financial risk. So, in order to distribute this risk, such projects are 
often financed through a joint financial structure where both government and the DFI 
underwrite a certain portion of the project.  
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DFIs are not unique to the South African government since they are a result of post-
World War II global developments, when focused financial and regional development 
was required in order to bolster economic growth (Stilwell, Mukhura, Jackson & 
Kirsten 2004:3).  
The establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions in July 1944 (World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund) reshaped the international development and financial 
system. Development institutions such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), 
later followed in the 1960s (Musasike 2004: 2). It was within this context that the 
establishment of the DBSA was initiated in 1979, at the Carlton Conference held in 
Johannesburg (DBSA Annual Report 1988/89). By September 1983, the DBSA was 
officially established.  
The DBSA was established with the intention of supporting economic development 
through loan finance of development projects in independent and self-governed 
Bantustan territories. The Bantustan territories were former homelands established 
by the Apartheid government to implement segregationist racial policies (Southall 
1982; van der Kooy 1985; van Rensburg n.d). Bantustan territories were – amongst 
other things – structurally formulated to reinforce an unequal economic policy.  
The Bantustan territories essentially provided a reserve of cheap black labour 
(Legassick & Wolpe 1976:87). Despite being morally flawed, since its foundation was 
based on racial prejudice, there were proponents of separate development. 
Bureaucrats and policy makers were sincerely invested in separate development as 
the best means to attain high levels of economic growth for the Southern African 
region.  
It is clear from the Bank‟s establishment; the initial target client was the financially 
risky Bantustan territories and independent states. Moreover, the Bank‟s geographic 
coverage area was not limited to Bantustans, but also to the entire Southern African 
region. At the time, the region was dominated by the Republic of South Africa‟s 
(RSA) economy. Largely, in comparison to the RSA government, the Bantustan 
territories and independent states lacked the capacity and skills to formulate their 
own economic policies.    
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These challenges still affect the DFI arena today, where the DBSA is intended to 
perform its gap-filling role. Its purpose remains funding municipalities which do not 
have the ability to formulate accurate project capital proposals in order to attract 
development finance. In order to meet such deficiencies and perform gap-filling, the 
public sector should constitute the bulk loan portfolio of the DBSA.  
The inability of municipalities to secure financing from the private sector is due to 
their historical underdevelopment. Low tax revenue reduces the likelihood of 
securing finance from the private sector (Sibisi 2009). As such, the DBSA would 
ideally step-in to fill the gap by extending capital to municipalities regarded as high-
risk, low profit return clients.  
When it was formed in 1983, the core purpose of the DBSA was to bolster separate 
development under the Apartheid regime. The aftermath of segregated development, 
resulted in a post-Apartheid DBSA embedded in a society with skewed levels of 
development. As well, pressing demands for infrastructure development has been a 
recurring theme of post-Apartheid government policies and strategies.  
For instance, the National Infrastructure Plan (Presidential Infrastructure 
Coordinating Commission 2012) and National Development Plan (National Planning 
Commission 11 November 2011) are both policy instruments introduced to address 
infrastructure development backlogs in South Africa. It is within the framework of 
these government infrastructure policies that the contemporary DBSA is intended to 
align its infrastructure development mandate.   
1.1 Performing a development function? 
The Bank financed several projects in Bantustan territories such as the 1989 housing 
subsidy policy in Ciskei, now part of the Eastern Cape Province; the expansion of the 
1988 electricity network in QwaQwa, now in the Free State; and the 1988 
rehabilitation of roads in Bophuthatswana‟s western region. This area is now part of 
the Free-State and Gauteng Province. These projects, however, are listed in the 
DBSA Annual Report of 1988/89.  
Such projects were initially categorised under six main development functions of the 
Bank. These included human resource development, bulk infrastructure 
development, state and regional development, rural and agricultural development, 
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urban development as well as business and entrepreneurial development (DBSA 
Annual report 1987/1988). The multiple roles of the Bank were particularly congruent 
to the needs of the Bantustans. This was largely because the Bank offered flexible 
and comprehensive financial aid along with associated support. Neither of which was 
extended by the RSA government or the private sector. 
In 1994, following South Africa‟s democratisation, the Bank‟s diversified development 
finance mandate was streamlined. This saw the DBSA transferring some of its 
responsibilities to other South African DFIs, resulting in the Bank adopting a sectorial 
development finance focus.  
The DBSA now focused on infrastructure. The Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) on Industry; the Landbank on Agriculture; Khula Enterprise Finance (Ltd) and 
the Small Enterprise Finance Agency (Sefa)1 focused on small and medium scale 
lending and the National Housing Finance Corporation focused on housing 
(Musasike 2004:7).  
By fostering separate entities for key development functions, the South African 
government introduced a more specialised and targeted development funding model. 
This meant the support of entrepreneurial projects such as the Ciskei Small 
Business Development Programme III (1988) – initially financed by the DBSA – post 
1994, would be mandated to be financed by another South African DFI such as Sefa.  
To cement the Bank‟s specialised role, the introduction of the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa Act (No. 13 of 1997), further set the precedent for a more focused 
mandate for the DBSA. The Act stipulated the Bank was to finance Infrastructure 
projects in order to promote economic growth in the Southern African region.  
Gumede, Govender & Motshidi (2011:2) argue that for DFI‟s to be successful, they 
must be able to perform two functions well. The first is to “finance development 
projects effectively” and secondly, play a key role as advisors/facilitators/arrangers in 
providing “game-changing intervention” within the broader economic development 
strategies of their countries. Therefore, successful DFIs assume both roles of 
development finance while fashioning a state‟s broader national development 
strategy.  
                                                          
1
 Only established in 2012. 
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The DBSA plays a multiple role as financier, partner, advisor, implementer and 
integrator. This study‟s function is to understand the role of the DBSA as a DFI in its 
entirety. However, I am especially interested in finding whether or not it fulfills its 
gap-filling role.  Gap-filling is the core purpose of DFIs coupled with their ability to 
“act as (a) catalyst for accelerated industrialisation, economic growth and human 
resources development” (Gumede, Govender & Motshidi 2011:1). This is largely 
realised through financing development-centred projects. Although the DBSA Act 
(No.13 of 1997) is open for broad interpretation of the intended role of the DBSA, the 
Act does outline infrastructure projects to be financed. These include water, energy, 
transport and telecommunications. By financing these projects, the DBSA is likely to 
be considered to be in line with its infrastructure development gap-filling role.  
In order for the DBSA to perform its gap-filling role, this study proposes that a two-
pronged approach be applied. Development finance should fall within the framework 
of infrastructure development while financing of infrastructure projects should also be 
in line with the broader “needs” of the client. Therefore, financing must be provided 
to “deserving” clients who have a weak capacity to obtain finance in the market 
(Delphos 2004; Thorne 2011). The DBSA best fulfills its gap-filling role when 
achieving both elements of financing for the most deserving client engaged in an 
infrastructure project.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the meaning of gap-filler is contested. Some 
policymakers/scholars see the gap filling role of DFIs as addressing market failures. 
However, others argue gap filling is DFI‟s addressing state development failures 
such as institutional failure, capacity failure and information failure (Gumede 2008:1).  
A 2005 United Nations report comments how DFI‟s are generally expected to 
address broader development policy objectives. These include development of poor 
people and/or regions, employment creation and income redistribution. This 
dissertation explores competing understandings of not only what is meant by gap 
filling but also how the DBSA transforms its development finance mandate into 
development operations. Therefore, this dissertation also explores competing 
understandings of the role DFIs are intended to play.  
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1.2 Problem and purpose statement 
It has become apparent the DBSA has not been providing development finance 
according to the tenets of the traditional understanding of development finance. The 
problem is two-fold. The DBSA target client is not necessarily the most deserving 
and projects financed by the DBSA do not automatically fall within the infrastructure 
development mandate.  
There has been instances post 1994, when the DBSA has financed projects which fit 
the above classification of gap filling (see previous section). For example the North 
West Sanitation Programme 2009 and the Lesedi Municipality electricity upgrade in 
2007 are projects which fall within the infrastructure development mandate. They 
were initiated by provinces/municipalities which would otherwise not have received 
funding from the private sector (Lavelle 1999). These projects fell within the 
infrastructure development‟s specialised scope of activity.  
However, many do not adhere to the definition outlined above. The two following 
examples are indicative of the DBSA failing to meet its gap-filling role: 
1. In 2007, the DBSA financed the Cape Coral International Hotel. This 
development financed project was initiated by Coral International, a leading 
developer of boutique “dry hotels” based in the Middle East. By financing the 
development of a new dry hotel, the DBSA was not in line with both the 
criteria of most deserving client. As well, this project did not fall within the 
DBSA‟s infrastructure development criteria.  
At the time, the DBSA substantiated its support of this project as a unique 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) deal that would 
contribute towards tourism and employment (DBSA Annual Report 2007-08).  
 
Moreover, by financing an already financially sound entity, the Bank failed to 
perform a gap-filling role since Coral International was likely to receive 
financing from the private sector. In order to perform its role as a gap-filler, the 
Bank must only finance projects unlikely to receive private sector financing –   
projects in impoverished underdeveloped municipalities (Musasike 2004).  
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2. In 2010, the DBSA extended a R15 billion loan to Eskom with funds to be 
disbursed over a five-year period. Thus, as of this study, it is the largest loan 
the Bank has ever extended to an obligator (Engineering News, 2010). The 
problem with such a loan is that Eskom had already secured a R60 billion 
subordinate loan from government.  
 
This obviously suggests Eskom was in a position to broaden its funding 
options. Although, the DBSA was acting in line with its mandate of prioritizing 
energy, the Bank did not fulfill its gap-filling role in the market. What is of even 
more concern is that at the time of loan agreement, the DBSA was not in a 
propitious financial position to do so (DBSA internal Dataset 2008-2013.)  
 
This study intends to identify if there was dislocation between the kinds of projects 
financed by the DBSA and its gap-filling role, during the two distinct eras of 1984-
1993 and 1994-2013.  
Unlike most studies which are interested in the phenomenon of market failure, or the 
evaluation of the performance of DFIs, this paper adopts an approach of questioning 
other somewhat overlooked occurrences. Therefore, it is less focused upon 
revealing the development impact of a project which is a financial recipient, but 
rather does the DBSA actually fill a gap in the market when financing a project? This 
study finds its purpose in the understanding of such a gap. This analysis also 
questions why the DBSA decides to finance some projects over others as well as the 
underlying factors behind such decision-making.  
The evolving South African market economy has destined the traditional DBSA pre-
1994 development finance monopoly held in Bantustans to be nonexistent in 
municipalities, post 1994. The DBSA has been met with the emergence of a stronger 
private sector and challenging municipal environment. Morever, changes in funding-
models contribute to the blurring of the gap-filling role performed by the DBSA. For 
instance, in financing development projects, the strength of the private sector has led 
to a more competitive market system. Thus, in the South African institutional arena, 
further challenges are exerted upon the traditionally understood role of DFIs. 
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The further blurring of the DBSA‟s financier role reveals that, at times, the Bank acts 
as a strategic gap-filler to alleviate key state infrastructure development bottlenecks 
which the market is often unable to resolve. In other instances it is difficult to 
establish what kind of projects the DBSA finances while attempting to perform its 
gap-filling role. 
This study draws insights from New Institutional Economics (NIE) as an umbrella 
theory best suited to explore the DBSA‟s gap-filling role. This is informed by 
limitations evident in classical and neo-classical theories which over emphasise 
market failure and underestimate the actors filling the gaps of market failure. NIE, on 
the other hand, advocates institutional context as important in a study.  
 
Some research by Neo-classical economists has been conducted on the important 
role DFI‟s can potentially play in addressing financial market failures (Wallis 
1999:11). However, little is known about the extent to which they actually implement 
their gap-filling roles in development, particularly when performing their core function 
of development finance to borrowers excluded by the market.  
Moreover, most studies in International Political Economy (IPE) are centred upon the 
evolving history of DFIs and their role in establishing the developmental state (Scott 
2008; Gumede 2008; Aron 2000). However, in the contemporary era, these studies 
fail to address the altered role DFI‟s play and the extent to which they are digressing 
from their development-centred mandates. As well, little has been expressed about 
the kind of gap the DBSA has been filling when providing development finance to 
South African projects.  
The purpose of this study is thus to explore the gap-filling role of the DBSA. This 
study explores the extent of the disjuncture between the gap-filling role and what the 
DBSA has been mandated to perform. Also taken into consideration what the 
development projects the DBSA has financed are, as well as investigating why this 
deviation has been the case. 
There are a number of studies on DFIs which focus on organisational structures, 
cultures and norms. This study however will focus on the gap-filling role of DFIs. The 
contribution this study makes to the literature is that it maps the experiences of a 
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South African DFI in the context of the traditionally understood role of what DFIs are 
expected to do as opposed to what they actually do in practice.  
Instead of an overemphasis upon market disequilibrium as is the case in orthodox 
economics, this study draws on an alternative theoretical view of studying DFIs. That 
is, their role of filling gaps in the market, where neither the state nor private sector 
traditionally is willing to invest, as well as the institutional context shaping this role.  
This study highlights the extent development agencies such as the DBSA are 
institutions which can potentially contribute towards economic growth, if it acts in 
accordance to its development mandate. 
1.3 Research questions 
In light of its Development Finance Role:  
1. How has the DBSA interpreted and acted in relation to its mandate prior and 
post 1994 as set out in policy documents, strategies and DBSA Act?   
2. What was the nature (client, value and sector) of projects financed by the 
DBSA prior to 1994 and post 1994? And, was it in line with the traditional 
understanding of gap-filling by DFIs?  
3. What factors contributed to the DBSA‟s deviation from its gap-filling role? 
1.4 Limitations 
It would have been ideal to study the perceived role of the DBSA by the clients it has 
done business with. By so doing, this analysis would have married the study of the 
financier (DBSA) with a study of a myriad of clients (Public Sector – particularly 
municipalities, Provincial governments and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Both of 
which would not only have been impacted by a common institutional environment but 
also the perceptions of what constitutes a DFIs gap-filling role.  
 
A study of both the DBSA and municipalities as equal units of analysis would have 
revealed the kinds of relationships (enabling/antagonistic) between the DBSA and its 
clients. Moreover, by exploring the experiences of the clients, the study would have 
been better positioned to highlight the shortcomings of the gap-filling role of the 
DBSA. Missed opportunities of development finance-led economic growth in South 
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Africa would also have come to light. However, time constraints rendered the 
possibility of such an exercise too difficult.   
 
Since the study took place in 2012 at a time when the Bank was under a rigorous 
organisational restructuring epoch, inherent limitations of accessibility for personnel 
interviews were experienced by this researcher. Similarly, the knowledge repository 
of some staff members who have been retrenched or voluntarily resigned limited 
access to some documentation. The Bank, being a state institution, financing the 
Public sector means it is quite likely that access to some documents may be 
classified as highly confidential. Nevertheless, the study was able to access annual 
reports and conduct rich interviews which provided sufficient data to carry out this 
study. 
1.5 Outline of thesis and chapter contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the study – Provides the background for the study by 
introducing the nature of development finance as well as the rationale behind the 
establishment of the DBSA. The chapter introduces various challenges faced by the 
DBSA when performing its gap-filling role. This chapter formulates the problem 
statement, purpose statement and research questions.   
Chapter 2: A review of literature on Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) – This 
chapter explains what is meant by the market-failure gap and the gap-filling notion of 
DFIs. Theoretical approaches of classical and neo-classical economics are also 
discussed and NIE is identified as the best suited theory to inform this study. The 
evolution of DFIs is discussed so as to provide context. A working definition for this 
study is developed and the chapter concludes by locating the study in relation to 
other studies on DFIs. 
Chapter 3: Research methodology - The qualitative research approach is used, while 
the case-study research design is argued as best suited for the nature of the study. 
In this chapter the use of interviews and document analysis are introduced and 
clarification is made on how the chosen research instruments are applied in this 
study. Limitations of the study and ethical considerations were also presented setting 
precedent for the chapter which followed.  
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Chapter 4: The emergence of the DBSA: strategic gap-filler? – An account of the 
establishment and aim of the DBSA is discussed, as well as the changing 
circumstances in which the DBSA has worked. Elements of confusion regarding the 
mandate of the DBSA are also explored using a classification of: regional/location of 
activity, sector focus; nature of assistance, and the kind of borrower.  
The periods covered are from the Banks inception in 1984 through 1993 to the post 
democratisation period of 1994 - 2013. The institutional context – other development 
corporations; private sector competition; challenging municipal environment – is 
mapped out in order to provide context for the study.  
Chapter 5: Analysing development finance in action – This chapter unpacks 
development finance as performed by the DBSA in specific detail. To do this, the 
chapter explains the project finance cycle, phases of the project cycle and the actual 
steps taken by the DBSA when extending finance to a borrower. The kinds of 
projects financed by the Bank are then explored and argued to be misaligned to the 
gap-filling mandate of the DBSA. The use of the Siyenza Manje case highlights the 
findings of this study. The chapter concludes by noting the valuable lessons to be 
learned from the Siyenza Manje Case. 
Chapter 6: Funding-model influencing the DBSA‟s gap-filling – This chapter maps the 
financial position the DBSA finds itself post 1994. It also examines the implications a 
self-sustainability model has upon the Bank‟s ability to perform its gap-filling role. 
The chapter illustrates how, despite attempts to establish the Development Fund -
responsible to advance projects with high development impact - the Bank still failed 
to perform its gap-filling role. In response to changes in its funding model, the Bank 
underwent restructuring, as an attempt to realign with its gap-filling mandate. 
However, this was met with only limited success.  
Chapter 7: Concluding remarks – The study concludes by summarising the research 
problem, research aims and objectives plus findings. The relevance of the research 
is also noted alongside recommendations for future research.    
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1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the study by situating the DBSA in the traditional 
understanding of the role of DFIs – principally understood as a gap-filling role. Gap-
filling has largely been understood as a means to address imperfections found in the 
market economy. Although formed post World War II, DFIs as a means to propel 
development, have remained an important advocacy tool for governments. In the 
case of the DBSA, development finance should be awarded to infrastructure projects 
presented by “deserving clients”. This has been a key indicator of “gap-filling”. 
The problem however, is the DBSA has not always acted in line with the traditional 
understanding of gap-filling. This is particularly evident in the kinds of projects it 
financed in the post 1994 era. This observation prompted this researcher‟s keen 
interest in this study.  
Providing funds to clients who would have otherwise received financing from the 
private sector was identified as a problem. This is not only because it meant poorer 
municipalities would have to forgo these funds, but it also questions the extent to 
which there is actual gap-filling. In particular, the Bank‟s development finance should 
be in line with national development policy and strategy documents. The literature 
review chapter which follows provides the theoretical and conceptual framework for 
the study. 
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Chapter TWO: Literature Review  
2 Introduction 
The following chapter positions the study of the DBSA within the broad literature of 
classical economics and New Institutional Economics (NIE) as well as the study of 
DFIs. Gap-filling, the topic of this study can be examined by drawing upon the 
theories and literature from a plethora of schools of thought. These include classical 
economics, institutional economics, heterodox economics and social science 
disciplines of sociology, political science et.al.  
It is, however, important to illustrate that although traditionally studied under the 
umbrella of classical economics, this study draws on the theoretical contributions of 
NIE in particular. NIE provides useful insight for understanding how the Bank has 
behaved in relation to a changing institutional environment.  
This chapter begins by explaining what is meant by development finance and the 
nature of “gap-filling”. The chapter then provides a historical account of the 
development of DFIs. This is followed by a discussion of competing definitions in the 
international literature of development banks as well as their categorisation based on 
ownership or core function. A working definition of DFIs is then developed to 
underpin this study. By developing working definitions, the study is better equipped 
to address the research questions.  
2.1 Understanding the nature of the market failure gap 
Classical economics and institutional theorists argue that market failure is the core 
rationale behind the establishment of DFIs. States are supposed to overcome market 
imperfections in the same manner firms overcome market imperfections impinging 
on profits (Lavelle 1999:201). DFIs exist to bridge the gap between low-income 
borrowers and conventional finance. In the case of the DBSA, low-income borrowers 
would be various segments in the market. These include long term projects such as 
infrastructure; projects whose social benefits far exceed commercial benefits; new or 
risky ventures and clients; projects in low-income or distant regions, as well as 
projects that are small or lack collateral (Thorne 2011:6; Development Finance 
Forum 2004).  
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Development banks thus originated from a need to finance development projects not 
able to secure financing from existing money-lending institutions such as commercial 
banks. Often these financial institutions were far too specialized, lacked the qualified 
personnel to understand the nature of development finance (Ligeti 1985:297) and 
were not equipped financially to handle the risks associated with financing 
development projects.  
As such, the limitations and incapacity commercial banks have to finance 
development projects gave rise to a gap in the market leading to the formation of 
development banks. Development banks would then ideally finance development 
projects which otherwise would not have been financed by traditional commercial 
banks. Figure 1 is an illustration of the kind of gap DFIs are intended to fill.  
Figure: 1 Mandate of Gap-filling in Development Bank Finance  
 
Source: Thorne (2011) adapted from a diagram by B.M Jackson (1998) 
Government resources and market funding are provided to projects where limited 
cost recovery is possible. This is represented by a “Fiscal Transfers and Grants” in 
the diagram. The private sector provides funding to projects able to generate profits 
and this is represented by “Private Sector Capital” in Figure 1. 
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The private sector finances low risk projects with high profit returns, represented by 
the dotted curve in diagram. Conversely, government will finance high risk clients 
with low cost recovery. This is shown as a solid curve in the diagram. The gap 
between the Government and Private Sector is the niche area filled by development 
banks.  
For example, since development banks were originally created to finance long term 
financing to industrial development projects. Such projects included infrastructure 
ventures having long gestation periods (Mathur 2003:799); this is where 
development banks step in to fill the gap. They provide finance for high-risk projects 
having limited profit generating potential (Thorne 2011:6). 
The aim is to bridge the gap between projects funded by the government and those 
by the private sector. Development banks attempt to lower the risks of investment in 
these projects while still contributing to government development objectives.  
Scholars such as Lavelle (1999), Hanke (1997), and Garten (1998) have argued that 
contemporary global financial crises have prompted the reevaluation of some DFIs, 
particularly the global DFIs. This is because there has been a growing trend for DFIs 
to move more and more away from pursuing their mandate of development finance 
operating within the “niche” area. Scholars such as Mathur (2003:799) have gone so 
far as to caution that the DFI model is failing. As an example, in India, the 
proliferation of state-funded DFIs has led to duplication of functions, tenuous 
governance structures and the unsustainability of DFIs. 
Alternatives to rectifying the shortcomings of DFIs range from making DFIs more 
transparent, to disbanding DFIs to make room for the private sector to take over. 
DFIs have also been demolished and completely new institutions have been created. 
Despite criticism of them, there are still over 500 development banks internationally, 
which clearly illustrates the reluctance of governments to give-up on development 
banks as a policy instrument (Thorne 2011:4). However, there is still a need for 
institutions to fill the gaps the private sector and government are not willing to 
undertake.  
Exploring the Gap-Filling Development Finance Role of the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) 
 
18 
 
2.2 Exploring theoretical approaches of gap-filling  
Theories of government and market failure often “focus heavily on the desirability or 
otherwise of government in market or exchange processes rather than on the public 
sector per se” (Wallis 1999:61). Generally, researchers fail to focus on the public 
sector. Means in the market, the roles of government departments and agencies are 
seriously underestimated.  
It also suggests a neglect of understanding HOW the various public entities have 
intervened in the market. For example, the roles played by State Owned Enterprises 
(SOE) and DFIs in the market tend to be overlooked. However, there are exceptions 
such as the economic theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1972) and its “derivative 
notions of bureaucratic failure”. This theory attempts to explain the role of the public 
sector within the market. 
Government and market failure, as argued by NIE, gives rise to the gaps 
organisations such as DFIs enter and rectify (Stalebrink &Sacco 2006:358). Since 
this study is not focused on economic theories of government or market failure per 
se – such theories most often explore the benefit or detriment of state intervention – 
so, such nuances are supplementary to the problem statement.  
Rather, this study focuses upon NIE‟s acknowledgment of the role institutions such 
as the DBSA play in achieving stated outcomes in the market. Such efficiency can 
be achieved by filling gaps brought about by market failure as well as government 
fiascos (Stalebrink & Sacco 2006:358). This study is concerned with the DBSA as an 
institution operating in the market. It is the Bank‟s function to provide or not provide 
development finance as per the tenets of its mandate. Therefore, the NIE provides 
useful insight into undertaking this research.   
The working definition of DFIs developed in this study (presented in section 2.5) 
settles well within the theoretical approach offered by NIE. Although classical and 
neo-classical economics are able to explain how the market gap comes about and 
the necessity to fill it; they fall short of providing concrete answers. Such theories fail 
to explain institutions such as DFIs which fill the gap. These hypotheses also neglect 
to identify the factors shaping how DFIs operate in the market. 
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Classical and neo-classical theorists thus place emphasis on the gap that needs to 
be filled. Conversely, NIE places emphasis on the actors filling the gap and the 
manner which institutions influence the actors‟ ability to fill the gap. This is important 
because not only do shifts in the market occur, but institutions themselves also take 
on different roles in response to change in its surroundings.  
Interestingly, an institution‟s response to change in its surroundings can again alter 
those surroundings. This is the element of institutions and institutional context 
neglected by classical and neo-classical economics. Institutions and institutional 
context matter as NIE very well illustrates.  
2.2.1 Understanding New Institutional Economics 
The Ronald Coase Institute (2013) defines NIE as a conglomeration of theories on 
institutions pertaining to laws, customs, rules and norms. NIE uses a neo-classical 
economics theory base as core notions found in microeconomics such as scarcity 
and competition (Klein 1999:456).  
NIE is repeatedly used as an umbrella term for theories of market failure and 
institutional analysis (Stalebrink & Sacco 2006:358). NIE does not dispute the neo-
classical economic theory. Instead, it argues neo-classical theory lacks explanations 
of “asymmetric information, imperfect market structure, externalities and sub-optimal 
allocation of government sponsored goods related to the institutional environment of 
organizations” (Stalebrink &Sacco 2006:358).  
In essence, NIE goes beyond examining the economy as an end in itself. As an 
alternative, NIE examines the role of institutions in preventing or furthering economic 
growth by uniting both theoretical and empirical research (Ronald Coase Institute 
2013). Klein (1999:456) echoes a similar understanding of NIE by succinctly 
describing the goal of NIE as one that seeks “to explain what institutions are, how 
they arise, what purposes they serve, how they change and how – if at all – they 
should be reformed.” NIE can thus be distinguished by not only studying institutions, 
but rather studying institutions embedded in an economic market system.  
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2.2.2 Key assumptions of New Institutional Economics  
Instead of presenting a unified theoretical framework, NIE is composed of mutually 
overlapping and interconnected approaches (Picot, Bortenlanger & Rohrl 2006: 108). 
Unlike most theories that came about through a systematic collaboration of like-
minded scholars, modern institutionalism (NIE‟s initial name) was developed through 
theoretical developments. It contains sub-fields such as public choice theory; law 
and economics; the principal–agent approach; transaction-cost economics; property 
rights and comparative economic systems.  
Similarly, NIE also borrows from several social science disciplines including political 
science, law, sociology, organization theory and anthropology. However, the primary 
language it is based upon is economics (Klein 1999:456). Such an eclectic identity 
brings with it a diverse methodological understanding of how to address 
organisational and institutional issues in a study (Furubotn & Richter 2008:15). 
Methodologically, NIE regards the term institution as having a dual meaning – 
procedures/rules of the game as well as organisations such as government 
agencies. Both understandings of institutions are interdependent since social entities 
shape the normative rules in the institutional framework. In turn, those normative 
rules influence the behavior and decisions made by organisations and individuals in 
society (Zhu & Thatcher 2010:56). This study takes on the dual meaning of 
“institutions” by referring to both the DBSA and the context in which it operates.  
 
Theoretically, NIE agrees with classical economics – as opposed to Neo-classical 
economics – on the following: “a preference for an „evolutionary‟ rather than 
mechanistic approach to the economy; and an emphasis on empirical observation 
over deductive reasoning” (Klein 1999:457). It is greater emphasis on the latter, 
which best suits this study.  
 
One cannot make any unilateral deductions about the DBSA‟s view on economic 
theory without conducting empirical research. This is largely because the DBSA is 
embedded in a particular institutional environment. The economy is part of the 
institutional environment shaping the South African arena. Further, the market 
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economy actively evolves, thus warranting the shifts in the kind of gap filled by the 
DBSA. This will be shown in chapter four.  
 
Amongst other factors to be revealed by this empirical study, there are shifts in the 
institutional environment which contribute to the ability or inability of the Bank to 
perform its gap-filling role. This study draws its insights from the strengths of 
empirical research of institutions promoted by NIE. 
 
The following section discusses the evolution of DFIs. This is of importance because 
it provides evidence for statements made in chapter one and this chapter. That 
assertion, of course, is: the establishment of DFIs was in direct response to market 
failure and the need to fill gaps in the economy. 
2.3 The evolution of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) 
The earliest reported development bank was the privately owned Crédit Mobilier, 
established in 1848 in France (Thorne 2011:6). This bank managed to raise capital 
from middle class French investors and financed infrastructure projects to the Middle 
East, North Africa and Europe (Newmarch 1858:444). Crédit Mobilier was a model 
for many development banks such as the Industrial Bank of Japan (1900). This was 
because it was able to increase per capita income in Europe (Thorne 2011:6). The 
core assumptions at the time were DFIs could fill market failure gaps and contribute 
towards an increase in economic growth. 
The era of Industrialisation and post-World War I reconstruction of Europe occurred 
through the facilitation of development banks. Two catastrophic events created the 
need for development finance at scale in Europe; the reconstruction after World War 
I and the 1929 Great Depression.  
Both incidents gave rise to the need for long term finance (Thorne 2011:6). The 
market economy under the aforementioned events was unable to meet the demands 
of reconstruction. Institutions such as the Delcredere were founded by the Belgian 
government in 1921 i.e. after World War I (Delphos 2004:42). Delcredere was initially 
created to revive Belgian exports as well as providing political risk insurance.  
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Agence Française de Développement (AfD), established in 1941, is acclaimed as the 
“first true global” DFI (Delphos 2004:xii). AfD works on behalf of the French 
Government to realise France‟s Overseas Development Assistance policies through 
financing development (UNECE n.d.).  
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was the first multilateral 
organisation focused upon economic expansion through development finance. 
Established in 1944 it was the original institution for the World Bank group (de Kock 
1944) and began operations in 1946.  
State sponsored development banks became a trend shortly after World War II. In 
response to the effects of the Second World War, many countries found themselves 
in a position where reconstruction efforts were to be bolstered with the 
implementation of new plans and strategies. It was then that a plethora of state 
development finance institutions were formed.  
The United States (US) for instance, developed an organisation within the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). Named the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC), it was established in 1975. The main purpose of the 
OPIC was to support investment in developing economies (Delphos 2004: xi). 
Similar development agencies and banks mushroomed throughout the latter half of 
the twentieth century with a majority of them being informed by post-war 
development theories and concepts of post-colonisation.  
Examples of post-World War II institutions include the German government-owned 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and the Japan Development Bank, the 
forerunner of the Development Bank of Japan (De Aghion 1999:85). It was through 
the establishment of DFIs post-World War II and post-colonisation that states 
believed DFIs could aid post-war reconstruction agendas. 
The common thread running throughout the establishment of all DFIs is the need for 
DFI-lead market intervention. DFIs emerged as a remedy for events such as World 
War I and II, both of which necessitated the need for economic growth and 
immediate intervention. The DBSA was created in response to socio-political events 
in the RSA Apartheid regime. This then questions whether indeed DFIs are a 
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temporary remedy in response to economic anxiety or whether they are an 
irrefutable feature of permanent solutions to ensure the market serves all. 
The emergence of various forms of DFIs ranges from a remedial response to socio-
political instability or governmental policy. The different DFIs listed below illustrate 
the extent DFIs vary in ownership, geographic focus as well as motives for providing 
development finance:  
 “Global Multilateral DFIs” these institutions, such as the World Bank Group, 
have a worldwide focus. A good example of this is the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) (Delphos 2004:2-13). 
 “Global Bilateral DFIs” were established to ensure sponsor countries “benefit 
from a more prosperous global economy” Delphos (2004:17). Global Bilateral 
DFIs have been in existence for several decades and finance projects 
expected to yield universal social and economic development. Examples are 
AfD and the Netherlands Finance Company (FMO). The latter was 
established by the Dutch government in 1970 (www.fmo.nl/ww.) 
 “Bilateral DFIs Supporting Sponsor Country Investors DFIs” provide 
assistance where such financial assistance is in direct correlation with the 
sponsor countries‟ national interests (Delphos 2004:2-13). Often a sponsor 
country would have ownership interest in projects where the company‟s 
nationality is the same as the sponsor country. An example of this is Export 
Development Canada (EDC) which, in turn, provides trade finance services to 
Canadian exporters and investors in over 200 markets (Delphos 2004:45). 
 Regional DFIs consist of a conglomeration of member states supporting 
development projects in member countries. One of the most widely published 
regional development banks is the Inter-African Development Bank (IDB), 
established in 1959. The IDB‟s mission and banking structure has served as a 
model for most Regional DFIs. Agencies adhering to this paradigm include the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Caribbean Development Bank 
(CDB) (Barria & Roper 2004:620).  
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Within the AfDB, members of banking and financial institutions engaged in 
development finance activities in Africa establishing the Association of African 
Development Finance Institutions (AADFI) in 1975 (Baloyi 2011:44). Such 
associations are a common occurrence in regional DFIs. 
 Quasi DFIs are those initially starting as traditional national DFI‟s but over 
time have merged or were acquired by other investment or commercial banks. 
This means they are functionally government-owned yet overall they are 
privately owned (Delphos 2004:213). A good example is the National 
Development Bank of Sri Lanka (NDB), which is listed on the Colombo Stock 
Exchange (www.ndbank.com).  
It is argued by Mathur (2003:799) that in order to fill market failure gaps, the best 
suited type of development bank would be one established by state sponsorship, 
fully state owned and performing both financing and planning functions. Emerging in 
the 1950s another type of DFI is owned entirely by private shareholders. This was a 
World Bank initiative, albeit heavily supported by government. However, it was 
regarded as less likely to fill gaps as it was driven by a profit-making motive (Ligeti 
1985; 302).  
It is within the rationale of the former this study argues the DBSA was initially formed 
as a fully state owned and sponsored DFI. However as this dissertation will assert in 
Chapter four, the non-profit motive of the DBSA later became a mere ideal. The 
evolution of development banks raises an open-ended question: how exactly are 
development banks defined? 
2.4 Defining a development bank: principal functions versus 
ownership  
Definitions of development banks in international DFI literature either categorise 
development banks based on their ownership structure or their core motive for 
operation. A good example of this would be the principal functions performed by 
such a development bank (Ligeti 1985:298). The following sections discuss key 
differences between definitions of DFIs based on their ownership and those based 
on principal functions. 
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2.4.1 Ownership defining development banks? 
A salient feature spanning all DFIs, is that the ownership structure of a DFI not only 
has implications on how development banks are defined, but also largely upon who 
funds the DFI. In most instances, the ownership structure has a direct correlation 
with the operations of the Bank.  
For instance, privately owned banks are more profit-driven and thus acquire capital 
from financing less risky development projects (Ligeti 1985: 300). In contrast, state 
owned development banks are more engaged in national objectives such as 
infrastructure development. Therefore, they often undertake high-risk low-return 
projects privately owned banks are less inclined to finance. In ideal situations, state 
owned development banks are relatively cushioned from adverse losses since these 
Banks are guaranteed by the state.  
There has been a shift to rather question the form in which a DFI is constituted. The 
form a DFI takes reveals not only the kind of functions the Bank performs but also 
whether or not in performing its function, the DFI fills a gap. The next section 
expands on the notion of defining a DFI based upon its function.  
2.4.2 Defining development bank on principal function 
dominates 
This study is more aligned with the contributions of Ligeti (1985:297) who states the 
greater question is not whether development banks are state owned or privately 
owned. Rather, the analysis should be focused on “whether development banks are 
profit oriented institutions or whether their promoting function, dominates.” In other 
words, development banks are defined by their gap filling role, which is more 
concentrated on their development finance role as opposed to its ownership 
structure.  
This study adopts the definition of development banks based on their principal 
function. This goes with the assumption that the dominating function performed by 
DFIs – development finance – is fundament because such DFIs essentially exist to 
fill gaps in development finance (Simon 1997:186).  
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Delphos (2004:xii) defines development banks as “multilateral or bilateral institutions 
providing the risk capital (debt and equity) guarantees, technical assistance, and/or 
insurance and that enables flows of foreign direct investment into less developed or 
emerging markets”. From this definition, emphasis should be placed upon the key 
feature distinguishing development banks from other commercial banks. 
Development banks extend finance to “less developed or emerging markets”.  
Definitions by Nyhart & Janssens (1965:v) and Diamond (1957:2) defined DFIs as 
institutions granting medium and long term loans that have a primary role to promote 
and finance the private sector. However, this study does not employ such an 
understanding of development finance institutions. DFIs are better aligned to their 
gap-filling roles when providing finance to less privileged borrowers who are unable 
to secure finance from the market which may also include public borrowers.   
Further, with regards to assets and other activities funded, this study is aligned to 
Ligeti‟s (1985:299) definition. Ligeti describes development banks as not only 
financing medium to short term assets, but also provide in addition to finance, 
“essentials of productive investment” such as technical skills and managerial 
experience.  
The latter characteristic is an add-on to development finance as this offering is likely 
to be available in instances where the DFI has both the capacity and the institutional 
environment to support such efforts. This key feature of development banks is 
absent in commercial banks. Therefore, this difference is what this study adopts for 
understanding the idea of a development bank – particularly the DBSA. What 
distinguishes the DBSA from any other commercial bank is its mandate. It does not 
only extend development finance. It also provides technical assistance on occasions 
when the Bank has the institutional capacity to do so.   
2.5 Developing a working definition for DFIs  
Despite competing arguments about whether DFIs should be defined on the basis of 
ownership and core functions, Delphos (2004: xiii) offers interesting list of common 
DFI features relevant to this study. Firstly, he argues, DFIs are centred on issues of 
a “common good”. By this, it is assumed the core existence of DFIs is focused upon 
improvement of the environment, reduction of poverty levels and unemployment, all 
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of which are normative issues. This study agrees with this characteristic since the 
function of development, as argued earlier, is one of the key defining factors 
distinguishing a development bank from a commercial bank. 
Delphos (2004: xiii) further suggests DFIs have an appetite for supporting Greenfield 
and venture projects as they are acclimatised to the inherent risks. It is true the 
support of Greenfield projects is not a defining characteristic of DFIs. However, DFIs 
are often called in to reconstruct industries, sectors and aid SOE which would have 
otherwise not been recipients of finance from the private sector. It is the feature of 
financing Greenfield projects that this project does not fully advocate as a defining 
feature of all DFIs. Rather, this study does acknowledge it as a feature in some 
instances.   
However, there are two characteristics this study does agree as common features of 
DFIs: they are reliant on government funding and are likely to be used as tools to 
achieve political objectives.  
Secondly, although most DFIs are initially capitalised by government, they are 
expected, over time to become self-sustainable and maintain investment-grade risk 
ratings from international credit evaluation agencies such as Moody‟s and Standard 
and Poor‟s.  
DFIs are placed in a delicate situation where they are expected to advance the 
policies of the main shareholders – typically the government – yet still remain non-
partisan, development orientated and financially self-sustainable. In order to maintain 
self-sustainability, DFIs often secure their own finance from other sources beyond 
the state, such as borrowing from the financial market.  
This two-fold characteristic succinctly outlines the situation of the DBSA. The 
common features offered by Delphos (2004: xiii) are all interconnected features in 
the case of the DBSA and offer nuances for developing working definitions for this 
study.  
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2.5.1 Working definition for a development bank as understood 
in this study 
1. The conceptual framework developed for this study assumes that in order for a 
Bank to act in terms of its own mandate, it should perform in a manner prescribed by 
its policy documents and strategy.  
2. In order for a Bank to be a developmental Bank, it should be focused on 
development projects. Such projects should not be primarily driven by a profit 
motive.  
3. Regarding the ownership of the development Bank, government should also be a 
feature in the ownership structure.  
4. In order for a Bank to play a gap-filling role, from a financial perspective, it should 
be financing projects which neither the government nor the private sector are 
prepared to take on. Gap-filling is also understood from the kind or nature of the gap 
to be filled i.e. the nature of the gap should be one which is development orientated. 
5. In order for a Bank to have developmental impact, it must contribute towards 
economic growth objectives as set out in government policies .i.e. the Bank must 
support and focus upon economic development objectives identified by the 
government.  
By developing the above definitions, this study is able to offer a solid approach 
towards studying development banks. Development banks are largely studied based 
on their contribution in addressing market-failure and/or government failure. 
2.6 Locating this study in relation to other studies on DFIs 
This study did not find any other studies which particularly focused on the DBSA‟s 
role as a development bank or gap-filler. Studies found were largely focused on the 
potential contribution of DFIs towards creating a developmental state as discussed 
by Gumede, Govender, & Motshidi (2011). These scholars argue the role of DFIs 
has gone beyond simply providing development finance as they must also respond 
to market failure. As well, DFIs are getting more broadly involved with addressing 
state development failure.  
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State development failures are categorised into the following:  
 Institutional failure – failure to deliver mandated services;  
 Capacity failure – skill shortages in institutions managing development;  
 Origination failure – absence of innovative development ideas and; 
 Information failure – challenges in development information asymmetry (Scott 
2008 in Gumede, Govender, & Motshidi 2011).  
Gumede, Govender, & Motshidi (2011), argue it is under such conditions of state 
failure that DFIs actually operate and extend their roles in the contemporary era. 
And, in performing these roles, they contribute to the developmental state.  
In their publication, Gumede, Govender, & Motshidi (2011) discuss the many roles 
performed by DFIs in successful developmental states. The roles are to:  
 “Provide counter-cyclical lending; 
 Provide an enabling environment for enterprise and industry; 
 Identify and develop strategic and longer-term profitable sectors, and steer 
long-term industrialisation; 
 Expand infrastructure development; 
 Promote and support their countries‟ national interests in the international 
arena; 
 Play a part in institutional capacity building; 
 Provide leadership in development coalitions and; 
 Serve as model corporate citizens.”  
The above roles are discussed by use of case-studies and inferences are drawn of 
how successfully DFIs have bolstered economic growth when performing such. 
Little, however, was expressed about how the DBSA actually performs these roles. 
Large gaps are evident in the literature and this study aims to fill in at least some of 
those blanks.  
Other literature on DFIs concentrate on the institutional environment DFIs must 
operate. For instance, Sibisi‟s (2009) study on Local Economic Development (LED) 
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notes the importance of LED as well as the limitations experienced because of a 
series of gaps – information gap, strategic gap, institutional gap and financial gap. 
Contributions by Sibisi (2009) and Gumede, Govender, & Motshidi (2011) focus on 
development debates and the means which development can be achieved. Sibis‟s 
(2009) study proposes new ways of thinking of development in a manner 
underpinned by collective action based upon a hybrid glue of networks.  
Lubeck (1992) instead argues that one must also look at the capacity of the African 
state to manage development as well as the kind of institutions such a state 
reproduces. In most cases, societies which are reproduced are those that resist 
market forces or state-centred development. From the above studies, it becomes 
evident development debates offer this study an opportunity to understand the 
complexity of the myriad of views on development in South Africa.  
This researcher‟s study on the DBSA, advocates a DFI-led development approach to 
bolster economic growth. Unlike other development debates focusing on society-led 
development approaches, this study agrees with Thorne (2011) that development 
bank-led expansion initiatives can be successful tools to bolster economic growth.  
Contributions by Gumede, Govender, & Motshidi (2011) and Sibisi (2009) offer 
insights into the institutional environment the DBSA is situated. The institutional 
environment is one mired by various “gaps” and “failures” such as the inability of 
municipalities to translate development finance received into viable and effective 
development projects.  
Monyae‟s (2011) discussion paper titled “The role of South African DFIs in regional 
infrastructure development in Africa” is an effort to study the extent of DBSA‟s role as 
a DFI is indeed in line with its infrastructure development mandate. However, the 
paper fails to critically analyse the performance of South African DFIs, the DBSA and 
the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC).  
The discussion paper instead notes the roles of the DBSA and IDC and places more 
emphasis upon recommendations for the DBSA and IDC to strengthen their impact 
in regional infrastructure development. Monyae (2011) makes strong contributions to 
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contextualise infrastructure development from a regional perspective and illustrates 
the extent of DFI-led development regionally.  
Generally, projects/cases used in studies are underpinned by regional growth 
policies such as New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD). Like most 
scholars delving into DFIs, Monyae‟s study focused heavily on assessing whether or 
not the objectives of achieving a developmental state have been served by DFIs.  
International literature on DFIs interprets the role of DFIs as largely based upon 
whether they address market failure or not. Market failure intervention in this context 
is interpreted by the extent DFIs address import substitution as well as how they 
develop poor people/regions, develop or revive industrial sectors, create 
employment and develop the private sector (UN 2005). 
While there are extensive studies on DFIs in relation to their constitution, funding 
structure and sectorial focus; there are few studies about the DBSA specifically and 
particularly in relation to its gap-filling role. Such a gap in the literature is what this 
study aims to fill. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The origins of development banks were largely informed out of the need for 
development finance in an international, post-world war context. Theoretical 
approaches informing the understanding of DFIs have principally been those of neo-
classical and classical economic impressions of market failure. Government failure 
was also noted as an argument mainly presented by development theorists. 
However, this study found NIE was the best suited theory to guide this study on the 
DBSA and its gap-filling role. The benefits of NIE – providing context and dealing 
with institutions – was a key strength this study leveraged on.  
Varying definitions of DFIs and the various kinds of DFIs existing provided context 
for this study. This chapter also highlighted the popularity of defining DFIs based on 
their ownership status, which undermines the core mandate of DFIs – being an 
agency to finance development. Instead, the chapter argues that DFIs were best 
defined by the principal function they perform.  
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The working definition developed, stated that for a Bank to act in terms of its own 
mandate, it should operate in a manner prescribed by its policy documents and 
strategy. In order to play its gap-filling role, the Bank should be focused upon 
development projects which neither the government nor the private sector are 
prepared to take on.  
The ownership structure of a development Bank was noted as one having features of 
government ownership. By developing the working definition, this study is better 
positioned to address the research questions. This chapter concluded by positioning 
this study alongside other studies. It has noted the gap evident in the DFI literature 
and how no other studies had been conducted on the gap-filling role of the DBSA. As 
such, this chapter has revealed the importance of development banks as a whole 
and the importance of gap-filling, particularly as understood within the NIE 
framework.  
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Chapter THREE: Research methodology 
3 Introduction 
The following chapter outlines why the case study research design is the best means 
to answer the research questions. Methodologically, an emphasis on the study of 
institutions by use of the case study approach is customary for NIE scholars and this 
study mirrors such an inclination (Posner 2010:3). 
The methodological research approach identified in this study is qualitative using 
case-study research design. The following chapter justifies the suitability of the case-
study research design to collate data and answer the research problem. Research 
instruments, sampling frame and analysis strategy are discussed in further detail, 
along with limitations and ethical considerations of the study.  
3.1 Qualitative research approach 
The choice of the qualitative research approach for this study is appraised by the 
distinct features and strengths this approach offers in relation to the research topic.  
Numerous scholars (Neuman 2011; Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Badenhorst 2007; 
Fielding and Fielding in Alasuutari, Bickman and Brannen 2008), have offered 
extensive differentiation between qualitative and quantitative research approaches. 
However, it is the differentiation of the qualitative approach offered by Neumann 
(2011), this study adopts.  
This study hinges upon a key strength of qualitative research – reliance on 
interpretivism, the use of a non-linear research path and readily deals with contextual 
matters and cases (Neumann 2011:151). When approaching research, simplistically 
qualitative research seeks meaning, while quantitative research asks for significant 
quantity (Badenhorst 2007:3).  
From Neuman‟s (2011:14) view, the difference between qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches are the methods of the latter and are described as data 
condensers, while methods of the former are understood as data enhancers. 
Neuman (2011:14) further argues that “when data is enhanced, it is possible to see 
key aspects of cases more clearly”.  
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In light of Neuman‟s (2011:14) distinction, it is appropriate to maintain that in the 
pursuit of enhancing data, this study adopts a descriptive and analytical function of 
research, with the intended purpose of formulating and generating precise questions 
for future research.  
In line with this study‟s purpose statement – to describe the gap-filling role of the 
DBSA, when performing its financier functions in South Africa – this endeavour is 
better able to answer research questions and generate new questions for future 
research pertaining to the changing role of DFIs. Such questions would delve into 
the relevance of the traditional understanding of DFIs in the contemporary market 
economy as well as the future of DFIs. Upon the completion of this study, I am 
confident cogent answers will emerge.  
Since, quantitative researchers emphasise the measurement of variables and 
hypothesis embedded in causal explanations, the reliance on a positivist approach to 
social science. This coupled with a linear research path (Neuman, 2011:151) means 
there is often difficulty in quantifying social phenomena occurring in cyclical patterns.  
As such, due to the descriptive nature of this study, it seems inappropriate to use a 
quantitative research approach. Although it may be possible to quantify milestone 
DBSA financed projects, these figures would fail to explain the DBSA‟s gap-filling 
role particularly in a changing institutional context. Thus, this study‟s research 
questions are best answered nestled in the case study research design of a 
qualitative research approach.  
3.2 Case study research design  
The case study research design is most suitable for this study because case studies 
are particularly useful when descriptions are complex and “involve a myriad of not 
highly isolated variables” (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster, 2000:24; Tellis 1997:1). 
Variables such as a changing institutional arena, South African government 
development policies, organisational factors, the DBSA‟s funding structure as well as 
a competitive market economy are all interrelated variables central to investigating 
the DBSA‟s divergence from its development mandate. It is within a myriad of such 
interrelated variables that a case study is used; when a “holistic, in-depth 
investigation is needed” (Merriam 2002:8).  
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Merriam (2002:8) defines a case study as an in-depth description and analysis of a 
bounded system. She states that the defining characteristic of case study research 
lies in determining the object of study – the case.  Creswell (2009:28) agrees “in a 
case study, a particular individual, program or event is studied in depth for a defined 
period of time”.  
Merriam (2009:39) says “if the phenomenon you are interested in studying is not 
intrinsically bounded, it is not a case.” She explains one technique of assessing the 
boundedness of a topic is to ask how limited the data collection would be. If there is 
no end to these, then the phenomenon is not bounded enough to qualify as a case 
(Miles and Huberman (1994:25).  
The phenomenon under investigation in this research qualifies as a bounded system 
as it seeks to investigate the DBSA in particular the understanding of its role as a 
gap-filler in South Africa‟s competitive market economy. Interviewees and 
documents consulted are limited to variables concerning the DBSA‟s gap-filling role. 
Those interviewed are current and former DBSA staff as. These   are the people 
involved in activities relating to project finance in South African development-centred 
projects. They are the most knowledgeable on the topic and will greatly contribute to 
data collection for this study. 
The thesis statement of the DBSA‟s gap-filling role was explored through analysis of 
interrelated variables such as the perceived role of the DBSA, project finance 
particulars. This includes the type of client receiving development finance, the nature 
of the project, financial value of the project plus the era when finance was granted. 
Other factors taken into consideration are the competitive market economy, the 
DBSA funding structure, organisational dynamics as well as institutional dynamics 
possibly contributing to the DBSA‟s development finance.  
By analysing these variables, the case study research design will reveal interplay 
among these inconsistencies and provide an understanding for possible conclusions 
regarding the DBSA‟s financier role in providing development finance. By noting the 
above variables, presenting detailed information about the case (DBSA) and drawing 
conclusions about the DBSA, the case study research design best serves the goals 
of this research.   
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3.2.1 Application of the case study design as it relates to the 
DBSA case 
Case study strength is mentioned by Tellis (1997:1) who says “case studies are 
designed to bring out the details from the viewpoint of the participants by using 
multiple sources of data.” The use of multiple sources of data accommodates 
triangulation which is important for proving validity. The need for triangulation is 
particularly relevant in the case of the DBSA since there is a probability viewpoints 
from interviewed participants may differ.  
By using documentation – publications and policy documents – as well as interviews, 
a richer, more detailed and accurate account of the gap-filling phenomenon is 
presented. This study seeks to maximize a detailed accurate account resembling the 
strengths of a triangulated research strategy (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg 1991).  
In order to attain triangulation, this research begins by reviewing annual reports and 
DBSA publications dealing with projects financed by the DBSA. The objective is to 
explore how the DBSA‟s development finance role has changed. This document 
review will be followed by interviews with DBSA personnel who have been with the 
organisation for a substantial number of years. Findings will then be cross-checked 
to attain triangulation. 
A frequent criticism of the case study research design is whether it is possible to 
generalise from presented conclusions. This criticism is largely driven by the 
subjective nature of case studies and the dependence upon the context of the study 
(Badenhorst 2007). To counter this censure, Erickson (1986) argues that since the 
general lies in the particular, what we learn from a particular case can be transferred 
to similar situations.  
This study supports Erickson‟s view that the case of the DBSA is likely to resemble 
the experience of other DFIs both locally and internationally, faced with a similar set 
of institutional circumstances. Generalisations from a case can be reached in 
instances where the narrative description of the case is presented well. Strengths of 
a narrative description present in the case study research design will override its 
weaknesses. Thus, using the case of the DBSA, this researcher is able to draw 
generalisations about DFI‟s in South Africa.  
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This study aligns to Yin‟s (1984) well-constructed differentiation between statistical 
generalisation and analytical generalisation. He asserts “in analytical generalisation, 
previously developed theory is used as a template against which to compare the 
empirical results of the case study” as opposed to statistical generalisations which 
leaves little room for analysis. Yin‟s (1984) work thus states generalisation can be 
made from theoretical relationships and by doing so, external validity is achieved.  
A study conducted by Levy (1988) used a single case design for a study of the 
University of Arizona involving the nature of information technology acquisition in a 
university setting. Levy‟s research truly resonates with Yin‟s. Both studies replicated 
and added to the body of language, which initiated more studies by Danziger (1985) 
and Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991) delving into information technology acquisition 
at universities.  
Like the aforementioned scholars, this researcher‟s use of the case study design in 
analysing the DBSA is anchored in the desire to make use of the most appropriate 
research model. The case study approach will not only give rise to a focused  
description of the DBSA‟s gap filling role, but will also contribute to the body of 
research on DFIs.  
3.3 Methodology 
The case of the DBSA includes a number of variables all of which must be measured 
in order to support the thesis statement. Does the DBSA‟s gap-filling role resemble 
the traditional understanding of gap-filing performed by DFIs? The use of case-study 
research design is operationalised in the ensuing sections.  
3.3.1 Research instruments 
Having explored various research techniques such as focus groups, interviews, 
document analysis, field-notes and observation, this researcher has found a 
combination of interviews and document analysis to be the best suited techniques to 
conduct this study of the DBSA. Both instruments are utilised in order to attain levels 
of validity and reliability. This is achieved by cross-checking data generated from 
interviews against data reported in documents and visa-versa.   
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3.3.2 Interviews 
Patton (2002:341) notes interviews are used to better understand people‟s 
perspectives, feelings, perceptions and thoughts; all of which cannot be directly 
observed. Classified according to the amount of structure, interviews may be highly 
structured; semi-structured or unstructured Merriam (2009:90).  
This study conducted eight unstructured interviews. Of the eight; seven were with 
DBSA employees and one former employee. All eight interviews were no shorter 
than 60 minutes and no longer than 90 minutes. 
Unlike a highly structured interview, which is rigid and adheres to predetermined 
questions, this study makes use of unstructured interviews. This allows the 
researcher to more readily access participants‟ perspectives of the DBSA‟s gap-
filling role. Interviews conducted had a broad framework categorising demographic 
information, participants‟ perceptions of the DBSA‟s infrastructure mandate and the 
kind of projects the Bank should finance.  
The nature of the questions themselves allowed fluidity in conversation and the 
interviewer had opportunity to probe for answers. The interview framework used to 
conduct interviews is attached as Appendix A. Questions asked served largely as a 
guide and were not exhaustive. Also, questions asked in the interview were thematic 
on perceptions of the DBSA‟s role. As well, interviewees were queried about the 
kinds of projects assumed to be more closely aligned to the gap-filling mandate of 
the DBSA.  
The majority of interviews took place at some interviewee‟s offices at the DBSA in 
Midrand, South Africa, while others took place in residences. The location of 
interviews was largely determined by the interviewees based on where they felt the 
most at ease to conduct the interviews. 
The distinct advantage of face-to-face interviews enabled the researcher to establish 
rapport with participants. This enhanced the use of the interview research 
instrument. Moreover, interviews have the distinct advantage of allowing the 
researcher, when appropriate, to clarify ambiguous answers (Leedy and Ormrod, 
2001). Additionally, the interviewer is more readily able to gain follow-up information. 
Follow-ups are the pivot-point for attaining reliable results in a study such as this.  
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Follow-up information was particularly important for this study because it granted the 
researcher opportunity of referral as well as to consult DBSA publications supporting 
the claims/perceptions of the interviewees. Thus, conducting unstructured interviews 
are better suited to answer specific questions pertaining to the interviewees‟ unique 
perceptions, experiences and interpretations of the gap-filling role the DBSA is 
intended to perform.   
3.3.3 Research population and sampling 
A sample population speaks to whom the researcher will collect data from. Social 
enquiry requires that a researcher design and select samples for study (Ritchie and 
Lewis 2003:77).   
Two techniques of sampling exist: random and non-random sampling (Merriam 
2009:77). In a simple random sampling, elements of the population are chosen 
arbitrarily and have a known probability of selection (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:78). 
Simple random sampling is particularly useful in instances where large-scale surveys 
are conducted. However this sampling technique cannot guarantee the sample 
observed is representative of the overall population (Babbie 2011:182).  
Although, simple random sampling enables the researcher to formulate 
generalisations about the sample population (Merriam 2009:77), generalisation in a 
statistical sense is not the priority of this research. Therefore, random sampling is 
inappropriate to use in this study of the DBSA.  
Non-random sampling, on the other hand, is best suited to explore the changing 
development finance role of the DBSA and is the method used in this study. Non-
random sampling is the most appropriate because the logic and power of purposeful 
sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases, for study Patton (2002:440). 
Information rich cases contribute to a great deal being learned – not only about the 
case itself but the purpose of the enquiry. Samples are chosen purposefully based 
upon prior knowledge and judgment of the researcher. 
Through the use of a purposive non-probability sampling technique (Babbie 
2011:179), this study focuses on a subset of a larger population in the organisation. 
A sample was selected on the basis of population knowledge, unstructured face-to-
face interviews were informed and targeted at three DBSA employees (working for 
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DBSA for 20 years or more), four DBSA  employees (working for DBSA for no longer 
than six years) and one former DBSA, Commercial Bank and IDC employee. The 
decision was made to sample the above mainly because they were the most 
representative of the era being studied.  
The snowball sampling technique was used as it is most appropriate for this kind of 
research. It reveals various dynamics as well as detecting other important aspects of 
the population studied.  
Recommendations from people about who to interview, which is the application of 
snowball sampling, was essential in this research. It provided the advantage of 
unravelling shared perceptions of issues such as what the DBSA‟s mandate was, the 
DBSA funding model and what projects were regarded as the most in line with the 
DBSA‟s development mandate and gap-filling role.  
3.3.4 Document analysis 
Existing records – reports, studies, evaluations and reviews submitted quarterly and 
annually – were read to identify activities of the DBSA. This was done to better 
understand how the agency perceived its mandate, changes over time, etc. The 
process started with a review of important literature and an analysis of annual and 
internal operational reports such as strategic plans and internal datasets. 
Merriam (2009:152) lists the key strengths of using documents in research. They are 
usually produced for reasons other than research purposes and are therefore not 
subject to the same weaknesses as observation and interviews. The presence of 
documentation does not intrude upon or alter the setting in the way the presence of 
an investigator will. Nor are documents subject to the whims of human beings whose 
cooperation is essential for collecting good data.  
However, in the case of the DBSA, this strength has the possibility to be a 
weakness. This is because their Annual reports are directed towards a specific 
audience. This study must therefore be aware of instances where the success of 
some projects may be over stated in the annual report. DBSA publications have an 
intended purpose and audience. Consequently the researcher must not fall into the 
trap of accepting all publications as authentic, absolute truths.  
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3.3.5 Data description  
The quantity of the data collected was sufficient since the annual reports consulted 
spanned the years between 1988 and 2013. Moreover, strategic plans and extensive 
literature from DBSA publications provided a significant knowledge repository which 
was both detailed and indicative of a strong institutional memory.  
The interviews conducted were not restricted to individuals with the most work 
experience and formal employment status in the DBSA. People considered experts 
in the field of development finance were also questioned. This was important as the 
DBSA‟s gap-filling role is not easily understood by most people. 
The rich oral history gleaned through unstructured interviews and document history 
in DBSA publications, and warranted the quality and ability of the data collected to 
answer the research questions. Instead of verifying and checking at the end of data 
collection, the material underwent a vigorous process of testing, probing, verifying 
and confirming during the collection process.    
3.3.6 Data analysis strategy 
To make sense of the data for the purpose of answering the study‟s questions, the 
Category Construction data analysis strategy proposed by Merriam (2009:175) was 
used. 
Category Construction is the most preferred data analysis strategy for this paper. 
This is because it assists to highlight themes offering more answers to the research 
questions as well as tentative conclusions concerning the DBSA‟s gap-filling role. 
Merriam (2009:175) proposes that making sense of data involves reducing, 
consolidating and interpreting data to find meaning. In a qualitative study, a key 
feature of data analysis is the hidden information within the data often emerges as 
the research develops. Likewise, the collection and analysis of data was done 
simultaneously in a cyclical process as per Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Data collection and analysis strategy  
 
In addition to the cyclical process as illustrated above, data analysis was carried out 
before and parallel to data collection. This was done since preliminary analysis was 
very important to determining areas needing to be examined in greater detail. 
Moreover, the interpretation of Data was accomplished through coding which 
entailed the grouping of interview transcripts and DBSA publications into segments 
of data, creating category themes (Grbich 2007; Silverman 2006; Strauss 1987).  
 
The interpretation of category themes enabled the study to answer the core research 
questions. The selection of quotes from both the interview transcripts and 
publications was also used to support/justify the presented findings.  
 
From a practical perspective, interview transcripts were analysed by categorisation 
on the perceived role/mandate of the DBSA, nature of DBSA‟s clients, kind and 
value of financed projects, plus organisational dynamics. Overall perceptions of the 
extent these categories were influenced by the prevailing era of the South African 
economic climate were flagged. The data was further sub-grouped based upon 
common perceptions of when the DBSA best fulfilled its gap-filling role. 
 
For the analysis of documents, this researcher compared annual reports based on 
the “Chairman‟s Report” which provided insights into the context of the South African 
socio-political environment of the financial year being reported. The remaining 
content of the annual reports, internal datasets and DBSA publications provided 
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detail about the kinds of projects funded and the amount of finance extended by the 
DBSA.  
This researcher examined such documents for projects receiving the highest loan 
amounts.  Next the recipients of funding were considered. Was the borrower for such 
a project likely to be excluded from the market? Did such a loan, fall within the 
infrastructure development mandate of the DBSA?  
In instances where the DBSA financed projects both non-deserving and non-
infrastructure orientated, these projects were flagged and placed into a non-gap-
filling category. Where the DBSA financed infrastructure related projects, but to a 
“non-deserving client”, the activity fell within the partial gap-filling category. On 
occasions where the project financed was both infrastructure development orientated 
and spearheaded by a deserving client, the activity was categorised as “gap-filling”.  
Figure 3: Categories constructed for DBSA gap-filling role in project finance 
 
However, by creating these categories, the study was also mindful of the overarching 
context in which development finance of these projects occurred. It is within such a 
climate, that the study reveals the limitations of the traditional understanding of the 
gap-filling role of DFIs in general and the DBSA in particular. 
3.4 Limitations 
This is an explorative study concerning development finance roles of the DBSA. 
Alternatively, this study could have been carried out via a statistical investigation of 
the DBSA financial statements. With this mode of investigation, particular focus 
would have been placed upon the general trends of the balance of payments.  
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This study endeavours to provide a microcosm of the financial well-being of the 
DBSA. A detailed statistical review of financial reporting by the DBSA and RSA 
government/National Treasury could have added more value to the study. Granted 
sufficient attempts were made to consult DBSA financial statements. However, a 
statistical analysis without description would have been insufficient to address the 
research problem. As such, a statistical representation of DBSA financials would 
have been complimentary to the study. Still, it does not override the core need for 
description in this study.  
This study is taking place at a time when the Bank is undergoing rigorous 
organisational restructuring. This brings inherent limitations of accessibility to 
personnel for interviews. Similarly, the knowledge repository of retrenched or 
voluntarily resigned staff further limits access to information and documentation.  
Moreover, the Bank being a state institution financing the Public sector, there is 
likelihood access to classified or highly confidential documents will be limited. This 
impediment can be mitigated by the researcher by employing a referral system to 
gain trust and then develop a network of personnel who work at the DBSA.  
3.5 Ethical considerations 
To ensure the credibility of qualitative research, rigorous methods of inquiry and 
credibility of the researcher are essential components to be considered (Patton 
2002:552). Of equal importance is the ethics of the researcher which also has 
implications on the validity and reliability of a study. Ethical considerations will be 
applied in this study by ensuring the informed consent of the interviewees regarding 
the purpose of the study, who financed the study and how the data will be used 
(Ritchie and Lewis 2003:66).  
 
From the onset, anonymity and confidentiality were assured and other than the 
researcher, the identities of interviewees were not known to anyone. Although 
specialist personnel were interviewed, it is unlikely their identities were revealed due 
to the manner in which these interviews are presented in the study.   
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In order to ensure anonymity the interviewees are presented in the study as follows: 
Table 1: Presentation of data for anonymity  
 Duration of service in 
institution 
Reference in the study   
Category A 
DBSA employee 
From 1984 to 2013  
From 1988 to date  
From 1986 to 2013  
 
Interviewee A1 (June 2013) 
Interviewee A2 (June 2013) 
Interviewee A3 (December 2012) 
 
Category B 
DBSA Employee 
From 2010 to date  
From 2007 to date  
From 2010 to date  
From 2010 to date  
Interviewee B1 (December 2013) 
Interviewee B2 (December 2013) 
Interviewee B3 (December 2013) 
Interviewee B4 (December 2012) 
 
Category C 
Previous 
employee of IDC 
and DBSA 
Previous Employee of 
IDC,DBSA and  Standard 
Bank (duration at DBSA 
from 2004-2006) 
Interviewee C1 (January 2014) 
 
 
From a document analysis perspective, annual reports are documents readily 
available for the perusal by the public. Therefore, the need for confidentiality is not 
necessary when making reference to them. However, some DBSA internal reports 
such as strategic plans and project specific spread-sheets published for day-to-day 
functions of the Bank were classified. Confidential documents, were simply 
referenced as: (DBSA Internal Dataset 2008-2013), (No. 1 Internal DBSA 2008), 
(No. 2 Internal DBSA 2012), (No. 3 Internal DBSA 2009), and (No. 4 Internal DBSA 
2010).  
3.6 Conclusion 
This researcher has delineated the case study research design as the best suited 
methodology to carry out the study on the DBSA. It has been established that the 
research is qualitative and orientated to exploring the changing development finance 
role of the DBSA. This was achieved by conducting interviews and reviewing 
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literature. The chosen data collection instruments enabled the study to draw closer to 
answering the core research questions.  
Cyclical and simultaneous data collection as well as the analysis strategy adopted in 
this study allows for greater triangulation. Additionally, further opportunities to create 
an audit trail have been created. This groundwork is particularly important for 
answering matters of validity and reliability.  
The chapter which follows submits the case of the DBSA. The case is presented in 
order to apply the methodology outlined in this chapter and to ensure the data is 
depicted in such a manner that it is a microcosm of the DBSA.  
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Chapter FOUR: The emergence of the DBSA:  
strategic gap-filler? 
4 Introduction   
The previous chapter outlined the qualitative research approach and case study 
design as the most suitable for this study. This chapter begins by mapping the 
establishment of the DBSA and the context behind its founding.  
The DBSA is a development finance institution initially created to provide finance to 
underdeveloped regions in Southern Africa. This chapter outlines the DBSA‟s role in 
“gap-filling” as translated in DBSA founding documents as well as how the DBSA 
has understood its role. Furthermore, this study explores how such an understanding 
has impacted the projects ultimately financed by the Bank.  
This chapter is important for mapping the emergence and history of the DBSA as a 
gap-filler from inception to its contemporary state. 
4.1 Establishing the DBSA  
The concept of establishing a development bank for Southern Africa was formulated 
in 1979 at the Carlton Conference. This meeting held in Johannesburg, was 
attended by business leaders and members of the South African government and its 
territories (DBSA Annual Report1988/1989).  
At the 1979 Carlton conference, key issues facing the Southern African institutional 
arena were discussed. First to be outlined was the need for an integrated regional 
development programme. Additionally, an effective development centred institution 
representative of all governments would be formulated. This body would need to be 
geared towards developing less developed regions and possess the ability to 
increase the scope for private sector involvement in areas such as Bantustans (van 
der Kooy 1985:64).  
On June 30th, 1983 an agreement signed in Cape Town by members of the central 
South African government established the DBSA. The less developed areas of 
Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei were tagged to be kick-off projects.  
Exploring the Gap-Filling Development Finance Role of the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) 
 
48 
 
DBSA operations subsequently began September 1983 in temporary offices located 
in Sandton, Johannesburg. In a 1985 DBSA position paper, la Grange (1985:3) 
states:  
“(the Bank was) …specifically set up and geared to mobilise private sector resources 
which it would apply together with the available public sector resources towards the 
promotion of economic development in the developing areas of the Southern African 
economic region”.  
The developing areas spoken of in la Grange‟s quotation refer to the Bantustan 
territories as well as the states of Transkei, Venda, Bophutatswana and Ciskei (van 
Rensburg n.d:3). Transference of political authority from the central South African 
government to the independent and self-governing territories gave rise to the need 
for a more targeted approach for the development of these neglected regions (van 
der Kooy 1985:63). Political authority was not fully decentralised. Although appearing 
to be independent, much of the decision-making of the peripheral TVBC (Transkei, 
Venda, Bophutatswana and Ciskei) states was regulated by the central apartheid 
state.  
In an attempt to appease the black threat against the survival of the Apartheid 
government, Bantustans were created (Legassick & Wolpe 1976:87). By placing a 
few educated elites in strategic positions of influence, Bantustans presented a 
perceived notion of independence (Chipkin & Meny-Gibert 2011). In this way, the 
Black population could be somewhat “managed”.  
However, the resultant effect of Bantustans was an upsurge of increasingly 
underdeveloped territories relying more and more on the core South African 
government. This study further discovered the rationale behind the establishment of 
the DBSA was to alleviate the heavy reliance of Bantustans on the RSA 
government‟s fiscal budget.  
As alerted to by Interviewee A3 (December 2012) there was a great deal of pressure 
“to manage their fiscal arrangements to the satisfaction of the government in those 
days.” The pressure for the RSA government to finance underdeveloped regions was 
largely because the RSA government was perceived as “modern” and industrialised. 
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Conversely, the Bantustan territories were underdeveloped and engaged in 
subsistence activities such as small-scale farming.  
Given the framework of separate development, policy makers in the SA state felt 
there was a need for separate development programmes and instruments in order to 
stimulate underdeveloped regions (van der Kooy 1985:10). These development 
policies came in the form of regional development policies, of which the DBSA 
played a key role when providing technical assistance (van der Kooy 1985:28).  
Further details of the kinds of projects financed by the DBSA in light of technical 
assistance, in line with Apartheid separate development policies are noted in the 
following sections.  
4.1.1 Context when establishing the DBSA 
The Bank was established in the context of a domestic socio-political arena where 
separate development was instiutionalised by the central government. Bantustans – 
also referred to as Homelands – were created by the Apartheid government as a 
façade granting independence and sovereignty to black people for the administration 
affairs of their defined territories.  
Under the Bantu Authority System, traditional elites and senior bureaucrats could 
perform judicial and administrative functions (Chipkin & Meny-Gibert 2011:6). The 
assumption by the Apartheid government was that by granting independence, the 
Apartheid project could carry on without appearing illegitimate. 
The political institutional arena giving rise to Bantustans was one evolving from 
1910. In 1948, the National Party gained power of the central South African 
bureaucracy in Pretoria; referred to in this study as the RSA government. Thus 
began the introduction of a range of apartheid policies which deepened racial 
segregation.  
It is within this context numerous laws were passed to control the movement, 
working conditions and residential areas black people were to live (van der Kooy 
1985:57). Ensuing acts such as the Native Affairs Authority Act (1951); Promotional 
Bantu Self-Government Act (1959); Transkei Constitution Act (1963) and the Bantu 
Homelands Constitution Act (1971) (van der Kooy 1985: 58) were established. The 
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political institutional realm created divisions not only on racial lines but also on the 
rate of economic development.  
Under the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971, self-governance and 
independence were granted to the states of Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and 
Ciskei (TBVC). This meant the RSA government would have no authority over their 
territory and they would cease to fall under the jurisdiction of the RSA government 
(van der Kooy 1985:57).  
Ironically, it was claimed the TBVC were sovereign and independent. However, a 
large proportion of their sustainability was dependent upon the RSA government. In 
the 1982/1983 financial year, the RSA government had spent approximately 
R2 billion from the Treasury. This outlay came in the form of  grants, services and 
other transfer payments to the independent and self-governed territories, while the 
total expenditure for the same period by these territories amounted to R2, 5 million 
(Engelbrecht 1985:3).  
Such expenditure demonstrates substantial financial pressure on the central 
government due to accrued budget deficits. Financial pressure on the Fiscus budget 
also had political implications. Dissident factions consisting of interest groups and 
opposition parties decried that taxpayers‟ money was being thrown into a bottomless 
pit (Engelbrecht 1985:4).  
The DBSA emerged within an institutional environment framed by segregate political 
ideologies and discontent about expenditure of public funds. The DBSA was 
designed to fill a financial gap by becoming a vehicle to channel development funds 
into TBVC states.  
The RSA government would give the DBSA money to administer grants, technical 
assistance and development finance for performing such a function. At the time, it 
was assumed the Bantustans could eventually become self-sustaining and develop 
independently. Upon inception, it became apparent to the DBSA that the 
development backlogs experienced in the Bantu states and territories needed urgent 
economic development interventions.  
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From an international context, social unrest, rising levels of unemployment, 
persistent inflation and the 1973-1979 oil price hikes contributed to the slowing of the 
global economy and ultimately, the 1970s recession. With state-owned banks 
significantly contributing to foreign debt and fiscal deficits in their respective 
countries, gaps emerged in the availability of long-term finance and high risk projects 
(Thorne 2008; No. 4 Internal DBSA 2010).  
By the end of 1970s and into the early 1980s, despite the World Bank continuing to 
finance the establishment of development banks under rigorous conditions, Banks 
unable to survive found themselves operating in a new international arena. 
Conservative macroeconomic principles championed by Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan dominated the economic scene (No. 4 Internal DBSA 2010). It is 
within this global climate DFIs began to mushroom across the world. With South 
Africa already experiencing international criticism for its Apartheid regime, the 
initiative to establish a development Bank for Southern Africa was viewed a feasible 
alternative to pacify criticism of separate development. 
4.1.2 Aim behind establishment of the DBSA 
The reason behind the establishment of the Bank was to address the emergent 
development gap between the industrialised/urbanised core and the impoverished 
periphery in the context of the homeland system. The vehicle to address imbalanced 
development was economic expansion through development finance in those 
territories and governments requiring assistance (DBSA 1989/90:3).  
The Bank itself would not engage in the development of the region but rather by 
providing development finance. It was envisioned that the Bank would become a 
financial intermediary to support governments, independent territories and local 
corporations mandated to spearhead development.  
As per the founding documents, the stated aim behind the establishment of the 
DBSA was to ensure development of the impoverished Bantustan territories, 
independent states and any other underdeveloped federations in the Southern 
African region. This view of independent states also referred to the self-governing 
territories of Gazankulu, KwaNdebele, KaNgwane, Lebowa, Qwaqwa and KwaZulu. 
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Incidentally, all these regions had previously, given their support to the establishment 
of the DBSA in 1983 (DBSA Annual report 1984/85).  
The geographical focus of the Bank included the member countries (TVBC) and “all 
developing areas, regions and states” likewise, membership was open to any 
independent country in the Southern African region. Associate memberships were 
made also available to autonomous states outside the region (DBSA 1988/89).  
The main concentration of the Bank‟s development finance as documented in Annual 
reports (1984-1990) was the prioritisation of the underdeveloped Bantustan 
territories and independent states. Most of these were characterised by low levels of 
economic growth and mounting poverty levels. Examples of projects in governments 
included the Lebowa government-construction of Seshego access road; the 
KaNgwane government‟s Nsikazi regional bulk water supply; and the Bophutatswana 
government‟s consolidation of the land farmer/settlement (DBSA Annual reports 
1985/86;1986/87;1988/89). 
Other than loan finance to the latter, recipients of DBSA finance extended to: 
 Local Corporations (Kwa Ndebele National Development Corporation- 
industrial development project) (DBSA Annual Report 1988/89; DBSA Annual 
Report 1989/90);  
 Neighbouring countries (Lesotho Highlands Development Authority- Butha-
Buthe village project I; Lesotho National Development Corporation-Lesotho 
Industrial Development programme project I) (DBSA 1988/89;1989/90); 
 Local business (Triple Trust Organisation – small business development 
projects in Khayelitsha) (DBSA 1988/89;1989/90) and; 
 Strategic national agencies/councils (South African National Tourism Board-
Strategic tourism development plan for South Africa; North-Eastern Natal/ 
KwaZulu sub-region- Agricultural development plan) (DBSA 
1988/89;1989/90). 
As supported above, the Bank granted development finance to diverse borrowers. 
However, Bank activities were not only limited to development finance since the 
Bank also provided technical assistance grants and loans for a multiple of 
disciplines. The DBSA also assisted institutional development and financial 
Exploring the Gap-Filling Development Finance Role of the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) 
 
53 
 
management, region and state development policy and planning, as well as project 
research, preparation, training and development-related publications (DBSA Annual 
1989/89;1990/91).  
Technical assistance for the above often came in the form of the Bank performing a 
consultative role. Thus, this study agrees with Muller (1992:44) that from inception, 
the DBSA‟s role went beyond solely lending. However, the Bank was also actively 
engaged in economic reform issues and sustainable development debates as well as 
policy making.  
For instance, the Bank was a member of the AfDB steering committee and made 
contributions to the study on the reintegration of post-Apartheid South Africa into the 
Southern African region. Such a study informed policy discussions for the South 
African government (DBSA Annual Report 1993/94:23). 
Similarly, by 1993, the Bank had devoted considerable effort towards policy 
formulation and operational frameworks for the World Bank structural adjustment 
programmes. This involved interplay between central governments and regional 
governments/territories such as Venda and Ciskei. DBSA activity in policy research, 
and policy making contributed to development debates but from the beginning of the 
1990s, it annually cost the organisation R11 million (DBSA 1993/94:23).  
A synopsis of the development finance and technical assistance granted by the 
DBSA from 1984 to 1993 was succinctly noted in the 1984-1993 Annual reports. 
Such reports revealed instances of the Bank providing both development finance 
and technical assistance spanning across diverse fields and borrowers:  
1. Rural and Agricultural: In 1988, the DBSA granted a loan of R4 523 970 to the 
KwaZulu government and KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation. This 
was for the provision of irrigation infrastructure and equipment to the 
Mhlatuze: Macekane sugar project. Here, members the private sector – 
Tongaat-Huletts and the Small Cane-Growers Financial Aid fund – also 
provided management and financial aid to individual growers (DBSA Annual 
report 1988/89:46).  
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2. Human resource development: In 1986, the Bank provided education and 
training services to projects financed by the South African central government 
itself. In light of an expansion of the Bank‟s activities, soon after 1986, the 
Bank began to take financial responsibility for such projects. Notable 
examples include the Collywobbles Transkei power station project which was 
initially guaranteed by the South African government (DBSA Annual report 
1986/87:23).  
 
3. Urban, business and entrepreneurial development: In 1984, the Bank 
provided technical assistance to develop a Queenstown/IIinge/Ezibeleni urban 
industrial development strategy. Since Ilinge and Ezibelleni were identified as 
industrial development nodes, the DBSA facilitated the engagement process 
in order to develop a coordinated urban development strategy (DBSA Annual 
Report 1984/85:18). 
 
4. Bulk Infrastructure: The Lebowa and Groblersdal joint water scheme entailing 
the construction of a pump station and reservoir provided considerable 
benefits for both regions. Financial details of this project were not disclosed 
but it remains an illustration of the DBSA‟s development finance fostering 
cooperation between two independent regions/territories (DBSA Annual report 
1984/85).  
 
5. Region and state: The Bank provided technical assistance in 1987 when it 
was contracted to manage operational functions of the South West 
Africa/Namibia Fund consisting of R40 million. This endowment instituted by 
the cabinet of that territory sought assistance from the DBSA for development 
planning and programming, training of staff, advisory functions and research 
(DBSA Annual report 1987/88:18).     
 
The above examples are indicative of the dual role played by the Bank. It takes on 
the role of a financier as well as strategic partner for technical assistance. Once 
formed, the DBSA became the first fully-fledged multilateral development structure in 
Southern Africa (van der Kooy 1985:67).  
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In response to development trends occurring globally, local development 
corporations already in existence in the self-governed and independent territories 
prior to the Bank‟s formation, began to establish more clout within the market. The 
resultant effects of these strengthened institutions resulted in the duplication of roles. 
This occurred because both the DBSA and local Corporations were engaged in 
financing development projects in the same regions aiming at the same target client. 
A detailed description of local Corporations is found later in this chapter. 
The core advantage local development corporations had over the DBSA was they 
possessed the institutional capacity to attract industry, had strong linkages with 
Bantustan authorities and had a better understanding of the needs of the target 
client. Due to its newness, the DBSA did not have any of these advantages (Hart 
2002:156).  
Designed to reduce duplication of development roles, the Bank was also intended to 
be the foremost development structure in South Africa. However, stiff competition 
came from amplified roles of local corporations. This, to some extent, suggests from 
the very beginning, there was a rejection of the Bank as a custodian for central 
development. 
In the example below, local development corporations such as the Kwa-Ndebele 
Development Corporation functioned far beyond their actual duties. This is significant 
mainly because by taking on more responsibilities, they were actually taking on the 
local authorities‟ roles.  
Interviewee A2 June 2013 noted:  
“…in November 1988. At that stage, there weren‟t really municipalities in Kwa-
Ndebele…The Kwa-Ndebele Development Corporation (was)…mainly involved in 
promoting or developing infrastructure for the industrial decentralisation points. From 
a municipal angle I think the Development Corporation, to a certain extent, 
played the role of a municipality as well, because they were providing 
infrastructure, not only for the industrial areas, but also for the surrounding residential 
areas in Umhlanga, Kwaggafontein and all those far outlying areas.” 
From the above interview, it emerged that local development corporations had more 
responsibilities than to merely ensure infrastructure development. Rather, these 
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development corporations took on the traditional roles of development which would 
otherwise fall within the realm of local government structures such as municipalities.  
It is within such an institutional environment, that the DBSA provided development 
finance not only to the Bantustans directly, but to local corporations which spurred 
development. This kind of development finance role was interestingly described by 
one interviewee (Interviewee A3 December 2012) thusly.  
“…The Bank was essentially wholesaling its money (in a form of) retail financing”. 
The Bank thus viewed its role as an intermediary between the RSA government and 
the Bantustans and local corporations. The use of terms such as retail financing and 
wholesaling, also suggests insights into the manner which the Bank itself 
approached corporations – being above all else, a financial intermediary. 
The succinct background sections provided above provide context for the section 
which follows. It presents a combination of both findings and analysis in order to 
answer two research questions of this study: 
1. How has the DBSA interpreted and acted in relation to its mandate prior and 
post 1994 as set out in policy documents, strategies and the DBSA Act?  
 
2. What was the nature of the projects – client, value and sector – of 
developments financed by the DBSA prior to 1994 and post 1994, and was it 
in line with the traditional understanding of gap-filling by DFIs? 
4.2 Gap-filling: maintaining the Bantustans 1983-1993 
Several studies (Southall 1982; Hyslop 2005; Picard 2005) pertain to the histories of 
Bantustan territories, separate development and the democratisation of South Africa. 
These lay a framework for this study to broadly understand the DBSA‟s role of gap-
filling in the apartheid period.  
The gap-filling role of the DBSA in its initial years was principally defined by the 
prioritisation of the needs of its target client, the Bantustans. With funding from the 
Republic, the DBSA was established to provide development finance to poor 
Bantustan economies which were underdeveloped, lacked access to finance for 
development and essentially subsistence farming based.  
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Conversely, the central South African economy was predominantly industrialised 
(van der Kooy 1985:43), relying on the Bantustan economies for their large reserves 
of cheap labour. It was within such a mutually reinforcing system that the DBSA was 
positioned to in some way attempt to fill a gap in an institutional environment 
characterised by a skewed distribution of wealth and economic development.  
 
The establishing mission of the DBSA was noted as “the broad promotion of 
economic development which will raise the living standards of the less developed 
areas of the Southern African economic region” (van der Kooy 1985:68). As noted in 
section 4.1, the less developed areas spoken of are the former Bantustan and 
independent states previously the recipients of large infusions of capital from the 
Fiscus budget.  
In its initial years, the DBSA‟s broad economic development mission was one aiming 
to provide development finance to entities with the assumption such development 
finance would ultimately be translated into sustainable development projects.  
In order to meet this mission, the DBSA was committed to three roles. First, it had to 
provide development finance on appropriate terms to the self-governed and 
independent Bantustan territories. Secondly, the DBSA had to provide technical 
assistance and training pertaining to the various levels of development policy actions 
and project proposals. And thirdly, it had to promote the investment of private and 
public capital into development projects, although this last role was a less prominent 
function of the Bank (van der Kooy 1985:68).  
van der Kooy (1985:69) further notes such roles in this excerpt below:  
“The Bank only provides loans for specific development projects, which are carefully 
appraised according to the contribution the project can make to the economic 
development of the country and the region. Through its technical assistance 
programmes, the Bank assists participating governments and their development 
agencies in identifying projects and preparing them for submission to the Board of 
the Bank. It can also assist the participating governments in building effective 
institutions to carry out these responsibilities.”   
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According to these functions, the kind of gap the DBSA was created to fill was for 
targeted development projects in the South African region. This was to be 
accomplished through development funding and technical assistance.  
From the interviews, it emerged employees in Category A, who had worked for the 
DBSA for over twenty years, were able to juxtapose the gap-filling role of the Bank 
over those years. Category A interviewees were of the opinion the Bank was more 
aligned to its gap-filling role in its formative years compared to the post-apartheid 
era.  
A review of DBSA Annual reports (1984/85; 1985/86; 1986/87; 1987/88; 1989/90; 
1990/91; 1991/92; 1992/93; 1993/94;1994/95) revealed during that period, a large 
majority of projects reported in the annual reports fell within the category of 
development projects in Bantustan territories. Further, there was a general 
consensus the DBSA had gradually shifted away from financing sectorial 
development projects presented by deserving clients. 
Such findings justified the views of Category A interviewees, that in terms of the 
ideology of the time, the DBSA played a role of providing finance to deserving clients 
(Bantustan territories) and for development focused projects. These interviewees did 
not question the moral correctness of the Bantustan system.  
Rather, they chose to make judgments based on if the Bank had acted in line with 
the broader government policies as well as the DBSA policy documents and 
strategies. From the point of view of acting within the precepts of such an 
understanding of the mandate, category A interviewees viewed the actions of the 
Bank to be justified. Their perception was that indeed, the Bank did act within its set 
mandate of the development of Bantustans at the time.    
In contrast, Category B interviewees, employed by the Bank for over ten years 
argued the DBSA was not in line with their development mandate of gap-filling. This 
view was justified by the idea that the DBSA‟s existence contributed to the 
maintenance of separate development.  
It is their belief the Bank ultimately held back the overall development of South Africa 
post 1994. This group of interviewees chose to question the fabric of the separated 
Exploring the Gap-Filling Development Finance Role of the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) 
 
59 
 
development ideology of the time. Interestingly, they were not so much interested in 
whether or not the DBSA acted in accordance to government policy or its own policy 
documents and strategies. 
As interviewee (Interviewee B1 December 2013) argued:  
“…It is a natural progression from being a tool of the State to do what we call 
clandestine economic activities of apartheid – that is what is was when it started, to 
becoming a State organ supporting legitimate development of the economy as a DFI 
owned wholly by the government. The DBSA is now serving the Government in a 
broader sense than when it was formed.”  
The broadness spoken of above is the inclusive nature of development finance for 
all, free of segregate policies. These interviewees were of the assumption unequal 
development equated to no development impact at all. This was largely due to their 
belief the DBSA was party to the reinforcement of inequality. As such, whether or not 
development finance was accurately disbursed to the Bantustans, the target client, 
these interviewees believed such development finance did not equate to gap-filling.  
A closer examination of the roles performed by the Bank positions the study to 
analyse the Bank‟s actions. Did it actually play its role as a gap-filler as per the 
definition of providing development finance to deserving clients who would otherwise 
not qualify for development finance, as outlined in chapter two?  
4.1.1 Roles performed by the DBSA 1984-1993 
The annual reports (1984-1988) suggest during this period, the DBSA focused upon 
six areas. These included: development planning; rural and community development; 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries; industry, commerce, tourism, mining and mineral 
affairs; urban development; manpower development and infrastructure.  
The diversity of these roles illustrates the DBSA‟s broad mandate and the relative 
ease to align to such a mandate during that era. This was possible mainly because 
of the Bank‟s diversified activity base. Bank activities were not limited to one sector 
but instead were multi-sectorial and spanned all development needs of the 
Bantustan states and territories.   
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Moreover, lack of competition from the private sector coupled with strong financial 
support from the Republic of South Africa (RSA) government of the day, meant the 
DBSA had relative ease in doing business in the Bantustan territories (DBSA 
2010:45). However, such conditions were short-lived.  
 
Post 1994, the South African socio-political climate become rather challenging and 
the DBSA‟s gap filling role would be stretched far beyond the geographical focus of 
Bantustans. This study discovered the kind of gap filled by the DBSA in the 
Apartheid era had a different nature than what is traditionally understood as market 
failure gap-filling.  
 
Primarily this was because the market system itself was formulated from a 
government policy perspective designed to exclude the Bantustans. Rather, the gap 
is geographical between the developed core RSA government and the Bantustan 
peripheries which were strategically placed to foster separate development. 
 
The kind of gap filling role performed by the DBSA in the apartheid era was not so 
much one that ensured equal levels of development for both the core and the 
periphery. Instead gap-filling was spurred by segregate development policies 
according to the dictates of the South African government.  
 
From this framing, the study found the DBSA was acting in line with its development 
mandate during the period between 1984 and 1993 since the DBSA focused its 
operations on the Bantustan and self-governing territories. This was in accordance 
with the prescripts of government policy as well as DBSA policies.  
 
This study has found it difficult to establish if the DBSA contributed to the economic 
development of the region primarily because the available data was limited to the 
activities of the Bank. Therefore, it did not significantly speak to the DBSA‟s overall 
contribution to the economic development of SADC. Therefore, to illustrate the 
DBSA‟s economic development contribution the data was measured through a 
development impact matrix, which is explained in further detail in chapter five.  
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4.3 Elements of confusion over mandate: the DBSA post 1994 
The DBSA Act (Nr. 13 of 1997) states the Bank‟s primary function as: one prioritising 
the promotion of economic growth and development, human resource development 
and institutional capacity building. These roles are what are defined by the DBSA Act 
(Nr. 13 of 1997), as the gaps in development needing to be filled in the democratic 
South Africa.  
Evident in the interviews conducted and in documents reviewed, as the years have 
progressed, there has been much confusion over the specific mandate of the DBSA. 
The confusion is linked to four elements –the regional/location of activity, sector 
focus, nature of assistance and the kind of borrower. These elements of confusion 
are discussed below. 
4.3.1 Regional/location of activity 
Once reconstituted as a development finance institution, in terms of the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa Act (Nr. 13 of 1997), the DBSA took on a 
more focused infrastructure development role in the Southern African region. 
According to official documents, (No.3 Internal DBSA 2009), DBSA activity would 
occur in countries and institutions in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).  
Following this directive, the DBSA provided technical assistance and development 
finance to TBVC states and independent territories between 1984 and 1993. 
However other countries receiving DBSA assistance included Mozambique (first 
project in 1988, R217 000 technical assistance loan for agro-forestry research); 
Lesotho (by 1988 seven projects approved worth R131 million in Lesotho Highlands 
Water Scheme) (No. 4 Internal DBSA 2010); and Namibia (1986 administration of 
Development fund) (DBSA Annual Report 186/87). 
Post 1994, the DBSA broadened its frontiers by financing projects in most SADC 
countries. A sampling of DBSA financed projects are listed below: 
 Angola: In 2009, the DBSA loaned the Angolan Ministry of Finance R50 
million for an infrastructure project. 
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 Madagascar: In 2008, the DBSA extended a R18 million loan to Ripple Fish 
International Ltd for an agriculture project.  
 Democratic Republic of Congo: In 2009, the DBSA extended a loan of R22, 2 
million to a commercial entity, the Grand Karavia Hotel for a tourism project. 
 Zimbabwe: In 2010 the DBSA extended a R45 million loan for Zimbabwe 
Platinum mines (Pty) Ltd for residential facilities. 
 Ghana: in 2008 the DBSA extended a R4.9 million loan to an institution 
building project for the Ghanaian branch of the United Cities and Local 
Governments of Africa Non-Governmental organisation.  
Extension of development finance to the latter is indicative of the confusion about 
which African region the DBSA prioritises as target infrastructure nodes. Ghana does 
not fall within the SADC region. Similarly, the interviews conducted failed to clarify 
exact regional boundaries for DBSA financing. Most interviewees made brief mention 
of municipalities while placing a greater emphasis upon the grand scope of DBSA 
activity not only across South Africa, but Africa as a whole. 
4.3.2 Sector focus 
Of the seven interviews conducted, the common understanding of the role DBSA 
played post 1994 was that of infrastructure development above all else. Upon 
probing further to understand what qualified as infrastructure development, an 
interviewee responded by saying: 
“Roads, water, electricity and ICT. Those are the core sectors... In fact DBSA has 
publically admitted that in recent years the banks mandated to be very wide starting 
to even finance tourists and things... mining... the bank has now exited those sectors 
and is now focusing on the four sectors that we have defined.” (Interviewee B2 
December 2013) 
Similarly, another interviewee noted how, unlike in the past when the DBSA had 
multiple development roles, the DBSA‟s current mandate had been “trimmed” he 
explained:   
“…the final trimming is now that we [are] looking at four sectors. Those are water and 
sanitation…energy, we [are] looking at ICT, we [are] looking at transport…So in other 
words it‟s less of a social economic infrastructure. It‟s more the hard core, which is 
water, transport and roads” (Interviewee A3 December 2012).   
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It emerged that a majority of the DBSA employees had a traditional understanding of 
what constituted infrastructure development – that of roads, water, electricity and 
sanitation. Others such as Interviewee B1 (December 2013), spoke of an 
“infrastructure value-chain” suggesting the DBSA dealt with “anything related to 
infrastructure”, whether it meant building a school itself, or constructing the roads 
and sanitation for the school.  
All interviewees employed by the DBSA had a somewhat uniform conceptualisation 
of the Bank‟s mandate – that of performing a traditional infrastructure development 
role. However, there was a vagueness about which sector of DBSA infrastructure 
development was actually discussed. This is what seemed to cause much of the 
confusion.  
The absence of a clearly defined sector-focus of the Bank means the open-ended 
interpretation of its infrastructure is not limited to specific sectors. Therefore the 
current DBSA mandate is really a continuation of the 1984-1993 era mandate.  
From the above discussion, it is evident the development role of the Bank post 1994 
– as interpreted by the DBSA through its publications and interviewees – has 
continued to be broad about infrastructure development. The vagueness in the 
interpretation of what constitutes infrastructure has also set precedent for confusion. 
Is the DBSA‟s infrastructure role limited to just development finance or does it 
include technical assistance? It appears no one at the DBSA can sufficiently answer 
this question. 
4.3.3 Nature of assistance: finance and/or technical assistance 
DBSA Regulations define the Bank‟s mandate as focusing upon: 
“the provision of financial, technical and other assistance to achieve the objectives of 
the Bank, with a focus on its investment activities on infrastructure funding, broadly 
defined, and with the object of acting as a catalyst to maximize private sector access 
to opportunities in the provision of public funding” (No. 3 Internal DBSA 2009).  
The above excerpt suggests the DBSA‟s role as all-inclusive, meaning it is not solely 
focused on development finance but also on other “soft infrastructure” issues. This 
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would include technical assistance and encouraging private sector investment to 
move into infrastructure development.  
Such a view resonates with the definition offered by Ligeti (1985:299) who defines 
development banks as not only financing medium to short term assets, but also 
provides – in addition to finance – the “essentials of productive investment” such as 
technical skills and managerial experience.  
Although not articulated clearly, DBSA publication (No. 3 Internal DBSA 2009) 
initially overemphasised the infrastructure development role of the Bank. This 
confusion was somewhat appeased by acknowledging that although infrastructure 
development in the traditional sense (hard infrastructure) is crucial, infrastructure 
development from a human and institutional perspective (both of which fall under 
technical assistance) are of equal importance.  
This publication suggested infrastructure as understood by the Bank at the time, also 
included human and institutional capital. The Bank viewed these as key constraints 
limiting overall infrastructure and economic development. This only added more 
ambiguity.  Although, from interviews, it is clear infrastructure was understood in a 
traditional sense – hard infrastructure. Often these DBSA publications adopted a 
broad interpretation of infrastructure development which was inclusive of “soft 
infrastructure” issues of human and institutional capital.  
DBSA interviewees associate the DBSA mandate as that of finance, human resource 
development and institutional capacity building. Human resource development and 
institutional capacity building are features existing only in some development banks. 
However, they were particularly present in the DBSA prior to 1994. The confusion of 
whether or not technical assistance is a DBSA feature falls in line with its mandate of 
gap-filling still remains contested in the Bank. 
4.3.4 Kind of borrower 
The kind of borrower the Bank is mandated to finance is the last element of 
confusion discovered in this study. As detailed in section 4.1.2 of this chapter, during 
the 1984-89 interval, the Bank financed TBVC states, independent states, local 
corporations, neighbouring countries, private corporations and strategic national 
agencies/councils (DBSA Annual reports 1988/89; 1989/90).  
Exploring the Gap-Filling Development Finance Role of the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) 
 
65 
 
At the time, as per the founding policy documents, the focus of the Bank was 
intended to be on the TBVC states and independent territories. The proportion of 
development finance loans extended to the TBVC states and independent territories 
equated to the bulk loan portfolio of the Bank (No. 4 Internal DBSA 2010). By so 
doing, the Bank acted in line with its mandate of providing finance to the most 
deserving client.  
Post 1994, it appears that the Bank continued to finance the same borrowers but 
with the inclusion of private clients able to secure finance from the private sector. 
One example is in 2010 when the DBSA extended a R150 million loan to Banco BAI, 
an Angolan private bank (DBSA Internal Dataset 2008-2013). 
The confusion has been whether or not the Bank fulfils its mandate by financing 
deserving clients, or if the principle of deserving client is even of relevance at this 
juncture in time. This is particularly true if by receiving development finance, the 
client will be filling a development gap, especially if the project is developmental in its 
outcomes. A detailed analytical account of the nature of projects and clients financed 
by the DBSA is presented in chapter six.  
The various elements of confusion pertaining to the DBSA‟s mandate are a result of 
the difficult institutional environment in which the DBSA operates. This environment 
is characterised by a target client – government entities and/or municipalities – 
unable to honour their commitment; competing understandings of senior staff in the 
DBSA; competing interests of board members and the influence of other players in 
the market such as a strong competitive private sector. All these factors contribute to 
the confusion in understanding the DBSA mandate and are discussed in further 
detail in chapter five.  
The DBSA has thus found itself in a questionable regarding acting in line with its 
mandate. It has become a matter of great importance particularly when placed in the 
context of the assumptions of NIE theorists (Furubotn & Richter 2008:16). The 
DBSA, like all other actors in the institutional environment are able to shape and 
impact the market economy.  
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Other organisations seeming to have also played key roles in shaping South Africa‟s 
institutional environment have also influenced the DBSA‟s gap-filling role. This also 
includes the IDC discussed in the following section.  
4.4 DBSA and other development corporations 
This study found prior to inception and once established the DBSA‟s mandate was 
never clearly defined by the South African government. Hence the Bank has always 
found itself unable to express a clear sense of its development finance role. What 
follows provides a detailed history of development finance entities in South Africa. 
The purpose here is to substantiate the argument that unlike the IDC or any other 
development corporation, the DBSA‟s mandate was never clearly defined by the 
South African government. Moreover, by using the IDC as an example of a DFI 
understanding its mandate, historical and current shortcomings of the DBSA are 
revealed. 
Prior to 1994, the South African government spoke of Corporations, which are 
equivalent to DFIs as they are known today. Corporations such as the Bantu 
Investment Corporation of South Africa Limited (1959); Xhosa Development 
Corporation Limited (1965); the Bantu Mining Corporation Limited (1969) and the 
IDC (1940) (van Rensburg n.d:181); all excluding the IDC, were created to promote 
economic development for the Bantustan territories (van Rensburg n.d). 
Corporations then emerged as a result of the Tomlinson Commission report of 1955. 
It contended the need for a development corporation to promote the development of 
Bantu territories and industrial undertakings (van Rensburg n.d 65). 
Although constituted under the Bantu Investment Corporations Act (Act 34 of 1959) 
and the Development Corporations for Bantu Homelands Act, No. 46 (both later 
replaced by the Promotion of Economic Development of Bantu Homelands Act, No 
46 of 1968) (van der Kooy 1985:58); these Corporations (excl. IDC) lacked clout. 
However, this was largely due to the inherently oppressive nature of the government.  
For instance, the Bantu Investment Corporation of South Africa Limited was created 
to provide assistance and expertise on the development and extension of existing 
industries. Yet legislation such as the Native Trust and Land Act No 18 of 1936 
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made it difficult for the Corporation to obtain land (van Rensburg n.d. 69) thus 
limiting industrial development capabilities.  
Furthermore, these Corporations were not only financed by share capital owned by 
the South African Bantu Trust (SABT), the President of the RSA was also a trustee. 
The Trust was also administered and managed by the Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development. Therefore, such dependence upon the central 
government further entrenched the toothless state of these Corporations.   
From a management perspective, the directors of the Corporations were nominated 
by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. Although appearing 
autonomous, in practice senior officials and the Secretary of Bantu Administration 
and Development had to be consulted in all matters.  
These governing structures and background behind the formation of these 
Corporations reveal the institutional memory of the South African state. It emerged in 
the study there was continuity in the manner the DBSA was formed, organised and 
managed based on the traditions of the Corporations.  
For example, the DBSA was founded on the share capital from the RSA  government 
with oversight by the Finance ministry lead by Prof. Owen Horwood (No.4 Internal 
DBSA 2010). Moreover, the Bank was also created in order to finance the 
development of these territories.   
The above description adds value to this study since it illustrates the same rationale 
used for the establishment of Corporations was also used for the establishment of 
the DBSA. Moreover, the DBSA was introduced into a climate already having 
competition from other corporations including the IDC.  
However, due to the substantial government support in the form of capital insertions 
(discussed in detail in chapter five), the DBSA was propelled above the local 
Corporations. Still, the IDC, being one of the oldest Corporations in the country had 
many advantages over the DBSA. It is a prime example of a DFI having a clear 
understanding of its mandate.  
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4.4.1 The IDC and DBSA 
The IDC was established in 1940 to primarily increase the industrial base of the 
central South African government (van der Kooy 1984). As well, the IDC was one of 
the first Corporations to appear in the South African institutional environment. 
Conversely, the DBSA was hastily formulated in 1983 to provide development 
finance for infrastructure advancement for underdeveloped regions.  
What is unique about the IDC is that unlike the other Corporations, instituted in terms 
of the Industrial Development Act (Act No. 22 of 1940), the IDC was a statutory body 
in charge of decentralisation of the industrialisation policy (van Rensburg n.d. 75). As 
such, the core activity of the IDC was to finance industries throughout the Republic 
of South Africa and South-West Africa (Namibia) with the exception of the Bantustan 
territories.  
To apply the decentralisation policy, IDC activities had to be present in industrial 
growth points such as homeland border areas (van der Kooy 1984). What this 
means is: unlike the DBSA which was created intentionally to finance Bantustans, 
IDC activities were centred upon the perpetuation of segregated development. This 
was achieved by financing industrial projects in the already well-established 
industrial zones of the South African republic.  
Projects financed – such as industrial manufacturing projects – were regarded as 
being in the national interest. However, due to their marginal profit-making 
possibilities or scope, they were not considered attractive enough by the private 
sector (Van Rensburg n.d: 75).   
What the DBSA shared with the IDC prior to 1994 was that they both occupied 
similar gap-filling roles albeit those were limited to defined economic activities –
infrastructure and industrial development. As well, both served different target areas; 
Bantustans for the DBSA and Southern Africa for the IDC. One other commonality 
was both DFIs acted as agents to fulfill government policies of separate development 
and were fully financed by the central government.  
However, post-1994 the DBSA was no longer mandated to finance industrial projects 
which previously fell in Bantustan territories. With the change in government, all 
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industrial projects irrespective of location in SADC would fall under the jurisdiction of 
the IDC.    
From a management perspective, Mr M T De Waal, Managing Director of IDC at the 
time, was nominated to investigate the corporate development structure of the DBSA 
and published a report –Brand/De Waal report 1979. This document formulated a 
Strategy for the rationalisation of State Development Corporations and the 
Establishment of a Southern African Development Bank). Ultimately, this report 
spearheaded the establishment of the DBSA (van der Kooy 1985:63-64).  
An interview with an individual who had held management positions post 1994 – with 
the IDC followed by the DBSA – revealed his perceptions of the two DFIs. He 
perceived the IDC as more focused and robust in its fulfillment of its industrial 
development mandate. However, his interpretation of the DBSA‟s mandate for 
infrastructure development was often blurred and subject to loose interpretation 
(Interviewee C1 January 2014).  
He further added the DBSA Executive Committee would hold quarterly “council” 
meetings with the Executive Committee of the IDC. These meetings were intended 
to be a bargaining and trade-off opportunity where the DBSA and the IDC would 
broker which projects would receive joint participation and which would be on the 
individual books of the DBSA/IDC (Interviewee C1 January 2014).  
Interviewee B1 December 2013 echoed the same sentiment but added these 
collaborative meetings were last held “four to five years ago”. The reason stated for 
such a long gap between meetings was: “the Bank had to focus on itself”.  
The “IDC is our best buddy,” this interviewee continued, “but also our biggest 
competition. But they are more our buddies than anything else because they are 
bigger and they play in a bigger space… [whereas] …the rest of the DFIs, we 
consider as cousins/siblings working together.” The above statement suggests how 
the DBSA regards the IDC as a competitor despite both DFIs being mandated to 
operate in different sectors.  
Throughout all interviews, little was mentioned about the synergy between South 
African DFI‟s and the platforms of collaboration. Rather, two of the seven 
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interviewees, spoke of international DFI counterparts such as the Brazil 
Development Bank (BNDES). They suggested a slight prioritisation of cooperation 
between international DFIs and local DFIs. There was no evidence to suggest 
cooperation with foreign DFIs was any more institutionalised than with domestic 
DFIS. 
Additionally, the existence of legislation such as the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act (13 of 2005) was intended to establish linkages between government 
departments and state organs. However, ongoing competitive behavior within South 
African government departments (Pieterse and van Donk 2008), was and still is an 
unfortunate consequence. This not only was evident in government departments, but 
also amongst DFIs.  
Such relationships one could argue have footprints in Bantustan histories where 
ideologies of separate development have been carried over into a new 
administration by former Bantustan bureaucrats. These old-school administrators still 
tacitly advocate the inverse of separate development.  
Linkage of the DBSA with the IDC adds value to this study. It has enabled this 
researcher to juxtapose the DBSA with its South African peers operating in the same 
institutional environment with the same end goal of economic growth of the country. 
Moreover, the IDC offered a framework to understand the evolution of the DFI model 
in South Africa. This is important for maintaining context in this study as well as the 
realisation of how a DFI with a clear mandate functions. 
4.5 Increasing competition in the development finance space in 
post 1994 period  
Another important player in the post-1994 environment is the private sector. The 
relationship between DFIs and the private sector is such that DFIs mobilise financial 
resources for development projects the private sector deems risky and less 
profitable.  
However, by virtue of carrying the risk, DFIs can enter into partnerships with the 
private sector to encourage investment in these development projects (Gumede, 
Govender & Motshidi 2011:4), by so doing the private sector is crowded in. It is by 
carrying this risk initially, that “once the markets are developed, the DFIs gradually 
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withdraw and focus on developing other underdeveloped markets” (Gumede, 
Govender & Motshidi 2011:4).  
The 1983 Articles of Agreement establishing the DBSA clearly stipulated the Bank 
would not compete with the private financial sector by extending loans directly to 
business enterprises. Instead, it would lend directly to governments and their 
development agencies (van der Kooy 1985:70).  
Private sector involvement was understood “by the Bank” to mean the Bank would 
invest in infrastructure projects such as water, roads, rural and agricultural 
development. This would then “pave the way” for the private sector to invest in more 
lucrative profit-generating projects (van der Kooy 1985:70). Such an understanding 
is in line with the common discourse by scholars like Smallridge & De Olloqui (2011), 
who propose partnership of DFIs and the private sector to achieve economic growth.   
Of all the interviewees, only one of seven linked the DBSA‟s partnership role as one 
which encouraged private sector involvement in infrastructure projects. The majority 
of interviewees spoke of the commercial banks as competitors and a threat to the 
DBSA‟s monopoly.   
In the DBSA‟s initial years, the Bank did not experience any competition in the 
market (Interviewee C2 December 2013). Such invulnerability resulted in a certain 
degree of overconfidence. “…At some stage, the DBSA may [even] have been so 
arrogant as to assume [that] as an AAA globally-rated institution, we could go it 
alone” (No.2 Internal DBSA 2012).  
This demonstrates an overemphasis on the assumed superlative position of the 
DBSA in the market. It also connotes a neglect of the DBSA‟s role to encourage 
private sector participation. Such competition was a direct contradiction of the DBSA 
Act (Nr.13 of 1997) urging a partnered role of infrastructure development in South 
Africa.  
The DBSA is not intended to be in competition with the private sector. Its area of 
focus should be on the development of underdeveloped regions. In instances where 
the Bank does compete with the private sector, it is a clear indication of the Bank‟s 
misalignment with its gap-filling development mandate. The Bank can, however, play 
Exploring the Gap-Filling Development Finance Role of the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) 
 
72 
 
a more partnered role with the private sector while still remaining within the bounds 
of its mandate.  
Clear examples of the DBSA acting in line with its mandate to promote private sector 
participation in the economy were more evident in the era prior to 1994. Centrally 
planned policies set the framework for private sector involvement in the development 
of the Bantustan territories. The DBSA‟s actions were closely aligned to the 
Apartheid regime by targeting development finance in Bantustan territories and the 
DBSA inherently crowded the private sector into entering those markets.  
For instance, No. 3 Internal DBSA 2010 noted how “a Regional Industrial 
Programme provided significant incentives for the establishment of industries in 
identified nodes”. These incentives came in the form of government subsidies to 
firms setting up business in the allocated economic rezoned areas.  
The presence of the DBSA in these economic rezoned areas was often in the form of 
the Bank setting precedent for the private sector. This was most often accomplished 
by illustrating the extent the Bantustan territories could be attractive investment 
opportunities. The DBSA would thus play a partnered role with the private sector 
attempting to attain economic participation in nodes of the country most likely to 
have been excluded. 
Once reconstituted, the post 1994 institutional environment saw the rise of 
commercial banks becoming more involved in the municipal space (No.3 Internal 
DBSA 2012). This reflection is in line with Diamond‟s observations that not only were 
development banks created as gap-filling institutions, “the composition of the 
financial sector had changed” (Ligeti 1985:320).  
In addition, as explained in the earlier section 4.7; the kind of space occupied by the 
private sector has grown to such an extent, it has become common practice for the 
DBSA to compete with the private sector to finance municipal infrastructure projects 
(Interviewee B4 December 2012).  
Although this study agrees that the mere fact the DBSA is competing with the private 
sector, the Bank has fallen short of its mandate to fill a gap. The Bank has moved 
into an incorrect development space. The observation that the private sector has 
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indeed taken on more and more development projects is a salient success often not 
celebrated.  
Such a success is what free-market economists would call the “invisible hand” in the 
market. This is a phenomenon which has taken care of the needs of the 
municipalities unlikely to have received financing. This data suggests the DBSA 
plays a role in contributing to filling gaps in the market by drawing the private sector 
in closer to the development space.  
This is evident since “it has become common practice for banks and other financial 
institutions to check the DBSA‟s presence in a municipality before doing financial 
business with them” (No. 4 Internal DBSA 2010:45). From the viewpoint of 
encouraging private investment into the development field, the DBSA has indeed 
succeeded in fulfilling an element of its soft infrastructure mandate. It has crowded 
private sector investment into development finance. The section which follows sets 
out the difficulties of providing development finance to under capacitated institutions. 
4.6 Further challenges to the DBSAs role: the challenges to 
working with municipalities 
The aftermath of Bantustan administration gave rise to a volatile municipal 
institutional environment. Not only are municipalities characterised by poor credit 
ratings, their weak revenue base bars them from accessing standard concessional 
loan agreements.  
Similarly, due to internal capacity constraints, some municipalities struggle to access 
other government grants such as the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) (Sibisi 
2009:14). Today, grants and concessional loan agreements are available to 
municipalities but most municipalities fail to meet the conditions of accessing the 
funds.  
It is therefore not an issue of the availability of funds (Interviewee B3 December 
2013), but an issue of eligibility of the borrower. The borrower – the municipality – as 
a former territory in a Bantustan was unable to perform key functions of 
administrative governance.  
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Two common themes characterising the municipal institutional environment in 1994-
2013 were identified by this study. They are: under-capacitated public officials and 
the inability of municipalities to formulate policies. Both these matters contribute to 
municipalities‟ inability to attain development finance.  
4.6.1 Under-capacitated municipal officials 
The effect of separate development policies created an institutional environment 
characterised by many municipal officials who are highly unskilled and lack 
experience. This is because most were numbered among the former regime‟s under-
capacitated black authorities (DBSA Annual report 1998/1999).  
For instance, Chipkin & Meny-Gibert (2011:6) succinctly describe the calibre of the 
Bantustan officials which would, upon democratisation, be absorbed into the public 
sector: 
“Collectively, Homeland officials were the least qualified and experienced. White, 
senior managers often consisted of those officials that had been transferred from the 
South African civil service because they were below grade. Below-grade, white, civil 
servants were joined by black officials, usually drawn from the ranks of the Chefferie, 
who were prized for their obedience and loyalty rather than their education and 
competence (p.297). For the rest, Homeland administrations consisted of tens of 
thousands of black, poorly trained subalterns, either performing menial or basic 
administrative tasks”.  
 
Such calibre of personnel coupled with duplication of roles and a bloated public 
sector (Chipkin & Meny-Gibert 2011), set precedent for a challenging institutional 
environment. This not only occurred in the DBSA in its formative years; these effects 
would be felt well into the era of a democratised South Africa.  
Having an under-capacitated target client, means although the DBSA is supposed to 
finance a risky client, municipalities have become even more risky than anticipated. 
Thus the extension of finance to such institutions has placed the Bank in a 
vulnerable position. The cause of weak municipalities cannot be blamed on the 
legacy of Bantustans alone. This unevenness is a result of a complex myriad of 
issues. Morgan et.al (2014:13) notes how unevenness is as a result of:  
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“long-term structural patterns combined with developments in the way that 
municipalities have been integrated and modeled since 1995, how they are staffed, 
and how they are incentivized and who is incentivized.” 
It is within conditions noted above that the South African state is now being termed a 
“contract state” (Brunette et.al 2014). Increasingly, core functions of service delivery, 
which should be administered by the state, are contracted-out to private companies 
who tender for the work.  
By so doing, not only do the local and national governments delegate their function, 
opportunities to develop expertise and know-how to administer service delivery is 
lost to the private sector. Moreover, the post 1994 economic and policy environment 
has also failed to equip and remedy evident unevenness and bottlenecks.   
4.6.2 Weak capacity to formulate policies     
The requisite capacity to develop and/or implement development strategies to fulfill 
broader government development policies is simply not in place in a majority of 
municipalities including metros and secondary cities (Sibisi 2011:11). Strategic 
planning and integration of government spheres, agencies and entities impacts the 
effectiveness and efficiency of government initiatives. To this very day, it remains a 
major challenge. 
Sibisi (2011:11) cites contributions by (Berrisford and Kihato 2008) who argue a “lack 
of legislative clarity regarding the role of the different spheres with regard to 
planning” exacerbate the current challenges for development planning in South 
Africa. Pieterse and van Donk (2008) further argue that:  
“The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and the Municipal Finance 
Management Act (MFMA) also militate against interdepartmental and multi-sphere 
integration and synchronisation.”  
From the above, it becomes apparent the obstacle is not only the inability of 
municipalities to formulate their own policies, legislation setting precedent for the 
manner municipal finances should be conducted is also limiting. From an institutional 
perspective, it is not to say policies in place during the Apartheid era were not met 
with their own institutional obstacles. As a 1984/85 DBSA publication noted: 
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“The lack of clear and comprehensive development policies, planning procedures 
and implementation capacity (often because of the lack of professional experienced 
staff) imposes significant constraints and will need the urgent attention of both 
borrowers and DBSA. The ability of the participating governments to create a positive 
climate for private investment also has an important bearing on the demand for 
infrastructure that can be financed by the DBSA“(DBSA Annual report 1984/85).  
Issues raised in a 1980s DBSA annual report acknowledge an institutional 
environment crippled by inexperienced staff heading governments. As well, a lack of 
clear and comprehensive development policies were cited as key stumbling blocks. 
This state of affairs continues to be an issue raised by the DBSA to this very day.  
In all seven interviews conducted, the interviewees mentioned the difficulty of doing 
business in the municipal space. Similarly, the Development Fund Annual report 
(2005/06) noted how: 
“The shortage of human and institutional capacity, especially at the municipal level 
where most service delivery is expected to occur, remains one of the main 
constraints on achieving the government‟s goals” (Development Fund Annual Report 
2005/06:5).  
An attempt to address this institutional and human incapacity was evident in 
initiatives such as the Siyenza Manje which are discussed in further detail in chapter 
six.  
Although the DBSA was in most cases financially equipped to provide development 
loan support, it was placed in a situation where the target client for development 
finance loans were most often inherently weak and grant-dependent municipalities. 
Such decline of the institutional environment has always been the case, even during 
the Bantustan era.  
Even when grants or loans were accessed, there was an inability to account for or 
properly spend the money. Issues such as a lack of financial management capacity, 
inadequate operational systems and weak financial management systems revealed 
“the problem is as much an institutional one as it is a financial one” (Sibisi 2009:14).  
To illustrate, in 2004 the Buffalo City municipality in the Eastern Cape, won a „best 
municipality award‟. Less than a year later, it was one of several municipalities listed 
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for “critical support measures from Project Consolidate – a national programme 
geared towards supporting municipal service delivery” (Hollands & Mageza 2004:4). 
Such municipal characteristics were already evident in the era of the Bantustans. 
Regarding the DBSA‟s target market, this study ascertained one cannot blame the 
nature of the municipalities or Bantustans as reason to justify the DBSA‟s divergence 
from performing its gap-filling role.  
The risky municipal institutional market calls for development finance from the DBSA 
and specialised grant funding from the state. It also requires a Bank and state able to 
develop more innovative development instruments customised for the riskier end of 
the market.  
Therefore, development instruments should be accommodative of the implications of 
a changing institutional environment. The necessary adaptation is not so much about 
the Bank‟s operating procedure. It is about overall functions and the way it does its 
business. In truth, the Bank has not adapted to the changing times and trends in the 
global economy. 
4.7 Implications of the challenging institutional environment 
The very nature of a changed institutional environment means the target of 
development finance may be of such high risk that it may be difficult to receive 
development finance. As well, the presence of private firms may be so strong that 
the kind of gap the DBSA has previously filled may become smaller and smaller. 
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Figure 4: Diagrams depicting size of institutional gaps in Bantustans and 
municipalities 
Diagram 1: Size of DFI gap to be filled by DBSA in Development finance for 
Bantustans in 1984 
 
Government      DBSA     Private Sector 
 
 
Diagram 2: Size of DFI gap to be filled by DBSA in municipalities in 2013  
 
Government    DBSA     Private Sector 
 
Source: Author‟s own interpretation 
 
Diagrams 1 and 2 illustrate examples of the gap-filling roles the DBSA has played 
and how it has shifted. In changing institutional environments, an opportunity exists 
for the Bank to fill a development gap where neither the state nor the private sector 
is able to accommodate.  
Diagram 1 illustrates the perceived gap-filling role of the DBSA in 1984. It is likely 
due to the relative monopoly of acting in the Bantustans; the DBSA occupied a large 
proportion of the development finance market share. The private sector at the time 
was also highly concentrated in the more developed central state.  
In Diagram 2, the private sector has started to occupy a larger proportion of 
development finance. This was a space previously occupied by the DBSA since the 
private sector began to have a larger appetite for risk. This change in business 
attitude was largely owed to global developments such as technological 
advancements and higher profit returns. The relative size of the DBSA in comparison 
to South African commercial Banks is noted in chapter five.  
Therefore, the issue is not one of an unfavourable institutional environment inhibiting 
the Bank‟s ability to adequately perform its gap-filling role. The Bank itself needs to 
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adapt to the changing institutional environment. In essence, gap-filling is not a 
constant role performed on a predefined gap, the gap is constantly shifting.  
Municipal space not only creates a challenging environment for the DBSA, but also 
emphasises that a very challenging institutional environment is, in essence, the 
space in which the Bank should be operating. To be more succinct, the Bank is 
intended to function in a challenging institutional environment as this is where it 
fulfills its gap filling role.  
The issue then is not so much the difficulty of doing business in such environments. 
Rather, it is how the DBSA has aligned its actions, not only with the DBSA Act 
(1997) which established it, but also government development policies and changing 
needs of the Banks majority clients – the municipalities. Changes in the product 
needs of its borrowers, translates into necessity to fulfill such a need. This is often 
where the DBSA falls short and finds the private sector stepping in.  
4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has presented an historical account behind the establishment of the 
DBSA. The institutional environment at the time the DBSA was established was one 
framed by political ideologies of separate development of blacks and whites.  
The growing gap between the industrialised South African core and the subsistence 
farming/under-developed Bantustan territories set precedent for the need to 
establish an intermediary body to address Bantustan underdevelopment. By 
becoming a vehicle to channel funds from the Fiscus to the Bantustans, it was 
assumed the DBSA could spur development of the Bantustans while also easing 
discontent over Fiscus public funds being directly injected into a Black area.   
This study found in its initial years, the DBSA had a broad mandate for its 
Bantustans target client. As such, gap-filling was largely defined by the target client 
who was underdeveloped and unable to secure financing from the private sector. It is 
from this perspective, which the study found the DBSA was acting within its gap-
filling role by financing clients which were otherwise unable to secure finance.  
Moreover, the DBSA also acted in line with the prescriptions of the separate 
development policies advocated by the main-shareholder, the Apartheid 
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government. In terms of policy goals of the time, this further warranted the 
conclusion that the DBSA was acting within its gap-filling role between 1983 and 
1994.  
However, in doing this, the DBSA also contributed to the underdevelopment 
associated with separate development. This mode of operation thus contradicted 
development as it is understood in its broader sense. The confusion over a mandate 
based upon the kind of borrower, sector focus, regional focus and nature of 
assistance further compounded the DBSA‟s ability to clearly articulate its gap-filling 
role.  
Post 1994, the study found the institutional environment the DBSA found itself 
entrenched in chaos. It was one characterised by municipalities led by under-
capacitated municipal officials, inability to formulate policies and too inept to properly 
use the available development finance.  
An environment with such enormous institutional and human incapacity obstacles 
has been proffered as the reason behind the Bank being unable to efficiently perform 
its gap-filling role. This argument was a consensus among most interviewees and is 
prominently found in DBSA literature.  
However, this study found a challenging institutional environment has always been 
an element of the South African socio-economic climate.  Therefore, the argument 
that the divergence of the DBSA‟s gap-filling role was precipitated by a challenging 
municipal environment is of little or no consequence. 
Rather, the presence of actors such as the IDC and the growing competitive private 
sector were factors far less dominant in the Bantustan era than they are today. Thus, 
this study‟s argument is warranted because the gap-filling space the DBSA 
traditionally filled has become smaller due to the growth of other actors in the 
market.  
This study has also chosen to conclude that the mere realisation the DBSA was 
competing with the private sector was in fact an uncelebrated success. It suggested 
the DBSA had succeeded in crowding the private sector, into spaces traditionally 
viewed as high-risk, low-returns. This institutional environment chapter also set 
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precedent for the chapter which follows. From a perspective of organisational 
impediments, it provides considerable context for understanding the DBSA‟s gap-
filling role. 
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Chapter FIVE: Analysing development finance in 
action       
5 Introduction 
The previous chapter detailed the establishment of the DBSA as well as the context 
and rationale behind the support for a Southern African development bank. This 
chapter delves further into the factors impacting the DBSA‟s ability to perform its 
gap-filling role. The previous chapter set the framework to understand the evolution 
of the DBSA.  
The DBSA had to deal with the dynamics of a confusing mandate and changing 
interpretations of gap-filling. It was also thrown into a complex institutional 
environment characterised by other development corporations. Additionally, the 
Bank had to compete with the private sector and cope with very challenging 
municipal clients. The previous chapter argued that it is within such dynamics, the 
DBSA deviated from performing its development finance role. It is within such a 
setting that this chapter is better positioned to answer the second research question:  
What was the nature (client, value and sector) of projects financed by the DBSA prior 
to 1994 and post 1994; and was it in line with the traditional understanding of gap-
filling by DFIs?  
In order to answer this research question, this chapter presents examples of projects 
substantiating the DBSA‟s deviation from its gap-filling role.  
When the DBSA started its operations on the 1st of February 1984, it took over 96 
projects from the Department of Foreign Affairs, with a total loan value of R637 
million. In addition, 42 projects were in the pipeline with a total investment value of 
R762 million (DBSA Annual report 1984/85). These projects varied from rural 
development and agriculture to industrial development.  
The DBSA‟s initial loan book was thus not composed of projects chosen based on a 
clear set project classification and funding criteria. Instead, the DBSA project 
portfolio was a reflection of the Apartheid regime‟s targeted separate development 
initiatives of strategically placed industrial buffer-zones in less developed Bantustan 
self-governed and independent territories.  
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Almost three decades later, the DBSA continues to finance the same areas in South 
Africa, albeit now they are known as municipalities (DBSA 2004; DBSA Internal 
Dataset 2008-2013). This chapter provides more detailed evidence of the manner in 
which the DBSA has deviated from its gap-filling role. 
Throughout this chapter, questions of the kinds of projects financed by the DBSA are 
asked in an attempt to provide a more detailed account of the DBSA‟s gap-filling 
role. To analyse the Bank‟s gap-filling role, this chapter investigates the kind of 
client, sectors and geographic areas obtaining development finance from the DBSA. 
This information will help identify whether or not the Bank is performing its 
development finance role of filling gaps in the market. 
5.1 Project finance cycle: A framework for the DBSA  
Project finance, being the key role performed by the DBSA, is carried out through a 
systematic cycle embedded in planning and thorough consultation. The DBSA‟s 
project finance cycles from 1985 to date offer little if any significant difference. The 
relevance of the project finance cycle is that it explains how the issue is not so much 
that the process is flawed – it is the fact that it is the same one used by most other 
finance institutions. Therefore, greater emphasis should be placed upon who 
receives finance and for what kind of projects.   
5.1.1 Phases of project cycle  
In the DBSA Annual report of 1985/86, the Bank notes the different phases of the 
project cycle. Figure 9 indicates a classic case of the project finance process but 
excludes instances where difficulties may arise. 
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Figure 9: Phases of DBSA project cycle 
  
Source: Author’s own diagram 
The project phases displayed in Figure 9 above are:  
1. Identification phase; 
2. Preparation phase; 
3. Appraisal phase; 
4. Negotiation and implementation phase and; 
5. Evaluation phase.   
The Identification phase entails the identification by the borrowers of the key 
development projects likely to fall within the realms of the DBSA financing criteria.  
The identification phase is then followed by the preparation phase which involves a 
“systematic planning process” to ensure plans submitted by borrowers are in 
accordance to the DBSA standards of finance application.  
The preparation phase is often the longest and most demanding as it entails 
thorough research plus appointment of consultants and experts to ensure project 
details are in accordance to the development policy and representative of the 
strategy of the participating borrower i.e. The Bantustan state (in the pre-1994 era); 
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municipality; SOE. This stage involves interaction with DBSA project teams who are 
equipped to advise on the project application.  
The third step is the Appraisal phase. This is the final planning stage ensuring 
projects are ready for “appraisal and final consideration” by the Bank.  Most projects 
do not get to the appraisal phase. In such a scenario, they will revert to the 
preparation phase; or start the entire process again; or be rejected altogether. 
In instances where a project is approved, it progresses to the negotiation and 
implementation phase. This phase entails the borrower reviewing the terms of 
reference of the loan. Once accepted, the loan agreement is signed between the 
DBSA and the borrower.  
The evaluation phase is then the final stage which requires joint evaluation by the 
Bank and the borrower. Together, they analyse the outcome of the project as well as 
the effective and efficient use of resources to achieve development objectives. The 
evaluation will also reveal lessons to be learned and applied to similar projects. 
The evaluation phase is arguably the most important of all as it is the most aligned to 
the DBSA‟s development mandate and distinguishes the Bank from other 
commercial banks. The consultation with the borrowers is not only an opportunity for 
the DBSA to revise their product offering; it also becomes the link between the DBSA 
and the main shareholder. During the evaluation phase, the Bank is in a position to 
evaluate if the proposed project contributes to not only the DBSA‟s mandate but 
most importantly, to the development objectives of the main shareholder – the South 
African government.  
The above process enables the DBSA to act as a gap-filler primarily because it has 
time within engagements to gauge the development impact of the project and its 
alignment to the demands of the main-shareholder.  
This study was unable to establish the means in which the Bank measured 
alignment to the development objectives of the South African government prior to 
1994. However, post 1994 the measurement tool used was the Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) Model.  
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The SAM model is a standard set of indicators used by the Bank to measure 
development impact of its operations. Based on its funding portfolio, the Bank is able 
to calculate “a range of economic and socio-economic impact indicators” (Annual 
Report 2007/08; Interviewee A: 1 June 2013). Further details pertaining to 
development impact follow in section 5.2. 
By evaluating the expected development impact of a project application, 
development impact is hypothetically a key component within the evaluation process 
of the project finance cycle. The evaluation phase is also an integral part of risk 
management practices and aims to ensure all present and future risks are avoided. 
According to the DBSA, this can be achieved by ensuring that projects are “socially 
responsible, environmentally sustainable, technically appropriate, and legally and 
contractually sound.  All risks must be clearly identified, thoroughly analysed and 
prudently mitigated.” (www.dbsa.org).  
The project cycle discussed above, describes the process of project finance and 
provides important background to understand the framework the DBSA acts within. 
Likewise, the engagement model in Figure 10 fulfils the same purpose by further 
making a distinction between engagements by “Capital markets and commercial 
banks” and “Conventional development banks”. The Model further illustrates the 
envisioned “2014 DBSA development bank model”. This is important for this study as 
it illustrates the role the DBSA is intended to perform that is not performed by other 
financial institutions. 
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Figure 10: DBSA envisioned engagement model 2014 
 
Source: No 4 Internal DBSA 2010 
The top arrows “Pre Project”, “Entry point range” and “Exit point range” are all 
phases within the project finance chain in which the DBSA was already engaged. 
“Capital markets and commercial banks” only finance projects as illustrated in Step 3 
of the engagement model. Whereas a “conventional development bank” will go 
beyond financing the project to “Identify”, “Appraise”, “Finance” “Plan and procure”; 
all of which have been discussed in the earlier section. The role of a conventional 
development bank would thus end at the stage of “Plan and procure”.  
The diagram also emphasises what was mentioned by Interviewee B: 4 (December 
2012). The commercial banks only came into the development space to provide 
finance and not to provide technical support to plan project proposals and create 
implementation strategies. It is clearly depicted in the diagram, that “Capital markets 
and commercial banks” are only concerned with step 3 “Finance” and not with step 
4, “plan and procure”. 
Conversely, the “Vision 2014 DBSA development bank model” was proposed to go 
beyond steps performed by conventional development banks as it would “Monitor 
implementation”. 
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 The 2014 DBSA development bank model would be at the forefront of 
“Development Planning, mobilisation, partnerships and facilitation”, all in an attempt 
to ensure project success. By monitoring implementation, the role depicted above 
would be an important link to achieving government objectives of service delivery. 
The project would have a “direct impact” on the target population and be in line with 
achieving the development objectives of the South African government (Sibisi 2009).  
The 2014 model as envisioned did not ultimately materialise. The Bank, undergoing 
restructuring in 2012, to be discussed in the next chapter, had an adverse impact 
upon DBSA approaches and strategies which had earlier been codified.  
When a project application for finance is received, in practice, the steps below are 
the chain of events within the internal DBSA structures.  
5.1.2 Step by step: DBSA project finance in practice  
Step 1.  Receipt of business plan from borrower.  
This document details the nature, scope, organisational structure of 
the institution/sponsor. It demonstrates “technical and financial 
ability to plan and implement a project” 
Step 2.  Evaluation of the business plan.  
DBSA assumes financial, environmental, economical, technical, 
legal and institutional aspects of the project with the project owner 
Step 3.  DBSA releases a “project appraisal report” and “term sheet”  
This is the report submitted to Executive Management for approval 
and later, again reported to the Board of Directors 
Step 4.  Once approved, negotiations are entered into with clients 
Negotiations regarding proposed terms and conditions  
Step 5.  Finalisation of legal documentation and disbursement of funds. 
Once a borrower has submitted an application to the DBSA, the process time for 
appraisal and decision-making can take from two to three months. This is assuming 
the project application is indicative of a venture at an advanced stage of preparation 
with information readily available (www.dbsa.org).   
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In performing its gap-filling role, the Bank will not provide a loan for the entire project 
cost. Instead, it will fund a portion of the costs. For example, in the 1984/85 Annual 
report, the Bank granted a loan amounting to R1, 5 million to the Venda homeland, 
for the upgrading of electricity supply. However, the total project cost was R7,5 
million . Likewise, in the 2006/07 Annual Report, it was stated the DBSA contributed 
R7,3 million to the R17,6 million Gillimburg Farming project based in Limpopo. The 
project entailed the establishment of an animal feed company for national and local 
distribution.  
 
To address the gap of development finance, the DBSA would typically grant a loan 
over an extended period of time. For instance, in 1984, a loan of R21, 5 million at a 6 
per cent interest rate over a 40 year term was granted for the construction of the Fika 
Patso Dam on the Namahadi River in Qwaqwa (DBSA Annual Report 1984/85).  
 
Such a protracted lending period gives the DBSA a competitive advantage as most 
commercial banks only grant credit lines for a maximum of 10 years (Interviewee A1 
June 2013). The extension of credit lines over such long periods of time continues to 
be a distinguishing feature of the current DBSA. In performing its development 
finance role, Interviewee A3 (December 2012) described the development finance 
process as retail financing “…the bank is wholesaling; essentially wholesaling its 
money” (Interviewee A2 June 2013). Such a view was in contrast to how 
development-centred project finance is ideally supposed to be described, as that of 
filling gaps in the market.  
However, in practice the wholesaling spoken of in the project cycle is the pitting of 
some projects against others irrespective of high development returns. Interviewee 
A2 (June 2013) and Interviewee B4 (December 2012) also shared similar sentiments 
by adding that there was ambiguity regarding why some projects were granted 
finance while others were declined. On other occasions, projects were not 
scrutinised based on their contribution to overall development which goes against 
the traditional model of project finance. This then raised the question of the criteria 
used by the DBSA for project classification and the extent development impact was 
prioritised in the decision-making of which projects received finance and which did 
not.   
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5.2 Development finance with impact?  
Musasike (2004:15) argued development impact can only be attained through 
“sound governance, fiscal and outreach policies”. By this he implied that through 
policies embedded in the prioritisation of basic needs of under-developed areas, the 
impact is more likely to be felt by the beneficiaries of the development project.  
In the case of the DBSA, the shareholder, measures the success of the DBSA‟s 
development impact through the yardstick of improved living conditions of affected 
communities. Processes adopted by the DBSA to measure development impact and 
its indicators are tabulated below:   
Table 4: Development impact indicators (Figures calculated over last 10 years) 
 Total approvals 
including co-funders 
Total DBSA loans 
approved 
Project Funding ($ million) $10, 889 $3,723 
Contribution to GDP ($million) $7, 940 $2,176 
Employment creation (numbers) 527,874 143,904 
       Skilled (numbers) 51,250 15,355 
       Semi-skilled (numbers) 227,027 63,100 
       Unskilled (numbers) 249,597 65,449 
Impact on low income 
households ($ million) 
$968 $328 
Source:  DBSA 2004, Ten Year Review. Development Bank of Southern Africa, Midrand, South Africa. 
The column titled “Total approvals including co-funders” pertains to the DBSA‟s third-
party funding it has leveraged to achieve development objectives both in South 
Africa and the Southern African region. Partnerships can include governments, 
regional bodies and even private enterprises. “Projects supported by the DBSA have 
contributed $2.176 million to the region‟s GDP over the last 10 years” (Musasike 
2004:15).  
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Of all the interviews conducted, little was said regarding development impact, 
interviewee A1 June 2013) even noted that the SAM model was predominantly used 
for annual reporting purposes, and not so much in practice when project finance 
decision-making occurs.  
It further emerged reporting making reference to development impact was essentially 
a practice to align with the main-shareholder. Although the Bank reports on the 
development impact of its actions (Annual Report 2004/05; 2005/06; 2008/09; 
2010/2011; 2010/11), linkages between these activities and their relevance to 
broader South African development policies and priorities – particularly those about 
infrastructure development – were often difficult to follow.  
For instance, the 2006/07 Phumalani Lodge Tourism Development project in 
Mpumalanga was centred on “stimulating the economy”. This was to be 
accomplished through temporary and sustainable jobs through the establishment of 
an African Safari in the Lowveld area. The focus on tourism-led employment 
opportunities, although present in government policies, was not adequately reported 
with clear linkages to the DBSA‟s role in tourism development. This was clearly a 
role not included in the Bank‟s infrastructure development mandate. 
This is in contrast to annual reports between 1984 and 1990 which recounted at 
length on linkage of activities with broader government policies.  
As mentioned in chapter four, the stark difference from a reporting perspective is that 
the 1984 to 1989 DBSA annual reports (1984/85; 1986/87; 1988/89) appear as 
though they were government sponsored advocacy tools directly influenced by the 
RSA administration.  
The 1989 to 1994 annual reports (1989/90; 1990/91; 1991/92; 1992/93; 1993/94; 
1994/95) are clouded with uncertainty and an almost uneasiness of the changing 
institutional environment. It is apparent the restructuring of the Bank was meant for it 
to fit into an institutional environment characterised by an ailing economy and 
transitional political climate.  
In contrast, the 1995 - 2013 DBSA Annual reports (1995/96; 1999/00; 2002/03; 
2004/05; 2010/11; 2011/12; 2012/13) revealed a trend of gradually becoming less 
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reflective of government influence. Differences in reporting trends during the pre/post 
1994 eras are important to acknowledge. This is because they are likely to reveal 
nuances of how the bank interpreted its mandate as well as the kind of relationship 
the DBSA had with its main shareholder.  
Development impact was thus not always an evident contributing factor considered 
when decisions were made regarding which project would receive finance from the 
DBSA. The project cycle and envisioned engagement model discussed highlighted 
the differences between procedures and steps to be taken when conducting project 
finance and what happens in reality.  
Development impact, although being a key determinant of the DBSA‟s alignment to 
the shareholder‟s development expectations, was not a contributing factor to project 
finance decision-making. The following section argues that the nature and kinds of 
projects financed by the DBSA are best understood by classifying them on their 
sectorial and geographical features and whether such attributes are in line with the 
DBSA‟s mandate of gap-filling as defined in chapter four.  
5.3 Project Finance in reality  
The DBSA website (www.dbsa.org) notes how, in order to qualify for finance; 
projects are required to meet a set of criteria. These include risk management, 
alignment to the DBSAs sectorial and geographical mandate, development impact, 
institutional capacity and financial and economic viability. So, to answer the first and 
second research questions, the sections which follow present data and analysis. 
Queries to be answered are: does financing certain projects fall within the DBSA‟s 
sectorial and geographic mandate?  Are such projects economic and financially 
viable?   
A project “must be consistent with the DBSA‟s sectorial and geographic mandate i.e. 
support of infrastructure development within South Africa and the SADC region” 
(www.dbsa.org). Due to legacies of the past, the criterion of a geographic mandate 
mirrors that of the DBSA under the Apartheid regime – concentrated on the 
development of certain regions.  
Figure 11 illustrates the geographical activities of the Bank during the 1985/86 
financial year.  
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Figure 11: Development regions DBSA operated in 1985-1986 
 
Source: DBSA Annual Report 1984/85 
Region D followed by region E were the greatest recipients of Bank loans in 1984/85 
(DBSA Annual Report 1984/85:12). Both regions fell within the industrial nodes in the 
Bantustans and supported infrastructure development and factories (No. 4 Internal 
DBSA 2010). From the above, it is clear that geographically, the DBSA‟s 
concentration of development finance strategically targeted designated nodes in the 
Bantustans. This was in line with its mandate of gap-filling in designated 
geographical areas. This outcome echoes similar findings discussed in chapter four 
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demonstrating that prior to 1994, DBSA activity was largely in the underdeveloped 
Bantustans.    
  
Figure 12: Project approvals per province 2007/08 (in per centage) 
 
Source: DBSA Annual Report 2007/08 
In contrast, the geographical focus of the DBSA in 2007/08 does tell quite a different 
story. As per figure 12, the (2007/08) DBSA Annual report recorded KwaZulu-Natal 
received the highest number of project approvals amounting to 54 per cent. This was 
followed by 15 per cent going to Gauteng. The reasons noted for this were:   
 
 “(these provinces had)…metropolitan municipalities and larger urban centres which 
continued to receive significant support, given their higher absorption capacity and 
the concentration of poor communities in urban areas” (DBSA Annual Report 
2007/08).  
 
The above reasons contradict the DBSA‟s gap-filling role from the most deserving 
client perspective. Since the Bank is intended to provide financing for municipalities 
unlikely to obtain development finance, the focus on metropolitan municipalities and 
urban centres defeats the gap-filling role the DBSA is intended to perform. This is 
largely because these clients are likely to secure finance from the private sector. 
Although, the DBSA can provide finance to larger municipalities on the grounds of 
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high development impact, the proportion of finance to such clients should not exceed 
that of deserving clients. 
 
Figure 13: Approvals per province 2006/07 (in per centage) 
 
 
For instance, a year earlier, a similar trend was observed in Figure 13. Here Gauteng 
Province and the National government were the largest recipients of development 
finance, together accounting for 71.4 per cent. This was despite their being the most 
likely candidates to secure finance from the private sector (DBSA Annual 2006/07).  
 
KwaZulu-Natal, in contrast, received the least amount of development finance at 0.5 
per cent. The disparity of KwaZulu-Natal being the highest recipient of finance in one 
year followed by being the lowest the following year was a common finding in most 
annual reports post 1994. The difficulty to monitor trends was indicative of a 
somewhat scattered interpretation of the geographical focus and nature of clients 
prioritised for development finance.  
 
Trends were more evident in the DBSA‟s annual reports prior to 1994. This was 
when the role of the Bank was wide-ranging warranting a broad scope of 
development finance in an array of sectors.  
Prior to 1994, the Bank‟s activities predominantly involved Urban Development, 
Rural and Agriculture Development as well as Small business Development. In order 
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to carry out these pursuits, the Bank divided its operations into a variety of 
programmes. These dealt with agriculture, forestry and fisheries, industries, 
commerce, tourism, mining and mineral affairs, urban development and housing, 
manpower development and infrastructure (Annual Report 1984/85). 
 
Of the loans disbursed in these programmes, the Industrial Development 
Programme in the KwaZulu Bantustan received the most financing. An amount of 
R79 million was allocated to the industrial development of the Madendeni, Isithebe 
and Ezakheni areas via the construction of factories and supporting infrastructure in 
the 1984/85 financial year (DBSA Annual Report 1984/85).  
 
An examination of several DBSA annual reports (1987/88; 1988/89; 1990/1991) also 
revealed a similar pattern of the Bank being involved in regional segregation through 
the development of industrial nodes, as per the Apartheid government‟s strategy. For 
instance, 1984/85 Annual report noted how: 
“Of the total 52 loans for 40 investment projects approved by the Board of Directors, 
19 were for the promotion of Industrial development. This represented 78 per cent of 
the total investment value and 66 per cent of the total loan amount approved during 
this period” 
By aligning itself to Apartheid government policy, the DBSA was acting within its 
broad scope of gap-filling by backing industrial development in the Bantustan 
territories. As such, from a sectorial perspective as argued in chapter four, it appears 
the DBSA‟s activities were wide in scope and, so mandated the Bank to act within its 
wide authority.   
 
Between 1994 and 1996, the DBSA continued to finance municipalities in the former 
Bantustans. However, annual reports seem to place greater emphasis upon bulk 
infrastructure development in rural and urban areas. The 1994/95 Annual Report 
particularly noted R 1 472 million in loans was disbursed. Of this, R917 million was 
allocated to infrastructure representing 62 per cent of all loans earmarked for bulk 
infrastructure development.  
Breaking it down further, of the R 917 million, R400 million went to “connector and 
distribution infrastructure” such as water and sanitation, pipelines as well as electric 
cabling”. However, electrical infrastructure finance was already a prominent aspect 
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of the DBSA‟s sectorial projects in 1994/95. This set precedent for the continuation 
of financing electricity in the years to follow. For example, in 2013/14, Eskom 
received additional project finance from the DBSA. Further details of this loan are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
The above discussion of the geographical and sectorial focus of DBSA projects 
financed prior and post 1994 have illustrated how the Bank has been able to align 
itself to its geographic mandate of development finance prior to 1994. Post 1994, it 
appears the Bank has financed projects within the South African provinces.  
However in most instances, provinces financed had strong metropolitan 
municipalities very able to have secured finance from other sources. In proportion to 
the size of loans extended, richer, less risky municipalities were chosen over poorer 
municipalities. Therefore, indications are clear, post 1994 the Bank has deviated 
from its gap-filling role.  
 
An even clearer indicator of the nature of Bank financed projects is the kind of client 
base the DBSA has attracted over the years. However, such clients generally do not 
fall within the deserving client criteria. 
5.4 Financial and economic viability: motive for the DBSA’s 
client-base?  
By definition the primary objective of a development bank is to endeavour to achieve 
development;  
“…(the bank cannot be) oblivious to the profit motive… unlike a business enterprise, 
making the maximum possible profit may not be its obsession, yet it must make 
reasonable..., steady profits ... to maintain its viability” (Ligeti 1985:305). 
The Bank‟s likelihood to remain self-sustainable, yet still development centred lies 
largely upon who its client are as well as the ability of these clients to honour their 
obligations.  
From all the annual reports reviewed, it became clear the DBSA‟s main client is the 
South African public sector. In order to perform its gap-filling role, the majority of the 
DBSA‟s client base should be the public sector. In particular, municipalities 
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perceived as being high risk clients and unlikely to secure finance should receive 
DBSA assistance (No. 3 Internal DBSA 2009; Smallridge 2011).   
 
However, municipalities in metro areas such as Tshwane do not struggle to acquire 
private sector development finance (Interviewee A3 December 2012). In order to be 
a true gap-filler, the DBSA should be financing municipalities least likely to receive 
financing from the market due to being high risk clients who are unlikely to absorb 
the finance granted.   
 
Some interviewee‟s (Interviewee B1 December 2013, Interviewee B4 December 
2012, Interviewee A3 December 2012) did attest the DBSA does prioritise funding 
for under-resourced municipalities. Interviewee A3 (December 2012) advocated that: 
“…when we analyse the provinces, we analyse the poorest of the poor provinces…in 
other words those (who) economically are on their last legs… and those are Limpopo 
and the Eastern Cape”. 
 
From a review of literature on South African municipalities (No. 3 Internal DBSA 
2009; Sibisi 2009), it is evident municipalities most in need of economic development 
finance, are the least capacitated to qualify for development finance (Sibisi 2009: 
14). As noted in chapter 2 (literature review), the study used the assumption that 
2gap filling equates to financing both deserving clients in infrastructure projects. 
 
On many occasions, the DBSA did forgo financing poor municipalities in favour of 
profit generating clients such as Metropolitan municipalities and non-municipal 
clients. This caused the DBSA to be misaligned with its gap-filling, development 
finance mandate.  
 
Moreover, since 2011, the Bank began the practice of increasing the minimum 
threshold of loans to R15 million. By so doing, the Bank has-out priced poorer 
municipalities (Interviewee A1 June 2013). Out-pricing poorer municipalities 
translates into the DBSA inherently institutionalising the crowding out of the 
                                                          
2
 In order for DBSA activities to be recognised as gap-filling, finance must be granted to projects led by both deserving clients and infrastructure 
development-centred projects. 
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“deserving client”. The aftermath of such policies is evident in figure 14 which is an 
illustration of the DBSA client base for the 2010/11 period. 
 
Figure 14: Disbursements by type of client 2010/11
 
Source: DBSA Annual report 2010/11 
Figure 14 illustrates those secondary towns, known as district municipalities, were 
the second highest recipients of development finance; accounting for 29 per cent. 
Although secondary municipalities may be able to find funding from other sources 
they remain the DBSA‟s ideal client. This is because they are more likely to honour 
their debt obligations but are not always granted financing from the private sector.  
However, collecting the greatest amount of development finance are non-municipal 
clients who received 35 per cent of DBSA disbursements. This study does 
acknowledge that if the data was interpreted from a perspective of grouping all 
municipalities together, the cumulative would be greater than the “non-municipal 
clients”.  
Nevertheless, the unevenness between the most deserving clients and non-
municipal clients is glaringly evident. Under-resourced municipalities received 8 per 
cent of the DBSA‟s funding while non-municipal clients were awarded 35 per cent. 
This remains a key finding not to be ignored.  Further examination revealed non-
municipal clients included mining companies, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
35 
29 
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11 
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Universities and Trusts. Such a discovery was disturbing as a majority of the above 
were more than likely to secure grants and finance from the private sector.   
A closer examination of the make-up of mining companies constituting some of these 
non-municipal clients revealed they were B-BBEE companies. This echoes similar 
findings to be discussed in the next chapter regarding Board members who have 
vested interests in DBSA-financed B-BBEE projects.   
The Banks involvement in supporting B-BBEE projects did not come as a surprise. 
As early as 1994/95 Annual Reports revealed the Bank‟s involvement in the 
restructuring of the construction industry so to “include black contractors”.  
DBSA internal Dataset (2008-2013) also revealed B-BBEE companies receiving 
DBSA loans were mostly entrepreneurial, entering into green-fields projects. By 
financing B-BBEE entrepreneurs not focused on infrastructure development, the 
DBSA was not operating within its mandate. This is because such companies fall 
within the realm of other South African DFIs such as Sefa.  
Unlike the DBSA‟s mandate prior to 1994, which included entrepreneurial 
development (DBSA Annual report 1985/86), the post 1994 mandate clearly makes a 
distinction: The DBSA should only be engaged in infrastructure development projects 
and not the incubation of entrepreneurs.   
Of all the non-municipal clients, Eskom received the highest amount of development 
finance – R1 billion for the 2010/11 financial year. However, for the 2010/2011 to 
2012/13 period that amount rose to R15 billion (DBSA Internal Dataset 2008-2013; 
Engineering News 2010). In the history of the DBSA, this particular loan extended to 
Eskom was the largest ever granted to a single borrower (DBSA internal Dataset 
2008-2013; Interviewee B1 December 2013).  
In 2010, prior to the DBSA loan, Eskom had already received a R60 billion 
subordinate loan from the government, “as well as guarantees set at R350 billion” 
(Engineering News 2010). To add to this rather complex Eskom case, is that the 
company‟s infrastructure building programme had “escalated from R84 billion to 
R395 billion” in the space of only five years with no recorded explanation (PARI 
2004). 
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Eskom is a particularly interesting case since at the time of receiving finance the 
Bank had experienced substantial financial losses. This is discussed in detail in next 
chapter. Extending such a massive loan to Eskom created strain on the already 
fragile DBSA reserves (No. 2 Internal DBSA 2012; Interviewee A1 June 2013).  
In summation, the DBSA‟s decision to finance some projects over others was quite 
unpredictable. This rendered the possibility of establishing a clear pattern rather 
problematic. However, what became clearer to explain was the strong correlation 
between the changing institutional environment, the Bank‟s financial stability and the 
kinds of projects the DBSA would support.  
 
This was/is fundamentally shaped by pressures created by the Bank‟s funding model 
which is analysed in detail in the chapter that follows. Other institutional factors 
influencing the Bank‟s decision-making have been illustrated in previous chapters i.e. 
the competitive market economy and the challenging municipal environment.  
 
A clear illustration of an institutional context element influencing the DBSA is the 
choice to finance projects advocated by B-BBEE companies. This is despite these 
companies not falling within the infrastructure development mandate and/or the 
deserving client criteria.  
 
By financing such projects, the DBSA would be in line with fulfilling expectations of 
the main-shareholder – the South African government. With the advent of the new, 
democratic, regime strong emphasis was placed upon the empowerment of 
previously disadvantaged communities and their entry into the formal economy 
under B-BBEE policy (DBSA 2004). However, financing B-BBEE projects cannot be 
simplified to that level only and this has already been discussed earlier in this study.  
 
Figure 14 illustrates how pressures of a competitive market economy and policy 
expectations from the main-shareholder can define the norms of how a body such as 
the DBSA behaves in order to survive within the institutional environment (Zhu & 
Thatcher 2010:56).   
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Figure 14: DBSA Client base 1994/95  
 
Source: Annual Report 1994/95 
During 1994/95, the Bank was principally involved with institutional building (DBSA 
Annual Report 1994/95). This explains why in one fiscal year 50.8 per cent of DBSA 
funds went to the National government and provinces. At that time, rezoning of 
former Bantustans was one of the Bank‟s highest priorities (Sibisi 2009). 
Furthermore, at the time, the DBSA mandate was not specific to infrastructure 
development (i.e. the DBSA Act introduced in 1997).   
 
Figure 14 and 15 illustrate the core argument presented throughout this chapter. 
Despite having specific criteria for project classification, the Bank has repeatedly 
chosen a client-base which is less risky and able to receive funds from the private 
sector.  Post 1994, such decisions have caused the Bank to fail in performing its 
gap-filling role. 
Figure 15 which centres on the 2004 market focus, clearly states how by 2004, 54 
per cent of the SA book debt was from low risk Metropolitan municipalities. Medium 
and high risk municipalities, prime candidates for the DBSA‟s gap-filling programme, 
were relegated to second and third place.    
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Figure 15:  DBSA market focus 2004 
 
Source: Jackson 2004 
 
As argued by a report by the Finance Fiscal Commission (2010), this study agrees 
that “Metros should be treated differently as they have the resources to compete…in 
the open market”.  
 
From the above discussion, findings have revealed post 1994; the DBSA has not 
acted in line with its mandate to be a gap-filler. Municipalities most in need of 
development finance are excluded from obtaining project finance and overtaken by 
SOE‟s such as Eskom and Metropolitan municipalities with the organisational 
capacity to compete in the market economy.  
 
Why then has the DBSA become reluctant to finance poor municipalities? As noted 
in chapter four, the most common theme arising from the interviews was generally, 
people in poorer municipalities lacked institutional capacity. They fundamentally did 
not have the capacity to properly administer development finance. A probable 
remedy to address such institutional weaknesses, was thought to be the introduction 
of Siyenza Manje. 
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5.5 Technical Assistance: a case of Siyenza Manje 
As noted on the DBSA website, a crucial principle for project finance is the 
implementing agency “has the institutional capacity to plan, implement and manage 
the project”. Capacity not only means the ability to properly allocate development 
finance, but also to manage it and see the project through to successful completion.  
However, the hard fact is: the DBSA‟s primary clients – the municipalities – are 
headed by people incapable of translating development financing into fully realised 
development outcomes. This has led to further initiatives aimed at addressing such 
shortfalls.  
 
Post 1994, the first DBSA flagship project for capacity building was the “Siyenza 
Manje” Project – translated as: “we are doing it now” – commencing in May 2006. 
However, this was not the first capacity building project introduced in South Africa. 
Earlier government-led initiatives included Project Viability introduced in 1995. This 
programme was established to discourage the culture of non-payment for services 
among communities (No. 2 Internal DBSA 2012).  
 
Project Consolidate was inaugurated in October 2004 as a reaction to the 
underperformance of ailing municipalities (Financial and Fiscal Commission 2010). 
The Siyenza Manje programme was premised on the same practices and principles 
as Project Consolidate (Development Fund Annual Report 2005/2006:5).  
 
Capacity building of municipalities is a recurring theme of the DBSA‟s approach to 
rehabilitate ailing municipalities or regions it supports. As far back as the early 
1980s, the Bank was actively engaged in what it termed “Technical assistance” 
(DBSA Annual report 1987/1988). “Technical Assistance” programs introduced 
throughout the existence of the DBSA culminated in 2006 (DBSA Annual Reports 
1984-2005). The aftermath of the Bantustans resulted in an uneven institutional 
environment.  Financially sound Metropolitan municipalities were able to garner 
financial support from the market while poor local municipalities grapple with both 
strategic and functional operations.   
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The inconsistency of the institutional environment is described well by Chipkin & 
Meny-Gibert (2011: 4):  
“…the uneven character of public sector performance, especially at provincial and 
local government level, for example, is partly a function of the uneven and differential 
relations of new provincial governments to former Homeland administrations and 
administrators. This is likely true of local governments too. The viability and the 
institutional fortunes of post-apartheid, local and provincial governments owe a lot to 
the history of their emergence, in particular, the process of integration of former black 
and white, local authorities.”  
As documented above, changes in the socio-political climate during democratisation 
had a resultant effect of unevenness in the South African public sector. Some 
municipalities were unable to adequately oversee development finance offered by 
the DBSA.   
 
In order to bridge the gap and the unevenness, the DBSA spearheaded the Siyenza 
Manje programme. This initiative operated alongside a joint collaboration with the 
Office of the Presidency, National Treasury, Department of Provincial and Local 
Government, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Southern African Local 
Government Association (SALGA) and provincial governments (Annual Report 
2007/2008: 24).  
 
The central aim of the Siyenza Manje programme was municipal capacity building for 
infrastructure development through the deployment of expertise, to provide hands-on 
financial, technical and planning support, as well as on-the-job training.  
 
Initially, the programme was created to “strengthen engineering and project 
management capacity. However, this was later expanded to include financial 
management capacity” (Financial and Fiscal Commission 2010). By strengthening 
these facets of municipalities, it was assumed the programme would open 
bottlenecks and accelerate the expenditure of the Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
(MIG) funding, offered by the South African government. 
 
To ensure capacity building, the Siyenza Manje programme consisted of a two-
pronged approach. Senior/retired professionals – engineers, planners and finance 
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professionals along with young professionals – were deployed to municipalities 
identified as having weak capacity (Financial and Fiscal Commission 2010:6).  
Interviewee B1 (December 2013) was at the forefront of managing this programme 
and commented on the kind of skilled professionals employed.  
“We employed finance experts, chartered accountants, and town planners – those 
three sectors. We deployed them into municipalities who would otherwise not be able 
to afford to employ them on a fulltime basis. We employed them and positioned them 
in that municipality to support the municipality to deliver on infrastructure, manage its 
finances/books, and do proper planning.” 
In Interviewee B1‟s (December 2013) opinion, the Siyenza Manje was a “ground-
breaking programme” and a success in the municipalities it was implemented. The 
Siyenza Manje was so successful it was reported in numerous Development Fund 
annual reports between 2006/2007 through 2010/2011.  
 
By 2010/2011, Municipal Infrastructure Grants (MIGs) to the value of R8, 7 billion 
had been expedited (1 114 technical and 1 994 non-technical projects were 
completed). A total of “826 professionals had been deployed to 186 municipalities 
and 20 provincial departments” (Development Fund annual report 2010/11).  
 
Although there were pockets of success with the Siyenza Manje programme, it met 
with much more criticism than praise. Of the seven interviews conducted, a majority 
– four out of seven – believed the Siyenza Manje programme became a liability.  
Even though the Siyenza Manje had an accumulative development impact, the 
Bank‟s financial commitments to it were increasing yearly.  
Similarly, the Financial and Fiscal Commission in its report to the Finance committee 
in Parliament revealed the Rand value of budget allocations to Siyenza Manje from 
the National Fiscus and the DBSA Development Fund between 2006/07 and 
2009/10:   
“Between 2006/07 and 2010/11 the Siyenza Manje project was allocated an amount 
of approximately R1.445 billion. Of this amount the contribution of the national Fiscus 
was slightly above R1 billion and that of the DBSA Development Fund was in the 
region of R433 million.” 
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Table 5 confirmed the statement made in Parliament:  
Table 5: Siyenza Manje budget allocations (2006-2011) 
 
 
 
R million 
 
Audited outcome 
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Fiscal Transfers - 
Siyenza Manje 
258.3 168.9 246.8 267.4 93.0 
DBSA- Siyenza 
Manje 
- 36.4 94.0 137.0 123.0 
Total 258.3 205.3 340.8 404.4 216.0 
Source: Financial and Fiscal Commission 2010 
From the table above, it is also clear the outlay to keep Siyenza Manje afloat was 
increasing. The table also shows that from the inception of Siyenza Manje, the DBSA 
contributed comparatively little – less than 34 per cent of total budget allocations – 
while the Fiscus contributed the remainder.  
An interesting trend, however, begins to emerge where the DBSA increases its 
contributions between 2007/08 through 2009/10, while Fiscal transfers consistently 
remain within the R170-R250 million ranges. The increase in commitment by the 
DBSA suggests a somewhat overcrowding and almost lax financial approach by the 
government.   
Interviewee A2 (June 2013) succinctly described the position the DBSA finds itself: 
“…The DBSA Siyenza Manje project was met with limited success primarily because 
the DBSA was acting as a supportive entity, with zero decision-making capacity in 
the municipalities.” The subsequent failure of the project, he claims, was because 
“government decision-making and support to sign-off something as little as 
procurement for a paper-clip was filled with red-tape”. This was within the context of 
the Bank increasing its financial contributions and commitments.  
From the above, it emerges the DBSA was within its municipality building capacity, 
yet the Bank had limited power to make any decisions. Interviewee A3 (December 
2012) noted: 
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 “…there was no decision taking on the bank‟s side. We just go in there and provide 
the assistance and help them up to a level. They (the municipalities) were the ones 
who had to make decisions. And that is in essence when the dynamics of the 
relationship started to give us problems as well.” 
The DBSA operated in the internal realm of municipal day-to-day functions. Yet their 
mandate did not call for them to be a “gate-keeper” for municipal management. 
Moreover, the presence of Siyenza Manje “de-ployees3” started to cause the inverse 
of what it was intended to achieve. Interviewee A3 (December 2012) noted: 
“Siyenza Manje was better paying, it attracted skilled and experienced people from 
[the] municipalities, thus creating huge vacancy rates, and leaving capacity to root 
the programme within municipalities thin. DBSA experts became gap fillers, instead 
of transferring skills. As a result, the possibility of municipalities being perpetually 
dependent on the Siyenza Manje experts was high.” 
Siyenza Manje reveals an important observation. The DBSA initially performed 
contributory functions such as shaping municipalities. Yet the Bank did not have the 
full mandate to decide the final trajectory of these municipalities. Thus the DBSA, 
although acting in good faith to provide technical assistance, its activities were 
misaligned to accomplish its gap-filling role.  
The Bank poured enormous amounts of capital into the bottomless pit called Siyenza 
Manje. This capital could have been extended to other projects far more deserving of 
development finance.  
5.5.1 Learning valuable lessons  
The Bank, along with its partners, should not have defined human capital as the only 
element of capacity building. Rather, they could have adopted a multidimensional 
view taking into consideration organisational and human resource complexities such 
as recruitment and retention of permanent municipal staff. As well, being a money 
lender, the DBSA should have understood the institutional constraints impacting the 
overall performance of municipalities.  
                                                          
3
 De-ployees: Employees on the DBSA pay-roll who have been deployed and contracted to work under the 
Siyenza Manje programme. 
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The Bank should have offered its services within the limitations of its mandate as a 
gap-filler, and not overriding the role of the state. It is from such a context, the DBSA 
could have defined its soft-infrastructure role; specifically taking into consideration its 
own development finance gap-filling responsibility.  
The programme also failed to generate a clear outline of measureable timelines, 
targets and objectives clearly stating the conditions of exit of a municipality from the 
programme. Likewise, the lack of a specific time frame created a situation where 
municipalities developed an expectation of long-term support. This left room for 
dangerous presidents leading to a “dependency syndrome” (Financial and Fiscal 
Commission 2010). 
The Siyenza Manje project created a division of the core capacity-building functions 
of municipal infrastructure and finance. These functions were divided between the 
National Treasury and the Department of Cooperative Governance (DCOG). The 
National Treasury operated by initiating the Municipal Finance Improvement 
programme. The Department of Cooperative Governance (DCOG) utilised the 
services of the Municipal Infrastructure Support Agency (MISA).  
What the Siyenza Manje case adds to this study is: it provides an answer to the 
question of whether or not the DBSA acts within its infrastructure development 
mandate. The capacity-building role played by the DBSA was predominantly the 
constitutional mandate of several government departments; not its own.  Moreover, 
the request by the government for the DBSA to execute such tasks without changing 
the DBSA‟s legal statutes perpetuates confusion about the DBSA‟s mandate. The 
Bank‟s directive is often interpreted quite broadly, as was discussed in chapter two. 
However, from the above discussion, it becomes very apparent the DBSA has quite 
often not acted in line with its infrastructure gap-filling mandate.  
5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter laid out the project finance cycle and the various steps the Bank 
undertakes during the project appraisal phase. What this study confirms is the DBSA 
was established fulfil the needs of the Apartheid government and its establishment 
does not follow the gap-filling assumption as proposed by classical economists. 
Instead, the Bank‟s decision to finance some projects over others has been 
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influenced by institutional pressures as well as the interpretation of what sort of gap 
the Bank is perceived to be mandated to fill.  
 
Despite initiatives such as Siyenza Manje, the Bank has had limited success in 
addressing existent bottlenecks in the institutional environment. This is primarily 
because the well-being of the public sector falls within the mandate of the state, not 
the DBSA.   
 
This chapter has also revealed the nature of projects financed is not so much one of 
a geographic or sectorial nature. Rather, it is of the kind of clients the Bank grants 
financing to as well as the extent the project falls within the infrastructure 
development realm.  
 
The analysis of these findings has reiterated the DBSA‟s misalignment to its gap-
filling role of financing infrastructure projects to the most deserving client – poor 
municipalities in the public-sector. Although the DBSA has the ability to finance 
projects outside the realm of the public sector – as long as they contribute towards 
development – the majority of finance should be directed towards the most deserving 
client within the public sector.  
 
In instances where the Bank has failed to prioritise development-centred projects 
commissioned by poorer municipalities, this chapter has argued, the DBSA has 
deviated from its gap-filling role. But why would the DBSA at times make the 
decision to embrace high-profit low development returns projects over those more 
closely aligned to its mandate? The following chapter analyses the complexities of 
the funding-model and its contribution towards the DBSA‟s deviation from its gap-
filling role.  
 
 
 
 
Exploring the Gap-Filling Development Finance Role of the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) 
 
111 
 
Chapter SIX: Funding-model influencing the DBSA‟s 
gap-filling    
6 Introduction 
The previous chapter has illustrated that the Bank fills gaps by providing 
development finance to the public sector. However, a large portion of its client base 
is non-municipal clients able to have secured finance from the private sector. In 
instances where the Bank provides finance to non-municipal clients such as State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Universities and Trusts, the study argues the DBSA fails 
to perform its gap-filling role involving development finance. 
The previous chapter also outlined the project cycle, phases and various kinds of 
projects financed by the DBSA prior and post 1994. This chapter builds on the 
findings by examining the Bank‟s ability to perform its gap-filling role of development 
finance by arguing that the DBSA is intrinsically linked to its funding-model.  
There was difficulty in establishing clear trends regarding the geographical 
prioritisation of DBSA project financing in the previous chapter. In the following 
chapter this study delves into the Bank‟s funding. This is much needed insight into 
understanding the rationale behind the types of projects financed.  
The Bank‟s funding-model of self-sustainability was broadly informed by global 
trends of liberalised economies, government policy decisions and legislation. The 
resultant impact of these factors has reflected in the organisational functionality of 
the Bank and its deviation from performing its gap-filling role. This chapter also 
answers the third research question:  
What factors contributed towards the DBSA‟s deviation from performing its gap-
filling role post 1994? 
6.1 Who Finances the Financier? 
Before a financial institution can extend a loan to a borrower, it needs to secure its 
own finance. The means by which an institution secures backing is referred to in this 
study as a funding structure. The funding structure pertains to understanding not so 
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much who, how and when the DBSA provides development finance, but where the 
DBSA gets the financial backing?  
Between 1983 and 1994, the DBSA‟s source of funding was through borrowing on 
local and foreign markets. This was combined with capital injections from the Fiscus 
of the South African government (DBSA Annual Reports 1984/85; 1985/86; 1987/88; 
1988/89; 1989/90; 1990/91; 1991/92; 1992/93). 
The very establishment of the DBSA was achieved from a conglomeration of funding 
sources. However, financing did not just come from the five original member 
countries – the RSA government and the TBVC territories. Cash resources also 
came from local and foreign markets (No. 4. Internal DBSA 2010).  The Articles of 
Agreement establishing the Bank, stated how in proportion to the size of their 
economies, the TBVC contribution to the share capital of the Bank was R2 billion 
(van der Kooy 1985: 68).  
Of the R2 billion, R200 million had to be deposited into the Bank‟s development fund 
(No. 4. Internal DBSA 2010). In the interval between 1983 and 2000, the DBSA Fund 
was not a fully-fledged organisation as discussed in detail in section 5.4. Instead, the 
development fund was merely a capital account within the broader financial matrix of 
the Bank.  
For the first five years of the Bank‟s existence (1984-1989), the RSA government 
pledged R150 million per annum to the development fund (DBSA Annual Report 
1984/85). Between 1990 and 1994, the government committed itself to an annual 
additional R170 million in the form of a five-year top-up funding cycle (No. 2 Internal 
DBSA 2012).  
Government funding was consistent and created a situation of “non-inflationary 
recycling [by transferring] resources from the [more] rapidly developing regions to the 
less rapidly developing regions in Southern Africa. This was accomplished via the 
transfer of funds on an annual basis from RSA government to the Bank‟s 
development fund” (van der Kooy 1985: 69).  
This funding was a form of “non-inflationary recycling of resources”. This was 
because funds injected into DBSA coffers would ultimately be used by the less 
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developed regions of the Southern African region, Thus, in this process, there was 
far less pressure upon the RSA Fiscus compared to directly transferring capital into 
the independent and self-governed Bantustan territories. 
A comparison of annual financial statements from 1984/85 to 1989/90 reflected the 
disbursements of R150 million from the SA government Fiscus into the development 
fund. Likewise, Annual reports from 1990/91 through 1994/95 revealed the five-year 
top-up cycle of funding reflecting inflows of R170 million. The 1994/1995 Annual 
financial statement was particularly interesting as it illustrated no change in the sum 
total of the development fund. The figure recorded in 1994 was R3 792 000 and in 
1995, that number remained the same.  
Through DBSA financial statements issued between 1984/85 to 1994/95, this study 
observed the Bank enjoyed extraordinary financial stability.  This was due to  
contributions made by the RSA government and net interest accrued.  At this time, 
the development fund had grown from R400 million to R3.792 billion (DBSA Annual 
reports 1984/85 and 1994/95).  
These financial statements also revealed beyond the R150 million pledge from the 
RSA government, during the “initial years”, the Foreign Affairs Department would 
also transfer funds into the development fund. This financial support was noted in the 
1984/85 Annual Report as “consideration of a commitment taken over” and 
R298 000 was deposited into the development fund.  
The financial support by the RSA government into the development fund is in line 
with the extensive literature (La Grange 1985; Picard 2005; van der Kooy 1985; van 
Rensburg n.d) reviewed which noted the heavy presence of the RSA government 
and the transfer of former Foreign Affairs department‟s development responsibilities 
in the Bantustans and independent territories to the DBSA.  
The Bank had sound liquidity levels during the period 1984-1994 due to the 
cushioning provided by the RSA government, i.e. from a financial stability point of 
view, the Bank had a safety net. Moreover, since the Bank did not have to rely on 
borrowing from the international capital markets, the Bank was protected from Forex 
losses. 
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Figure 6 is an illustration of the Bank‟s funding sources for the periods 1988-1989 
and 2006-2007. Fundamentally, the study was unable to aggregate funding sources 
over a five-year period because each financial statement displayed different trends 
of income.  
Figure 6: DBSA Sources of income for 1988-1989 and 2006-2007 
 
 
The first pie chart (DBSA sources of income 1989-1989) indicates “cash from grants 
accounted for 37.9% of overall income. Grants spoken of in this cash flow statement 
came from the National Treasury. The second highest source was “cash from 
financing activities”. This aggregate is derived from the difference between amounts 
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borrowed by the DBSA from financial intermediaries and amounts repaid. And, the 
third largest income source is “cash from development activities”. Again, this sum is 
derived from loan disbursements against loan repayments.  
For DFIs, this is the principal source of revenue. However, in the 2006-2007 Annual 
financial statements, the “cash from development activities” was in fact a negative 
figure and did not account for income contributions in the period. This observation is 
worrying as it illustrates the extent which the DBSA was disbursing loans. However, 
since they were not being repaid, the Bank was not making any profits from 
development loans.  
Another interesting observation is illustrated in the 2006-2007 pie chart – the majority 
of DBSA income was derived from “cash from operations”. Conversely, in 1988-1989 
“cash from operations” accounted for the least amount of income.  
Cash from operations is interest income from the Bank‟s overall operations. In a 
nutshell, it translates into the DBSA‟s total earnings before taxes. The second 
highest source of income for 2006-2007 was “cash from operating activities”. As 
described before, this is primarily interest from development loans, investments and 
dividends received (DBSA Annual Report, 2006/07).   
However, since the bulk of the Bank‟s income came from operations and operational 
activities, one must not be misled to assume the DBSA was financially fit. In section 
5.2, Bank income is analysed in proportion to its financial stability requirements.   
In essence, the difference between the two pie charts in figure 6 is this: in 1988-1989 
DBSA funding came from grant disbursements. Comparing this to the 2006-2007 
report, core funding came from operations and operating activities. Another key 
difference is that “cash from investment activities” is an aspect present as a funding 
source in 2006-2007 but absent in the 1988-1989 financial years.  
Income from investment activities includes financial market assets. Due to the socio-
political pressure of the time, the DBSA was excluded from participating in some 
international financial markets. As such, it was exempt to gain from certain financial 
market assets.  
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This observation echoed documented findings that the DBSA in 1984-89 did not 
possess foreign market assets. Likewise, access to foreign donor aid at the time was 
limited. From 1984/85 through 1993/94, DBSA financial reports showed no record of 
foreign donor contributions. In contrast, the 1994/1995 Annual report revealed the 
beginning of a trend – the introduction of donor contributions into the DBSA funding 
pool.  
The Deutsche Gesellschatt fur Technische Zusummenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH 
contributed R227 000, the first instalment of a total R800 000. This funding was 
intended to support a planning advisory services project. Nonetheless, little detail 
was noted about this advisory services project. However, this study observed an 
almost natural shift to replace government aid with foreign donor financing.  
Foreign donor aid itself comes with its own complications such as the interests of the 
donor taking precedence over that of the main shareholder. However, such debates 
are outside the focus of this study. The presence of donor aid is not a dominating 
feature of DBSA income. Rather, income is generated from interest and profits from 
development projects as discussed later in this chapter.    
The trend of moving to donor funding was not nearly as significant as the decision to 
make the Bank self-sustainable in the 1995/96 financial year. Within a broader 
environment of national and international pressures, the decision was made by the 
National Treasury for the DBSA to adopt a self-sustainable model.  
In the wake of widespread restructuring, privatisation and the closure of many 
development banks globally, the decision to reform the funding-model of the DBSA 
was in consideration to the evolving global finance climate. The decision to alter the 
Bank‟s funding-model contained serious implications relating to its gap-filling role. 
The following section argues how the DBSA‟s gap-filling role was particularly shaped 
by 1990s macro-economic policy choices advocating self-sustained development 
banks. 
6.2 Entering a new terrain: self-sustainability of the DBSA  
Post 1994/95 the main source of income for the Bank was net interest received from 
development loans disbursed, minus the liabilities of the Bank (Smallridge & De 
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Olloqui, 2011). From 1983/84 through 1994/95, the DBSA‟s net interest income 
reflected profits on funding derived from the RSA government. 
In the 1995/96 financial year, it was agreed the government would no longer finance 
the development fund. This was due to a change in the South African political 
landscape. Fortunately, this shift opened new funding opportunities for the DBSA in 
the international financial markets (DBSA Annual report 1994/95: 45).  
The first concessionary loans secured by the Bank were from France, China and 
Japan. Technical assistance grants for institutional building were obtained from 
Sweden, Ireland, Finland, the United Kingdom and Germany (DBSA Annual report 
1994/95: 45). The means to secure finance was couched on the condition the Bank 
maintained positive assessments from global rating agencies such as Standard and 
Poors and Fitch.  
Since the DBSA is a state-owned entity, its credit ratings are solely based on the 
potential support from the South African government. Through a R20 billion callable 
capital facility, the Bank is able to negotiate access to such funds in times of financial 
difficulty.  
In 2013, the Bank benefitted from a R7, 9 billion loan from the callable capital facility. 
Further details of this disbursement are discussed in section 6.3 of this chapter.  A 
model of self-sustainability means the Bank is responsible for its own financial 
stability and not at all dependent on support from government. A self-sustainability 
model means the Bank adopts traditional banking methods for profit generation –  
but must still advance a development-centred mandate.  
In 1998, KPMG conducted a study of the four major South African banks – Absa, 
Standard Bank, Nedbank, and First National Bank. It related to Bank margins and 
related profitability within South Africa. It noted since the beginning of the 19th 
century, 51% of the return for commercial banks is generated from traditional lending 
activities. The remainder is derived from value-added services and trading (No. 2 
Internal DBSA 2012).  
Although the DBSA does not fall within the category of a commercial bank, the value 
of Bank margins and profitability is best achieved by adopting a self-sustainability 
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model. But, even though it is not governed by the Banking Act, the DBSA is still 
susceptible to all the same pressures faced by other South African lending 
institutions.  
From the above it suffices to say the DBSA solely relying on its lending activities 
makes it more susceptible to risk. Furthermore, the development role the Bank is 
expected to fulfil, places it under even more pressure to perform.  
When comparing its size in relation to commercial banks also financing development 
projects, the pressure upon the DBSA is further heightened. Commercial banks use 
their asset base as an indication of their level of cushioning relative to that of other 
commercial banks. All commercial banks are also players in the development 
finance arena and among them, the DBSA is dwarfed.   
As of 2010, Standard Bank‟s asset base was approximately R1, 341 billion; Absa 
approximately R716 billion; and Nedbank R609 billion. The DBSA, on the other 
hand, had an asset base of approximately R47 billion (No. 2 Internal DBSA 2012). 
The Bank‟s vulnerable position further illustrates the level it is exposed to financial 
instability.  
The bulk of the DBSA‟s income is derived from net interest meaning interest 
movements directly impact the Bank‟s profitability. Net Interest Income, is a key 
indicator in observing the balance between its lending activities and its profitability. 
The equation below illustrates how the Net Interest Margin (NIM) is calculated and 
the value it adds to understanding the financial status of the DBSA.  
Equation 1: Net Interest Margin Calculation 
                   
(                                  )
                         
 
The NIM reflects a Bank‟s profitability. In order to calculate NIM, “interest income” 
from development loans are subtracted from “interest expenses” – interest paid by 
the Bank to lenders. The difference between “interest income” and “interest 
expenses” is then divided by the “average development loans” which then yields the 
NIM percentage (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga 1999; KPMG 1998). 
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Therefore, the NIM percentage is the difference between the return on assets and 
the interest paid on borrowings made by the DBSA (No. 2 Internal DBSA 2012). In 
order for a financial institution to maintain financial stability, the NIM curve should 
display a positive upward trend. Upward trending is indicative of a financial institution 
able to secure income from interest earnings from loans and assets while still 
covering operational costs. Figure 7 suggests the inverse for the DBSA.  
Figure 7: Net Interest margin 2004-2011 
 
Source: No.2 Internal DBSA 2012 ; DBSA Annual Reports 2004/05; 2005/06; 2006/07;2007/08; 
2008/09; 2009/10; 2010/11 
The figure above illustrates a downward NIM curve for the period 2004-2011. The 
issue is not so much to fixate on the percentage values, but rather the analysis of the 
curve – regressive or progressive.  
The NIM is valuable to understand the financial position of the DBSA. In theory, it is 
assumed the NIM should be wide enough to cover all operating costs. In the event 
interest is unable to cover operating costs, the Bank incurs losses and risks its 
financial stability (No. 2 DBSA internal 2012). The downward trend illustrated in 
Figure 7 is an indication of a year-on-year decline of the Bank‟s NIM resulting in 
greater inability to cover operating costs. 
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As a financial institution, the DBSA needs to be financially stable in order to extend 
loans to its clients. Financial stability boils down to having “the capacity to attract, on 
the basis of their own performance, the capital…required to pay…creditors, 
sustain… shareholders‟ interest, and support…its own growth” (Diamond 1996:12). 
Financial stability governs the financial welfare of an organisation. Insufficient 
financial stability results in pressure not only from operational levels but also 
diminishes an organisation‟s ability to perform its core functions (Diamond 1996:13). 
For the DBSA, the ability to perform its development finance role – to extend 
development finance – is hinged on its ability to be financially stable. As such, the 
Bank finds itself in a financial position where it is unable to cover its operating costs 
and failing to provide development finance. In instances where it does finance 
projects yielding high profit returns, the Bank can be accused of neglecting its 
development finance responsibilities.  
Moreover, if the Bank concentrates its development finance activities towards 
unsustainable social projects, it risks losing its financial stability and face pressure 
from the main shareholder. Post 1995/96, the Bank found itself in is such a dilemma. 
It is succinctly described by Thorne (2011:23) who makes reference to De la Torre‟s 
(2002) Sisyphean syndrome. This predicament is constantly faced by some 
development banks.  
The DBSA‟s vulnerable financial position is apparent in the discussion below. A self-
sustainability model illustrates the extent the DBSA‟s funding-model is a key factor 
leading to its deviation from performing a development finance gap-filling role. 
6.3 Implications of self-sustainability model?  
Based on the previous discussion, it is clear the DBSA‟s ability to perform its finance 
gap-filling role is innately linked to its funding-model. In all interviews conducted, 
without probing, interviewees raised concerns about the Bank‟s difficult position. All 
interviewed were of the opinion the funding-model was ineffective.  
The funding-model was described as one where the DBSA had to sustain itself 
financially. However, due to the nature of development finance – backing high risk 
clients – it was unlikely to receive high financial returns (Interviewee A2 June 2013; 
Interviewee B4 December 2012; Interviewee B3 December 2013; Interviewee A1 
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June 2013; Interviewee A3 December 2012; Interviewee B1 December 2013; 
Interviewee B2 December 2013; Interviewee C1 January 2014). The Bank is thus in 
a tenuous position where it expected to act as a financial intermediary within the 
constraints of executing a government development policy (Thorne 2011:7). 
In light of the argument on NIM as an indicator of the Banks vulnerable financial 
position, this study has delved into the DBSA‟s operating costs. Additionally, the 
extent such costs contributed towards the Bank‟s propensity to finance more 
profitable projects in order to cover its overhead has also been questioned.  
A detailed review of DBSA financial statements were, however, unable to justify the 
study „s initial assumption that high operating costs placed strain on the Bank. This 
was largely due to difficulty in benchmarking costs such as salaries, administration 
and other operational expenses. In addition, accessibility to such data was very 
difficult to obtain.  
However, by calculating the NIM and its relationship with the Bank‟s overall costs, 
this study established a relationship between the NIM percentage curve and the Net 
Margin percentage after DBSA costs. This was the foremost determinant affecting 
DBSA operating costs and its ability to function as a development bank.  
Net Margin percentage is the ratio of profits to revenue. In the case of the DBSA, 
signifies what percentage of each rand earned from development loan interest is 
indeed profit. Overall, figure 8 suggests the Bank is yielding lower profits relative to 
its operating costs.   
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Figure 8: Net Interest Margin and profits 2004-2011 
 
Source: No.2 Internal DBSA 2012 ; DBSA Annual Reports 2004/05; 2005/06; 2006/07;2007/08; 2008/09; 2009/10; 2010/11 
The net interest margin curve, represented in blue, reflects a downward curve in the 
Bank‟s inability to sustain itself financially. The “Net margin percentage after DBSA 
costs” curve, represented in red is an indication of Bank profits. From the above 
figure, it is clear the Bank is unable to sustain itself financially. This is based on the 
NIM curve. However, profits generated are below the acceptable NIM curve further 
emphasising the financial deterioration of the Bank.  
From the above graph, it is evident the Bank was only able to break even in 2007, 
when the curves intersected at 6.4%. In a financially stable Bank, the NIM curve 
would reflect a positive trend, while the net margin percentage curve would be above 
the NIM curve. The graph above illustrates from 2004 through 2011, the Bank‟s 
financial standing followed a declining trend. In short, the Bank essentially is unable 
to sustain itself.  
Most interviewees felt strongly the funding model was the most dominant factor 
contributing to the DBSA‟s inability to maintain a progressive NIM curve. They 
maintained this opinion despite the fact there were other factors such as market 
forces and the nature of the pricing-model contributing to the regression curve.  
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It was however clear the funding-model was a key factor contributing towards the 
Banks financial instability and ultimately, its deviation to perform a gap-filling role. 
Instead of focusing on financing development-centred projects, the Bank has been 
pressured to ensure such projects will not worsen its already fragile financial 
position. Another key factor leading to the Bank‟s vulnerable position was “Forex 
gains/losses” incurred by the Bank. Forex gains and losses are a key source of 
generating income for Banks. This is demonstrated in Table 2. 
Table 2: Total Operating Income 8-year review 
Operating Expenses per 
Annual Financial year (%) 
or basis points 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Other expenses 0.65 0.84 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.62 0.47 
Staff costs 1.62 1.57 1.82 1.72 1.61 1.44 1.50 1.50 
Depreciation 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 
         Subtotal operating 
expenses per AFS 2.33 2.46 2.65 2.49 2.39 2.27 2.17 2.00 
         
Other costs 0.07 1.97 0.06 -1.46 -0.76 -0.81 1.57 2.66 
Forex gains and losses, 
etc. 0.38 0.23 0.19 -1.71 -2.51 -2.44 -0.36 1.21 
DBSA grants and 
impairments loss -0.32 1.73 -0.13 0.25 1.62 1.09 0.90 0.78 
Grants to DF & Capacity 
deployment, etc. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.54 1.03 0.68 
         
Total cost before net profit 2.39 4.43 2.71 1.03 1.62 1.46 3.74 4.66 
         
Plus: Net profit for the year 6.99 4.24 5.43 6.35 5.44 4.84 1.62 0.20 
         Total operating income 9.39 8.67 8.14 7.39 7.06 6.31 5.36 4.86 
 
        Source: No.2 Internal DBSA 2012 ; DBSA Annual Reports 2004/05; 2005/06; 2006/07;2007/08; 
2008/09; 2009/10; 2010/11 
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In the 2007, the DBSA recorded Forex losses of -1.71 basis points4. While in 2008, it 
experienced all-time financial lows of -2.44 basis points. These shortfalls began in 
2009 and lasted well into 2011. Forex losses are incurred when an institution such 
as the DBSA services its debt to its international donors.  
To further explain, dealing with Forex is a double edged sword. In most international 
deals, the loan agreement is in US currency. Therefore, when an international 
borrower repays their debt, the DBSA incurs Forex losses when the rand value is 
low. Additionally, the DBSA must absorb Forex losses when it owes money to an 
international donor at a time when the rand value is lower than when the agreement 
was originally made. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the DBSA borrows money from the foreign financial 
market and the servicing of its debt is paid in foreign currency. Since the DBSA has 
operations in the African region, in instances of a weakened Rand against the 
borrowers‟ currency, the Bank incurs losses when interest is paid by those 
borrowers. Offshore equity investments are also a source of foreign exchange risk. 
This is particularly so when the Bank‟s equity portfolio is dominated by bonds in the 
international market (Fitch ratings report 2011).  
Multiple Forex losses incurred significantly impact the Bank‟s financial standing. 
Compounding losses hinder the Bank‟s ability to extend competitive development 
finance loans as per its development mandate.  
The Bank thus finds itself in a position where it must remain financially stable to 
cover its operating costs while remaining afloat from the knocks incurred by Forex 
losses. As illustrated in the last row of the table above, “Total operating income” took 
a downward trend initially beginning at 9.39 in 2004. By the end of the 8 year cycle in 
2011, it amounted to 4.86 – almost half of the initial basis point of 7 years earlier 
(DBSA Annual report 2004/05; 2010/11). Since this income loss was the greatest in 
DBSA history, the Bank entered a rigorous round of restructuring (Interviewee A1 
June 2013; Interviewee B1 December 2013).  
In 2013, the government announced it would grant the DBSA R7.9 billion in 
recapitalisation funding the Bank could borrow against (Interviewee B1 December 
                                                          
4
 A unit of measure used to measure percentage in rate or value of a financial instrument  
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2013; Business Report 16 April 2013). This amount provided much needed relief for 
the Bank. As stated before, the Bank is reliant upon credit assessment from rating 
agencies such as Fitch and Standard and Poors. The R7.9 billion from the South 
African government serves as a guarantee for creditors such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). With such a sturdy financial standing, the DBSA 
will have little trouble obtaining loans.  
This section has demonstrated financial pressures brought about by a demanding 
self-sustainability funding-model. This has been a contributing factor leading to the 
DBSA‟s deviation from its gap-filling role.  
With the backdrop of financial pressure to remain stable while still providing 
development finance, in 2001 the Bank established the Development Fund as a new 
game-player. This was an attempt to ease financial pressure while still retaining its 
ability for securing development grants.  
The following section explores the DBSA‟s attempts to mitigate its vulnerable 
position. The Bank has created a Development fund acting as both a channel to 
secure grants from international donors and the National Treasury as well as a 
technical assistance custodian for DBSA-supported development projects.   
6.4 Development Fund: a mechanism to attract grants? 
The Development Fund was formally established as a section 21 company on 21st 
December 2001. In terms of section 10 (1) (cN) of the Income Tax Act, and No. 58 of 
1962, the Development Fund is exempt from income tax returns. The organisation 
was primarily created to be a vehicle to channel aid from both foreign donors and the 
South African government5 as well as to buffer Forex losses.   
Between 1984/85 through 1994/95, the DBSA retained financial stability and was 
cushioned from market shocks and Forex losses. Such cushioning is important for 
this study as it illustrates the extent the Bank flourished during this period. The DBSA 
was able to fully carry out its mandate of development finance without the pressure 
of ensuring financial stability.  
                                                          
5
 Through government sponsored programmes such as Jobs Fund and Green Fund 
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Therefore, with support from the national government as well as the Foreign Affairs 
ministry, Bank activities could easily be channelled to development-centred projects 
and development policies advocated by the government at that time. The funding-
model of government fiscal transfers significantly impacted the DBSA‟s ability to 
perform its gap-filling role.  
Post 1995, the self-sustainability funding-model meant the Bank had to source 
finance in the form of grants and other capital reserves. At the time of establishment, 
the Development Fund was assumed to be a viable solution to the challenging 
funding-model.  
Once established, the DBSA was to continue fulfilling its development finance gap-
filling obligations as per its mandate, with a less significant cushion for its financial 
stability. Through National Treasury backing into the Development Fund, the DBSA 
was in a position very similar to where it had been prior to 1995, when funding was 
terminated.   
At this point, the Development Fund was introduced as a tool of the Bank. 
Operationally, the Bank could focus on more profit-generating projects to maintain its 
financial stability and channel some of its profits to the Development Fund. In turn, 
the Development Fund would carry-out development projects to meet the high 
development impact standards of the main shareholder.  
Core functions of the development fund were to provide grants as well as technical 
assistance to municipalities (Development Fund 2006/07). In the DBSA‟s initial 
years, technical assistance was originally performed by the Bank itself. This has 
already been discussed in detail in chapter four.  
In the 2010/11 Development Fund annual report, the Chairman noted how the “the 
DBSA Development Fund is the capacity building arm of the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA)”. What is meant by capacity building is the Development 
Fund is intended to facilitate and empower municipalities. It provides them with the 
relevant expertise to become more effective in meeting service delivery demands.  
 
The Development Fund‟s core facilitation role was to fill a gap where municipalities 
lacked the capacity to plan and implement projects (Interviewee A2 June 2013). Lack 
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of capacity is an aspect of the South African socio-political climate discussed in 
chapter four. By so doing, the Development Fund essentially took on the DBSA‟s 
development facilitation function. This expedited, created a training ground to ensure 
those seeking DBSA development finance could approach the Bank with “better 
prepared project applications” (Interviewee A2 June 2013).   
 
Interestingly, by delegating capacity building and other development oriented 
functions to the Development Fund, the Bank positioned itself to strategically focus 
on more “income generating projects”. The gap-filling role was delegated to the 
Development Fund which functioned very much like an extension of the Bank‟s 
development arm.  By so doing, the Bank was able to partially evade its development 
mandate, and still have its gap-filling responsibilities spearheaded by the 
Development Fund. 
 
In the DBSA Annual reports – 2001/02 to 2012/13) – reporting of both the 
Development Fund and the DBSA is presented in one annual report. But with that 
said, the annual report document is separated into two distinct sections. Still, these 
joint Annual reports rendered it difficult to make clear distinctions between activities 
exclusively performed by the Development Fund and those of the DBSA.  
 
To add to the ambiguity, all seven DBSA staff interviewed spoke of the Development 
Fund as if it were a unit within the DBSA and not an autonomous section 21 entity. 
The Development Fund is situated in the DBSA offices making use of Bank staff, 
facilities and services. For this, the Fund pays a management fee which “is charged 
at a market-related rate of 4% of disbursements” (DBSA Annual Report 2005/06). 
 
One vanguard project administered by the DBSA was the R9 billion Jobs Fund 
announced by the Minister of Finance in the 2011 National Budget speech. As well, 
Interviewee B2 December 2013 noted how the Development Fund was solely reliant 
on grants from National Treasury and the DBSA. It had zero profit generating 
capacity. This view is supported by Table 3 below. The Development Fund Annual 
Report 2010/11 notes its only sources of income were from National Treasury and 
DBSA grants.  
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Table 3: Development Fund annual financial statement excerpt 2010/11 
Financial results (R million) 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09 2007/08 
Income     
 Grants received from the DBSA 257,0 340,9 120,0 - 
 Grants recognised from the National 
Treasury 
288,4 319,6 219,3 85,0 
Expenditure     
   Siyenza Manje costs 412,1 456,6 313,3 121,3 
   Grants 69,8 120,1 101,0 59,8 
  Other Operating expenditure 90,4 86,9 19,5 9,6 
Funding reserve 20,9 10,2 10,1 104,2 
Approvals for the year 33,6 109,3 61,8 49,3 
Grant commitments at year-end 92,4 111,5 97,6 102,3 
Source: Development Fund Annual Report 2010/11 
In the 2009/2010 financial year, the development fund received R340, 9 million from 
the DBSA and R319, 6 million from the National Treasury. This financial year was 
during the global financial recession, although the true impact was felt particularly in 
2010/11. The table above illustrates how Development Fund income disbursements 
for the 2009/10 financial years had decreased. The DBSA reduced its support from 
R340.9 million to R257 million and the National Treasury from R319.6 million to 
R288.4 million. From the above it is abundantly clear Development Fund income was 
susceptible to the institutional environment and more specifically, market forces. This 
conclusion is also supported by the NIE theory (Furubotn and Ritcher 2008:16, 
Coase 1964). Moreover, the same Forex losses incurred by the DBSA were felt by 
the Development Fund, rendering the sustainability of the Fund obsolete.  
 
Following the DBSA restructuring of 2013, the Development Fund was dissolved 
(Interviewee B2 December 2013). The main reason given for the Fund‟s 
disbandment was the weight of its financial burden (Interviewee B2 2013; 
Interviewee B3 December 2013).  
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Why then, would the DBSA create an expensive to operate vehicle, precariously 
vulnerable to market forces only to dissolve it later? 
 
In an attempt to explain, the DBSA is a state-owned DFI embedded in a self-
sustainability model.  As it is a lending institution which secures backing from other 
financial intermediaries through loans, it does not qualify for grants. Intrinsically, the 
creation of the Development Fund enabled the DBSA to indirectly qualify for grants. 
This way, the Bank could focus on activities to secure financial stability and transfer 
profits to the Development Fund. By so doing, the Bank was in a position to generate 
income to sustain both itself and the Fund.  
 
The Fund would then be the vehicle to focus upon more development-centred 
projects and initiatives yielding the maximum amount of development impact yet 
minimal profit returns. By doing so, it was assumed the Bank could balance a dual 
set of demands. First it was expected to be a self-sustained Bank with financial 
stability to extend loans. Secondly, it was to be a responsible actor contributing to 
the economic development of the Southern African region.  
 
Following the 2013 restructuring, the Development Fund was dissolved. By doing 
this, the newly reorganised DBSA now had to take full responsibility for technical 
assistance as well as development finance.  
 
The Fund failed to achieve its objectives since it had become an expensive entity 
with limited development clout, primarily because its interventions had to be 
supported by government. In order to be effective, technical assistance at the 
municipal level requires government endorsement.  
 
The above statement was discussed in Chapter five, in the Siyenza Manje case 
study section. Since the Development Fund failed as a strategy tool, the next section 
explores the DBSA policy and the extent this strategy was a contributing factor to the 
DBSA‟s deviation from its development mandate.    
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6.5 Business strategy and legislative framework  
In order to achieve objectives noted in business plans, organisations adopt 
strategies to guide their alignment to their core business. Strategies are adopted by 
virtue of observation of the changing environment. Scott (1969:26) noted 
“corporations evaluate the changing environment they are embedded in and adjust 
their business strategy to fit into the environment; then choose the organisational 
structure best supported by the new business strategy.”  
Similarly, the DBSA has constantly adjusted its business strategy in order to not only 
fit into the changing institutional environment, but also to shape it. For instance, No. 
3 Internal DBSA (2009) speaks of how one of the key DBSA strategic goals was to 
“co-deliver social and economic infrastructure, with public sector focus and to build 
human and institutional capacity with a focus on key intermediaries such as 
municipalities.”   
In order to achieve its strategic goals, the DBSA adopts a business strategy. The 
Bank‟s Business Strategy is framed by development finance. A business strategy is 
more likely to be implementable, if factors such as the organisation‟s structure are 
able to generate a favourable environment to implement such strategy (Scott 1969).   
Organisations are sustained by the roles allocated to them (Reed & Hughes 1994: 
27). The roles allocated to the DBSA, inform the strategy used by the Bank to 
execute the development mandate. Roles extensively reported in DBSA annual 
reports post 1994, include Financier, Advisor, Partner, Integrator and Implementer 
(DBSA Annual Reports 1996/97; 1999/02; 2004/05; 2008/09).  
These roles have had a direct bearing on the organisational structure of the DBSA, 
but also on the kind of gap filled by it. The Bank‟s multiple roles illustrate the multiple 
“expectations” of the shareholder. Such multiple roles were problematic because 
they created confusion in the DBSA‟s primary mandate. This point was argued in 
chapter four. It is the Bank‟s function to provide infrastructure development financing 
to borrowers who would not receive financing from the private sector.   
Similarly, in a DBSA presentation, Jackson (2004), noted one of the challenges the 
DBSA faced was the “differences in strategic direction among staff, management, 
Board and shareholder – the SA government. Such differences often translated into 
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polarisation of not only the kind of gap the DBSA is intended to fill but also the 
strategy best suited to fill the gaps.   
The study found difficulty in acquiring a clearly defined DBSA strategic plan. Instead, 
the study found a propensity of reporting Bank activities. The lack of a defined 
strategy became clearer once the study understood the legislation establishing the 
DBSA. It provides for an overarching framework for the type of organisational 
structure the Bank is allowed to adopt.  
The Bank was reconstituted as a development finance institution, while also being 
governed by the DBSA Act (No. 13 of 1997). Moreover, it is also regulated by the 
Public Finance Management Act (No. 1 of 1999) and sections 284 to 303 of the 
Companies Act (No. 61 of 1973).  
Such a legislative framework places the DBSA in a difficult position. Provisos of a 
private company apply to it as well as principles of the Public Finance Management 
Act. To explain, the legislative framework has created a duality with the Bank being a 
public entity accountable to the government, but from an operational perspective, it is 
accountable to a Board, a typical feature of a private company.  
Therefore, the Bank is placed in a position where it must balance expectations of an 
independent Board as well as the government. From this perspective, the 
phenomenon of the Bank deviating from its development finance role can be more 
clearly understood.  
From a legislative perspective, the Bank is in a challenging position. However, the 
impact of the legislative framework upon the DBSA‟s deviation from performing its 
gap-filling role was not as significant as was the funding-model.  
This is largely because the funding-model set precedent for numerous interpretations 
of the relationships between the Bank and both government and Board members. 
Additionally, Bank employee perceptions regarding Board members as well as 
government are best understood from the perspective of the Bank‟s funding-model.   
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6.6 Exploring Relationships: the DBSA, Board and 
Government 
A common theme emerged from four of the seven interviews with DBSA officials 
(Interviewee A1 June 2013; Interviewee A2 June 2013; Interviewee B2 December 
2013; Interviewee B3 December 2013) This was nature of the relationship between 
the DBSA and the main shareholder, the South African government. Two excerpts 
from two interviewees are quoted below:  
“What we do is generate our own revenue so we have our own money, our own 
investments… We need to make money so that we don't depend on Government to 
do what we do. Otherwise we will be as good as a Government Department” 
(Interviewee B1 December 2013) 
 
“If you putting funding you can lever, if you not putting in funding, then you can‟t pull 
the shots” (Interviewee A3 December 2012).  
 
Both above statements, suggest a reluctance to be dependent on the South African 
government. There is a tacit assertion that being funded by the government has 
implications of administrative interference.  
 
From the perspective of the interviewed DBSA employees, it appears the DBSA‟s 
autonomy to perform functions is dependent upon the source of the income. 
Furthermore, in instances where the state is the donor, the DBSA‟s gap-filling role 
can be channelled according to the interests of the government.   
 
Ligeti (1985:306) makes mention of how in some countries, government interference 
often comes in the form of government influencing a DFI to forgo projects of national 
development interest. Instead, it favours projects that form part of a smokescreen for 
corrupt activity. Such unethical activity is likely to be found in state owned financial 
institutions characterised by “political interference, lack of transparency, low 
accountability to stakeholders, inadequate prudential regulation…” (Rudolph 2010: 
2).  
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Studies by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002: 268) further add day-to-
day involvement by the state in state-owned financial institutions results in lower 
economic growth and slower financial development. This is the inverse of the 
intended function of DFIs – to accelerate economic growth.  
 
State involvement in daily operations of a DFI increases the danger of hindering the 
allocation of development finance to deserving high risk borrowers who are unable to 
secure loans from the private sector. However, state involvement in a DFI is not 
completely destructive. The difference lies primarily in the extent which state 
involvement impedes the DFI‟s ability to perform its core functions.  
 
Notable examples of negative government involvement in emerging counties are 
highlighted by Dinc (2005: 454). He provides evidence suggesting there have been 
increasing world-wide trends where state financial institutions increase lending 
during an election year.  
 
However, Dinc‟s findings (2005:456) were not applicable to the DBSA, as one of the 
main assumptions taken in that study was in emerging markets; the book value of 
assets of the state-owned development Bank was twice as large as those of private 
banks. The inverse applies to the DBSA. Private bank assets are ten times larger 
than those of the DBSA (No. 2 Internal DBSA 2012). Therefore, the likelihood of the 
Bank dwarfing private banks and dominating the institutional arena is utterly 
improbable.  
However, the possibility of the DBSA financing development projects based on 
cronyism is a scenario more likely to occur. As discussed in chapter five, the 
financing of some B-BBEE projects are regarded as questionable. For instance, one 
particular unconfirmed allegation emerged from several interviews (Interviewee A2 
June 2013; Interviewee B4 December 2012; Interviewee B3 December 2013; 
Interviewee A1 June 2013; Interviewee A3 December 2012; Interviewee B1 
December 2013). 
 
From a document analysis perspective of annual reports from 1983 through 1995, 
symptoms of direct state interference were not apparent in the relationship between 
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the DBSA and national government.  Although a state-owned institution, government 
interference in the DBSA‟s day-to-day operations remained limited. This finding 
suggests the Bank had a fair degree of autonomy to make its own operational 
decisions. Consequently, the Bank was not readily susceptible to making 
development finance decisions due to government pressure. 
 
However, there is an indication of the state‟s direct involvement in the Bank‟s affairs. 
In (1994) the Minister of Finance appointed the DBSA Board of Directors – twelve 
from the private sector and two from the public sector (Musasike 2004: 6) as well as 
the CEO. All were political appointments by the ruling party. 
 
Interviewee A1 (June 2013) boldly stated how:  
“I ask myself the question who appointed him? That was a Government... a National 
Treasury and all the people involved in that appointment, even Cabinet. Cabinet 
doesn‟t play such a role that they look at the detail. They look at what is forwarded to 
them. I don‟t think they really understood the function of the Bank” (Interviewee A1 
June 2013). 
 
Other interviewees echoed similar sentiments. Over the years, the DBSA Board has 
been met with much controversy particularly since its unorthodox interpretation of the 
DBSA mandate. The Board has approved financing of some profit-driven projects 
disguised as development projects.  
One can assume prioritisation of high profit-generating projects came as a result of 
addressing financial stability issues. However, conflict of interest allegations 
emerged in four of the seven interviews. These particularly related to Board approval 
of B-BBEE projects where board members improperly benefited.  
Examples of conflict of interest were found in DBSA Annual Report (2007/08) where 
eight board members disclosed their “related party” to projects under review for 
approval. Four of the eight conflicts of interest are noted below: 
 A Board member was a Chief Executive of a Pan African Advisory, providing 
consultancy services to the Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund 
(PAIDF). The project had equity of US $ 100 million.  
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 The Gautrain infrastructure project was worth a R150 million in a senior DBSA 
loan and a R50 million DBSA standby loan. A Board member was the 
Chairperson of and shareholder in the J&J Group with interests in Murray & 
Roberts, also a member of the consortium.  
 Neotel Bridging and Nexus Empowerment Equity Finance project borrowed 
an equity loan of R151, 5 million from the DBSA. The conflict of interest was a 
close family relation of a Board member was involved in Nexus.  
 Debt funding of One & Only Cape Town Holdings where a member of the 
Executive Management was a BEE shareholder in the company.  
For all the above cases, the DBSA noted the following: 
“All transactions were approved at arm‟s length and the normal DBSA terms and 
conditions applied. All interests were declared at the meetings where the approvals 
were considered and the relevant Director did not form part of the decision-making 
process” (DBSA Annual Report 2007/08).  
Interestingly, this study could not establish whether or not the above occurred in 
reality. However, such close linkages of Board members with projects applying for 
DBSA loans were a cause for concern. And, several of the interviewees suspected 
favouritism for some projects over others irrespective of their development impact.  
Moreover, a DBSA Corporate Plan justified the concerns of the interviewees by 
noting:   
“The Banks mandate is informed by the policies and decisions of the Board of 
directors, which interprets the mandate and shapes the Bank‟s strategy” (DBSA 
Corporate Plan 2009: 6-7).  
The significance of the above statement is that the DBSA‟s mandate is “informed” by 
the “policies and decisions” made by the Board of directors is a cause for concern. 
The statement suggests that although constitutionally mandated to perform an 
infrastructure development function, in practice the interpretation of the Bank‟s 
mandate is implied. Hence, it is not entirely informed by the main shareholder, the 
South African government.  
Therefore, in this instance, the development finance mandate, although framed by 
the DBSA Act (Nr. 13 of 1997) was determined and shaped by the interpretation of 
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the Board. The organisational clout of the Board coupled with their particular 
interpretation of the mandate warranted observers to conclude director influence was 
a factor contributing to the Bank‟s divergence from its infrastructure development 
role.  
Direct political pressures from government officials also emerged in the interviews. 
However, the study was unable to verify the validity of such claims. As such, the 
study did not assume the Bank‟s divergence from its infrastructure development role 
was a result of constraints from government. The relationship between the DBSA 
and government is atypical. Being owned by the government, the DBSA‟s 
development finance role has always been framed by government policies.  
The extent and nature of this relationship was revealed in the manner which the 
DBSA reported annually. From 1995/96 onward, there was a gradual disregard of 
extensively explaining linkages between activities conducted by the Bank and their 
relevance to broader South African development policies and priorities.  
This finding was in contrast to the 1984-1990 reports where DBSA linkages with 
broader government policies were conveyed at length. The stark difference from a 
reporting perspective were the 1984/85 to 1988/89 DBSA annual reports appear to 
be government sponsored advocacy tools.  
The 1989/90 to 1996/97 annual reports resonated a change in organisational 
direction. A “wait and see” approach towards the South African institutional 
environment was adopted and it was also during this time the DBSA Act (No. 13 of 
1997) was codified.   
The nature of this Bank/government relationship was not antagonistic. There are 
many examples in DBSA publications (DBSA Development Paper 2005) where the 
Bank worked in close collaboration with the government. Similar sentiments were 
expressed by Interviewee A3 (December 2012) who noted the DBSA would look at 
the performance of numerous sectors in various provinces, Following evaluations, 
the Bank would approach the applicable ministry, communicate the identified 
development gaps and propose how it could fill those gaps.  
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By so doing, the DBSA was “acting like an agent on behalf of government” 
(Interviewee A3 December 2012). It appears from the viewpoint of this DBSA 
interviewee, being an agent of the main shareholder translated to working jointly with 
the government. This partnership was formulated to achieve joint development 
objectives within the SADC region and South Africa in particular. By performing such 
actions, the DBSA acted in line with its development mandate of collaboration and 
alignment of its activities to government economic development policies. 
 
In the study, it became clear the nature of the relationship between the Bank and the 
main shareholder post 1994 became more at “arm‟s length”. There were no findings 
of government directly interfering in activities of the Bank. Likewise, the study found 
no evidence of Bank interference in core functions of the Government unless 
otherwise commissioned to do so. An example of this would be the administration of 
the Jobs Fund.  
 
The study found no direct correlation between the kinds of development finance 
decisions made by the DBSA and government pressure. The importance of this 
discussion is to portray the DBSA‟s independence from its shareholder. Overall, the 
government‟s respect of the Bank‟s autonomy substantiates deductions made by this 
study. Government interference has not been a factor behind the DBSA‟s deviation 
from its gap-filling role. Rather, the funding-model has had an impact on the banks 
organisational functionality and the Board‟s role in interpreting the mandate within 
this environment. 
6.7 Impact of funding-model: restructuring and more 
restructuring      
By introducing a new funding-model, the DBSA underwent significant restructuring. 
Restructuring was not solely attributed to the funding-model, but rather to change in 
the political landscape. Following a 1988 visit to the IMF and World Bank, the 
DBSA‟s top management introduced an organisational development programme. 
This was in response to growth and complexity in the scope of the Banks operations 
(No. 4 Internal DBSA 2010). 
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The organisational development programme was met with much scepticism just as it 
had in the DBSA‟s early days. The Bank did not have documented systems and 
procedures in place and staff members were “learning by doing” (No. 4 Internal 
DBSA 2010). As such, the programme sought to introduce higher levels of 
delegation to the operations authority, revision of systems and procedures as well as 
“optimal development and utilisation of human resources” (No. 4 Internal DBSA 
2010).  
 
Scepticism of the programme translated into a form of resentment towards it. At the 
time, most staff felt such a programme would lead to the “bureaucratisation” of the 
Banks operating procedures. Moreover, another source of anxiety was “numerous 
confidential human resource initiatives and the Bank‟s participation in various task 
teams. Both led to rumours of corporate restructuring, demotions and outplacement 
of staff” (No. 4 Internal DBSA 2010).  
 
Ironically, this very same anxiety experienced in 1988/89, due to restructuring and 
implementation of a development programme, was repeated 23 years later in 
2012/13. Between 1983 and 1989, DBSA permanent staff had grown from 198 to 
678. This called for restructuring the organisation to support its expanded workforce.  
Following financial strain in December 2012, management adopted a new operating 
model reducing permanent staff from 750 to less than 450 (No. 4 Internal DBSA 
2010; Khuzwayo April 2013). 
 
Critics (Barron 2013: 1;  Khuzwayo: 2013) argue the DBSA‟s 2012/13 restructuring 
led to the departure of critical skill sets and much-needed development expertise, It 
is unfeasible to continue to adequately perform development responsibilities with 
limited human resources.  
 
The contribution of the discussion on organisational restructuring is valuable for this 
study as it illustrates the internal dynamics of the Bank. Internal discontent in an 
organisation has serious consequences upon its ability to perform core 
responsibilities.  
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As argued by Thorne (2001) the way in which development banks are run have 
significant impact upon their rate of success. In particular, issues such as “the 
accountability and capacity of management, the availability and retention of skilled 
staff, and sound operational, risk and financial management” are the difference 
between a successful development bank and one which fails.  
 
Interviews for this study were intentionally conducted in six month intervals – before, 
during and after the restructuring occurred. Of the two interviews conducted before 
the reorganisation (Interviewee A3 December 2012 and Interviewee B4 December 
2012), the interviewees expressed some discomfort with the Bank‟s proposed 
organisational structure. They felt it was aligned closer to organisational structures 
used by privately owned commercial banks and Bretton Woods institutions. They 
believed this new mode of operation would not be particularly suited for the Bank‟s 
development mandate.  
 
Similarly, such opinions were more emphatically expressed in interviews conducted 
during the restructuring (Interviewee A1 June 2013 and Interviewee A2 June 2013). 
Most employees were discontented with how the restructuring took place. As well, 
there were rumours of a “Bain report” conducted by an international consultancy “not 
even equipped to fractionally understand the kind of infrastructure development 
business the DBSA is involved in” (Interviewee A1 June 2013).   
 
Such perceptions, fears and opinions echoed those of the 1988/89 when DBSA 
employees were in a very similar position because of a lack of thorough 
communication, transparency and engagement in the restructuring process 
(Interviewee A1 June 2013; No.2 Internal DBSA 2012).   
 
With the initial 1988/1989 restructuring, the DBSA was – under the direction of 
management – responding to institutional pressure to build a more racially 
representative and expert-orientated staff. This came about because by 1989, “there 
was not a single black or female senior manager” (No.4 Internal DBSA 2010). The 
institutional environment at the time called for a more racially inclusive organisation, 
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in order to align itself to the main shareholder‟s introduction of racial inclusivity and 
redress policies.  
Conversely, the 2012/13 restructuring was a response to institutional factors such as 
Forex losses resulting from the global financial crisis.  
 
As a whole, this study found restructuring was often implemented without thorough 
consultation with staff. As a result, the majority of interviewees expressed much 
pessimism and distrust of the organisation and the changes being made. Adding to 
the complexity of the pessimism was highly qualified and experienced staff began to 
look at their options of moving to other organisations. Thus, the Bank risked further 
loss of skills.    
 
As well, the study found the DBSA attracted a high calibre of educated specialists. 
Of the seven interviews conducted, two had PhDs; one in social sciences and the 
other in commerce. The remainder of interviewees had no less than post-graduate 
qualifications with specialisations including environmental sciences, business 
administration, and project management. Unfortunately, if they are not properly led, 
educated specialists can contribute little to an organisation. 
 
 As stated by Pieterse and Van Donk (2008:65)  
“…International literature suggests that holistic development programmes require a 
high capacity for creativity and innovation… The technical, institutional, political and 
economic complexities of these programmes require managers who can work 
adaptively and not procedurally according to a rule book.” 
 
In light of the above, in two interviews (Interviewee A1 June 2013; Interviewee A3 
December 2012), references were made about the differences between senior 
management prior to 2006/07 and the incumbent senior management. Both 
interviewees noted the DBSA was gradually losing its “development edge”. Also, the 
Bank was increasingly becoming polarised into a “development camp” and a 
“banker‟s camp”. By 2006/07, the new CEO was categorised by both interviewees as 
more inclined to the “banker‟s camp” and introduced commercial bank practices, 
particularly those of Nedbank.  
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The new CEO was indeed from Nedbank and interestingly, a member of the first 
DBSA Board of Directors in 1983/84. This was GS Miller who was earlier Chief 
Executive of Nedbank (No. 4 DBSA Internal 2010). The DBSA‟s Nedbank connection 
has continued to the present time.  
 
From an organisational perspective, the study did find indications of the Bank‟s 
inclination towards operating as a commercial bank as opposed to a development 
finance institution. It was discovered the Bank tended to prioritise more profit-
generating projects rather than development projects. Also, the DBSA‟s corporate 
plans more aggressively targeted financially sound clients who could easily qualify 
for backing from commercial banks (No. 3 Internal DBSA 2009).  
 
Interviewees adamantly believed the DBSA had deviated from its traditional 
development finance decision-making role and this has been substantiated as 
factual. The restructuring of the Bank has been categorised as a strategy to “rectify” 
losses and misalignment to its development mandate. However, as long as the 
current funding-model remains in place, the likelihood of realignment to 
development-centred finance will be extremely limited.  
6.8 Conclusion  
In attempting to answer the third research question – what factors contributed to the 
Bank‟s deviation from performing its gap-filling role – this chapter has made some 
interesting findings. The DBSA can be best described as suffering from Sisyphean 
syndrome. This is characterised by being in the difficult position of balancing self-
sustainability with development finance. After 1995, the Bank no longer received 
generous cyclical capital disbursements from the government which had previously 
cushioned it from financial shocks of international financial markets.  
The funding model adopted by the DBSA has made it susceptible to Forex losses; 
an enormous source of vulnerability. Such weaknesses have translated into the 
Bank‟s inability to extend development loans to deserving clients. This is primarily 
because the Bank‟s financial stability has fluctuated over the years.  
However, the introduction of a Development Fund allowed the Bank to secure grants 
and spearhead development projects with high expansion impact. Nevertheless, jolts 
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felt in the market have resulted in the DBSA prioritising financial stability to 
safeguard its survival.    
Perceptions of the triad relationship of the DBSA, the Board of Directors and 
government revealed that within the funding-model, the Board was pressured to 
finance more profit-orientated projects. This was executed in order to maintain the 
Bank‟s financial stability. Although there was evidence suggesting the motive for 
financing such projects was also self-interest.  
 Observations of the interviewees regarding the Board were found to be significant 
as they revealed some board members, as decision-makers, had conflicts of interest. 
The relationship between the DBSA and government was also found to be 
constructive and unlike other DFIs, the Bank did not suffer from state interference.  
The decision for the Bank to be self-sustained has had consequences on its 
organisational strategy as well as internal organisational dynamics. Ultimately, 
restructuring has been the key feature of the post 1994 DBSA.  
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Chapter SEVEN: Concluding remarks 
7 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the challenge of the funding-model and the DBSA‟s 
ability to adequately perform its gap-filling role. Financial stability was noted as a 
major contributing factor to the DBSA‟s deviation from its mandated role. By 
presenting the DBSA‟s funding-model as well as its relationship with the Board of 
Directors and the main shareholder, the South African government, this study was 
able to illustrate several factors leading to the Bank‟s inability to perform its gap-
filling role. 
As explained throughout this study, the DBSA has been mandated to provide 
development finance to borrowers such as municipalities which otherwise would not 
receive finance in the competitive market economy. By providing development 
finance, the Bank is deemed to be filling a gap which neither the government, nor the 
private sector is able to fill. The following chapter ties the study together by linking 
the problem statement, purpose statement and research questions to the actual 
findings of the study. By so doing, general conclusions about the DBSA‟s gap-filling 
role are made.  
7.1 General Conclusions 
The study set out to understand the DBSA‟s gap-filling role based on its alignment to 
not only its infrastructure development mandate but also to determine if it was 
financing the most deserving clients. The Bank‟s mandate was understood as one 
set by policies and legislative framework set down by its main-shareholder, the 
South African government.  
 
The motivation behind exploring the Bank‟s alignment/misalignment to its mandate 
was largely to understand if it follows traditional theories on DFIs and notions of 
market-failure. To achieve this, the study made use of interviews and document 
analysis to gather data for rich description.  
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This study made the following general conclusions about the DBSA and its gap-filling 
role:   
1.  The DBSA was initially formed to direct development finance to the 
Bantustan territories for a broad scope of activities not limited only to 
infrastructure development. However, post 1994, as codified in the DBSA Act 
17 of 1997, the Bank‟s mandate became specialised for infrastructure 
development targeting the Southern African region.   
2. The mandate of the DBSA is interpreted as the Bank acting as a gap-filler for 
financing infrastructure projects.  
3. The nature of the funding model has had repercussions on the Bank‟s ability 
to remain a development-focused financier while remaining self-sustained. In 
an attempt to maintain such a delicate balance, the DBSA has found itself 
deviating from its gap-filling role. 
4. The changing institutional environment characterised by a strong competitive 
private sector and a challenging institutional environment has affected how 
the Bank performs its gap-filling role as well as its overall contribution to 
development. 
 
The above general conclusions are later discussed in greater detail to substantiate 
the study has answered the research questions and achieved its purpose.   
7.1.1 DBSA initially established for development of Bantustans 
The initial understanding was the Bank was established to address development 
gaps between the industrialised RSA government and the underdeveloped 
Bantustans. Post 1994, the Bank‟s mandate become more specialised focusing upon 
infrastructure. However, at that time, because it had the ability to finance projects in 
the entire public sector, it could target a broad client base. 
 
Key findings of this study are: the establishment of the DBSA was in line with 
classical economic thought on the need of DFIs to address market failure.  
Discussed in chapter two, the privately owned French development bank, Crédit 
Mobilier, was established in 1848 in response to industrialisation. Very similarly, the 
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DBSA was initially formed in response to pressure for development of Bantustans, 
discussed in chapter four.  
However, unlike most DFIs, formed for overall development of a region or nation, the 
establishment of the DBSA was specifically to pursue racial segregate polices in 
Bantustan territories predominantly occupied by black people.  
This study revealed how financial pressure on the RSA government Fiscus could be 
eased by creating a development bank. The DBSA emerged as a vehicle to channel 
state funds into Bantustans to ease that financial burden. Once formed, the DBSA 
became instrumental in ensuring the industrialisation of strategic nodes intended to 
form buffer-zones between the RSA and the self-governed and independent 
Bantustan territories. 
Being aligned to the prescriptions of separate development, the DBSA acted in line 
with its gap-filling role between 1983 and 1994. In doing this, the DBSA contributed 
to the underdevelopment associated with separate development. Therefore, the 
DBSA did the inverse of contributing to overall development as it is traditionally 
understood.  
7.1.2 Mandate of the DBSA is to fill an infrastructure 
development gap  
Once codified by the DBSA Act 17 of 1997, the Bank‟s scope of activities post 1994 
became limited to infrastructure development in the Southern African region. This 
study established the definition of infrastructure development, as understood in the 
traditional sense, to be development of roads, electrification, water and sanitation.  
This study concluded the extent the DBSA operates within its development finance 
role is not necessarily an issue of confusion over the definition of infrastructure in 
development finance. Rather, it is the understanding of the broader functions of 
development finance. According to its mandate, the DBSA should finance 
infrastructure projects led by deserving clients. Therefore, the Bank is most closely 
aligned to its gap-filler mandate when it provides development finance to clients 
unlikely to receive backing from the private sector. 
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The study has shown the Bank attempted to play a capacity building role through 
projects such as Siyenza Manje. However the Bank‟s statutory powers were 
restricted and consequently, implementation was also limited. Hence, the core 
business of the Bank should be development finance rather than capacity building 
initiatives. Later, capacity building fell within the jurisdiction of the state. 
Although orthodox economists would argue imperfect markets create gaps, the NIE 
as discussed in this study, has rather sought to understand the way actors such as 
the DBSA adapt within changing rules and norms. Market and state failure are 
common aspects of the institutional environment. However, this study found such 
conditions give rise to opportunities for DFIs to fill development gaps.  
By filling development finance gaps, this study has argued the DBSA is in line with 
its mandate. However, this mandate has been understood primarily based upon the 
Bank‟s role as a financier of infrastructure development.  
7.1.3 Funding model: Financial sustainability at expense of 
development? 
This study argues the DBSA‟s funding model contributed to its inability to fulfill its 
role as a gap-filler. Between 1983 and 1994, the Bank was the recipient of cyclical 
funding from the South African government. Government funding cushioned the 
DBSA from external market woes such as Forex losses.  
As well, the Bank was able to perform its development finance function without the 
pressure of self-sustainability. Moreover, having such a cushion coupled with having 
a broad scope of activities placed it in an ideal position to align to its development 
mandate with targeting the Bantustans.   
Post 1994, capital disbursements from government were discontinued. The Bank 
was suddenly faced with a specialised scope of activities – infrastructure 
development – requiring a specific skill-set and organisational structure.  
With the restructuring and loss of specialised skills, the DBSA‟s ability to perform its 
core functions was severely impacted. Internal dynamics within the Bank‟s decision-
making structures such as the DBSA‟s relationship with the Board was strained. 
Despite evidence suggesting some Board decisions were motivated by self-interest, 
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the predominant rationale behind the Bank‟s decision to finance more profit-driven 
projects was largely due to maintaining self-sustainability inherent to the funding 
model.  
From a financial stability perspective, the DBSA was in a precarious position. The 
NIM coupled with Forex losses incurred by attempts to obtain foreign funding created 
a situation where the Bank‟s survival was dependent on financing borrowers able to 
service their loans. Therefore, since municipal clients are often unable to repay their 
debts, the Bank opted to finance non-municipal borrowers in order to survive. This 
dilemma was caused by the nature of the Bank‟s funding model.  
The study also discussed the introduction of a Development Fund to secure grants 
and spearhead the Bank‟s projects with high development impact. Shocks felt in the 
market resulted in the Bank prioritising financial stability in order to survive. 
After 1995, the DBSA had to find its own sources of funding in the foreign capital 
markets. However, the open market came with disadvantages such as Forex losses. 
Losses in the capital markets increased the Bank‟s vulnerability.  
In the event the Rand weakened, the Bank would be expected to pay more when 
servicing its debt to creditors such as the Bretton Woods institutions. Once the 
funding model was altered, the DBSA found itself in the difficult position of balancing 
self-sustainability and extension of development finance – the latter being its core 
mandate. 
7.1.4 Development contribution made by the DBSA   
This study found the institutional environment where the DBSA operates not only 
contributes to the kind of gap it fills but also grants the Bank an opportunity to 
contribute to shifting the institutional arena. For instance, on occasions where the 
Bank financed high-risk borrowers such as poor municipalities, it was at times able to 
gradually “crowd in” the private sector.  
Crowding in of the private sector is not always guaranteed. However, interest of the 
private sector in areas traditionally dominated by the DBSA suggested a success for 
the DBSA in its gap-filling function. Such occasions, were noted as successful 
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alignment not only to the development finance mandate but also to NIE assumptions 
that actors also shape institutions in which they are embedded. 
The study found the institutional environment was not a hindrance to the Bank‟s 
ability to play its development finance role. Rather, the institutional environment 
characterised by municipalities with uneven development levels were deemed 
opportunities.  
Strengthened commercial financial institutions moved into the arena traditionally 
monopolised by the DBSA. In doing so, they created shifts in the kinds of gaps the 
DBSA would fill. This narrowing gap between commercial banks and the government 
suggested the disposition of the gap filled by the DBSA was gradually becoming 
narrower. 
7.2 Answers to research questions 
 
1. How has the DBSA interpreted and acted in relation to its mandate prior 
and post 1994 as set out in policy documents, strategies and the DBSA 
Act?   
 
The DBSA‟s official role from 1984 to 1994 was to provide development finance for 
the Bantustan territories.  
 
The study has argued for the 1983-1994 period, the DBSA was found to be more 
closely aligned to policy documents and strategies. This was because, based on its 
mandate at the time, the Bank was intended to fund a broad scope of activities so 
long as they fell within Bantustan territory.  
Prior to 1994 the Bank‟s broad mandate meant it could finance any activities in the 
Bantustans ranging from urban and rural expansion to small business development. 
The Bank‟s mandate during the 1984-1994 interval was very clear; the scope of its 
activities quite broad and not solely limited to infrastructure development.  
Between 1994 and 1996, the government narrowed development activities and 
distributed them among five national development institutions, thereby trimming the 
broad scope of activities the DBSA once had. The Bank‟s scope of activities became 
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codified in the DBSA Act No. 13 of 1997. It cogently outlined a mandate of 
infrastructure development.  
The narrowing of the mandate by the main shareholder meant infrastructure projects 
were to be prioritised and, as per the development policies and strategies set by the 
government, the DBSA‟s main client was to be the public sector.  
Interpretation of the new DBSA infrastructure development mandate was to be taken 
in the traditional sense –water, roads, sanitation and electricity. However, linkages 
between Bank activities and policies set out by the government were difficult to 
establish. Rather the majority of projects financed by the DBSA post 1994 were not 
in line with the Bank‟s gap-filling mandate.   
2. What was the nature (client, value and sector) of projects financed by 
the DBSA prior to 1994 and post 1994, and was it in line with the 
traditional understanding of gap-filling by DFIs?  
 
The types of projects financed by the DBSA prior to 1994 were those in the 
Bantustan governments and independent territories such as Ciskei, Transkei, Venda 
as well as neighboring countries such as Namibia and Lesotho. Clients included 
Local Development Corporations such as the Kwa-Ndebele Development 
Corporation and local businesses (Triple Trust Organisation) and strategic 
government agencies or councils (South African National Tourism Board). Values of 
projects varied based on the kind of developments they were.  
 
However, cyclical financial contributions made to the Bank by the government as 
well as its monopoly over the Bantustan governments and independent territories 
cushioned the Bank and enabled it to finance risky high-value projects. Likewise, its 
broad scope of activity varied from infrastructure projects to business development 
and agriculture development.  
 
The Bank therefore operated in line with the traditional definition of gap-filing largely 
because its activities addressed development gaps between the developed RSA 
government and the underdeveloped Bantustan governments and independent 
territories.  
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Post 1994, the DBSA did not function in line with the traditional DFI understanding of 
gap-filling. This was because the Bank‟s client base was primarily made up of 
borrowers having low risk profiles and likely to receive finance from commercial 
finance institutions. Examples cited in the study included Metropolitan municipalities 
in Gauteng, Eskom and B-BBEE companies. Poorer municipalities, the ones most in 
need of development finance received the least DBSA development financing.  
 
Several projects financed did not advance infrastructure development. For instance, 
as mentioned in the introductory chapter, the Cape Coral International Hotel received 
development financing in 2007.  
 
With regard to the value of projects financed, this study also found the DBSA 
favoured borrowers and projects having high income generation capacity but low 
profit returns. Contrary to what actually occurred, the Bank is expected to favour 
development impact over profit gains.  
 
Moreover, extending finance to Eskom even when the Bank was not in a financial 
position to do so further substantiated this stated claim. Therefore, the 
aforementioned is a glaring example of the DBSA doing the opposite of its gap-filling 
development mandate.  
 
3. What factors contributed to the DBSA’s deviation from performing its 
gap-filling role post 1994? 
 
Factors contributing to the DBSA‟s deviation from performing its gap-filling role were 
noted as the following:  
 Confusion over the DBSA‟s mandate was clear in both strategy documents 
and conducted interviews as both suggested the Bank‟s misalignment with its 
gap-filling role; 
 A change in the DBSA funding model applied pressure on the Bank to 
maintain financial stability at the expense of development impact; 
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 Emergence of a strong, aggressive and competitive private sector meant the 
Bank lost its traditionally held monopoly in development finance; 
 Municipalities unable to adequately manage financed projects and translate 
them into actual development placed pressure on the Bank to introduce 
capacity building as well as development finance. However this was met with 
limited success since the Bank did not have enough clout to implement 
certain initiatives e.g. Siyenza Manje. 
 Organisational dynamics such as a Board of Directors having conflicting 
interests and restructuring without adequate consultation are also end-factors 
contributing to the Bank‟s deviation from its gap-filling role. 
 
The list above is not ranked based upon the strongest contributing influence. Rather 
these factors are interrelated and indicative of the situation the DBSA finds itself post 
1994. In performing its gap-filling role, the Bank has been faced with many hurdles.   
 
Ultimately in its decision-making, these factors have contributed to the Bank 
extending finance to some projects over others. This was done irrespective of level 
of development impact, alignment to government policy or gap filling – the reason 
why DFIs exist.  
7.3 The Way Forward 
However, the concern of this research was not to provide recommendations on how 
the DBSA can best act within its development mandate. The intention of this study is 
to understand and shed light on the nature of the gap-filling role performed by the 
DBSA.  
 
An important realisation was made by this study – the Bank‟s funding model places 
considerable pressure on the Bank‟s sustainability. Stress on the Banks financial 
sustainability in turn, results in it providing development finance to borrowers who 
could have otherwise received development finance from the private sector. This 
negates its gap-filling role as the DBSA is mandated to operate in the space where 
neither the government nor the private sector is willing to venture.    
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This researcher understood fundamental challenges contributing to the DBSA‟s 
inability to perform its gap-filling role were due its funding structure. The Bank would 
be placed in a position where its sustainment would take precedence over 
development impact. For example, projects with the highest profit returns yet the 
least development impact would be favoured over those contributing to the least 
financial return, but much higher development impact.  
 
In order for the Bank to be more aligned to its gap-filling mandate, this study 
recommends more focus should be placed on addressing the funding model. Other 
factors such as a competitive private sector and confusion over its mandate 
contributed to the sort of gap selected to be filled by the DBSA.  
 
Also, the study found the institutional environment will always change. Therefore, in 
order to survive, DFIs must adapt their strategies in order to remain relevant. Despite 
DFIs self-sustainability being hinged upon their ability to secure funding sources 
more diversified and less dependent on the market. An example of this is state 
funding which is best suited for financing such as the DBSA.  
 
However, the South African government is unlikely to be in a financial position to 
make such a commitment owing to an already stretched National Budget and bail-
out seeking SOE. 
 
Hypothetically speaking, if the DBSA were to receive such cyclical state funding, it 
would be cushioned from market pressures and better able to provide development 
loans to high risk clients. A change in the funding model is by no means a guarantee 
the Bank would operate within its gap-filling mandate. As this study has already 
shown, other contributing factors have characterised the decision-making of the 
Bank.  
 
The extent of accountability of the Board of Directors for decisions affecting the 
DBSA‟s gap-filling ability is an important issue needing to be acknowledged. 
Moreover, factors such as a competitive market system have given rise to questions 
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of the relevance of the Bank in the contemporary South Africa. Commercial Banks 
have advanced on gaps traditionally filled by DFIs.  
 
Debates about the future of development banks have also emerged in the milieu of a 
more competitive market system willing to  take on more risky clients. Thus 
commercial banks are closing in on gaps traditionally occupied by DFIs. The future 
of development banks will, for quite some time, continue to be a topical issue in 
development, economics and NIE debates.  
 
Whether or not the DFIs will be engulfed by the evolving competitive market, remains 
to be a question scholars are unable to agree upon.  
 
What this study does however illustrate is traditional theories of market failure. 
However, gap-filling entities such as DFIs offer little information to understand the 
complexities of roles they are intended to perform and those they perform in reality.  
 
The DBSA has illustrated how it does not perform a traditional role of gap-filling. 
Instead, it is fixated on self-sustainability rather than development. Self-sustainability 
has become an aspect of the Bank which initially had not existed. Such a change 
has revealed the extent policy decisions by the main-shareholder can impact an 
organisation‟s ability to fully function within its mandate. 
 
Overall, this study has illustrated several limitations of how DFIs have been 
traditionally conceptualised. As well, it creates opportunities for further research on 
DFIs. 
7.4 Areas of future research  
By exploring the development finance role of the DBSA, this study has opened areas 
for future research in the South African DFI space.  
 
There is a need to explore case-studies delving into the role of DFIs in South Africa. 
Particularly, this is because a large majority of studies focus on the role of global and 
regional DFIs. Literature recounting the contributions of South African DFIs on 
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economic growth and development are scant. Moreover, even fewer scholars have 
studied the linkages between increased levels of development and the amount that 
can be attributed to DFIs.  
 
Further research on the synergy of South African DFIs could also be an interesting 
approach to offer much needed insights into the success and failures of the DFI 
model in South Africa. Particularly, cross-sectional comparisons of South African 
DFIs would expose performance and alignment to broader government development 
policies and strategies.  
 
Benchmarking the performance of South African DFIs with other successful national 
and global DFIs could also be an interesting avenue for future research.  
Additionally, when benchmarking, exploration could go beyond alignment to mandate 
and take into consideration the funding model as well as the nature of gaps being 
filled.  
  
The comparative study approach could also be applied to the various funding models 
of DFIs across the world. Such research could contribute to understanding the future 
role of DFIs and whether their roles are being superseded by a more vigorous and 
competitive private sector.  
7.5 Summary  
At the outset of this study, there was an impression that the DBSA was not 
functioning within its development finance role. Therefore, this exploration has 
sought to examine the Bank‟s changing development finance role and to determine 
whether or not it has deviated from its gap-filling function.  
 
This study is centred on development financing in the challenging municipal 
environment. It also speaks to the broader issue of the nature of the South African 
sector which is intertwined with inefficiencies and the lack of capacity to implement 
and manage development projects. 
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The South African socio-political climate is one characterised by a mismatch of the 
institutions of the state and the functions they are mandated to perform and the 
execution of such functions. This study has suggested the DBSA is no exception. As 
analysed in this study, the Bank‟s alignment to government policies and 
development strategies as translated in the nature of projects it finances, suggests 
minuscule execution of effectual development financing.   
 
Instead, the Bank has been placed in a position where by financing the Public sector 
– its main client – it is in line with its development mandate. However its main client 
is unlikely to repay its development finance loan. This is mostly because of the 
client‟s inability to take charge of the capital and translate it to a viable development 
project able to generate income.  
 
In response to such a dilemma, the Bank chooses to ensure its survival by financing 
non-municipal clients. Thus, it risks being accused of deviating from its development 
mandate. Although not clear from the onset, the balance between self-sustainability 
and development-centred finance is the contradictory nature of the DBSA‟s role as a 
financier.  
 
To conclude, in the final analysis, the DBSA is generally failing to perform its 
mandated gap-filling role. To maintain its own survival, it does not necessarily extend 
development financing to deserving high-risk infrastructure development borrowers. 
This in itself is the core failure to align to its gap-filling mandate. 
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Appendix A: Process to conduct interviews 
 
 
The process will begin with a brief introduction, background and overview of what the 
research is about. Interviews will be in-depth and conducted in an unstructured manor to 
allow more discussion and probing. 
The questions for the interviews will be divided into 3 sections: 
Section A: Demographic Information 
Section B: Participants‟ perceptions of the DBSA‟s gap-filling role in the SA context    
Section C: Project finance and development  
 
 
Sample of Framework Tool used to Conduct Interviews:  
ITEM QUESTIONS 
A.  Demographic Information 
1.  Name and surname 
2.  Designation 
3.  Number of years working in/with Organisation 
B.  Participant’s Perception of DBSA’s gap-filling role in the SA context 
4.  What is your understanding of the role of DFIs, particularly that of the DBSA?  
5.  What role does your designation play in the implementation of the DBSA‟s mandate of financing 
development? How do you implement and/or report these mechanisms? 
C.  Project Specific 
6.  How projects are initiated, what is your involvement and what assessments have been conducted before 
development finance is granted – feasibility and impact assessments? 
7.  What in your opinion are development projects closely aligned to the DBSA‟s role as a gap-filler?  
8.  Do you think the DBSA‟s decision to finance Siyenza-Manje and Eskom supported or contradicted the 
DBSA‟s gap-filling development mandate? 
9.  Are there any other issues relevant to the types of projects being financed?  
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